I am an independent scholar specialising in the history of war. I have nearly 20 years of experience within the education, museum and heritage sectors in Australia and the United Kingdom. I am currently the Senior Historian at Brisbane City Council in Australia. I am also the editor-in-chief and owner of 'From Balloons to Drones.' My research interests focus on the history of air power and air warfare, military leadership and command, military culture, and the history and development of professional military education. I also maintain an interest in transport history. To date, I have published numerous articles, chapters and encyclopedia entries, edited two books, and delivered papers on three continents to various civilian and military audiences.
Editorial note: This post originally appeared on the author’s website and is cross-posted here with permission.
In 1922, an interesting episode in the history of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) began. In October 1922, the Secretary to the Department of Defence, Thomas Trumble, wrote to the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, noting that as the RAAF constituted an independent service, Air Board and Air Force members should be afforded representation at official functions.[1] Its precedence was to come after the Australian Army. The Prime Minister’s Department’s reply was straightforward, noting that:
[a]rrangements will be made for the inclusion of representatives of the Air Force in connection with any general function to be held by the Commonwealth Government.[2]
Such a straightforward administrative request should have ended, but it did not. In 1924, the Governor-General sent a memorandum to the Prime Minister, Stanley Bruce, that ‘no precedence was accorded’ to the First Air Member at the inaugural dinner of the Lord Mayor of Melbourne that he recently attended.[3] It was suggested that to solve this issue, changes should be made to the Commonwealth Table of Precedence, namely paragraph 10.
While the changes suggested were eventually made, this episode highlights several issues related to the status of the RAAF and its emerging place in Australia’s defence establishment. First, the RAAF appeared to have a clear ally in the form of the Governor-General, Lord Forster. While Forster had not served in the military, he saw air power as important to Australia’s defence. In his memorandum to the Prime Minister, he wrote:
In view of the great and growing importance of the Air Service […] it would be desirable that the head of the Air Force should in future receive definite recognition on such occasions.[4]
Given the status of the Air Board in Australian defence planning, this is an interesting comment.[5]
Second, the issue that happened and had to be raised by Lord Forster illustrates the place of the RAAF in Australian thinking more broadly. Despite this issue being raised more than two years previously, nothing appears to have been enacted. Thus, it can be suggested that despite gaining its independence in 1921, Australian thinking had yet to adjust to the idea of an independent air force.[6] Thus, while orders of precedence may seem a curious relic to the modern audience, such things matter to the military cultures, especially to new organisations such as air forces. They are a status issue and illustrate to the broader public where an organisation might fit within the government’s thinking. By not giving the proper order of precedence to the RAAF, it could be argued that a clear message was being presented to the Australian body politic – independent air power did not matter. But was that so?
Dr Ross Mahoney is the Editor-in-Chief of From Balloons to Drones and an independent scholar specialising in the history of war with particular reference to the use of air power and the history of air warfare. He is currently the Senior Historian within the Heritage Policy team at Brisbane City Council in Australia. He has nearly 20 years of experience in the education, museum and heritage sectors in Australia and the United Kingdom. Between 2013 and 2017, he was the inaugural Historian at the Royal Air Force Museum in the UK. In Australia, he has worked as a Historian for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs and taught at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University based at the Australian War College. His research interests are focused on the history of war, specifically on the history of air power and air warfare, military leadership and command, military culture, and the history and development of professional military education. He also maintains an interest in transport history. He has published numerous articles, chapters and encyclopedia entries, edited two books, and delivered papers on three continents.
Header image: Port view of a RAAF De Havilland DH-9. This aeroplane was one of 128 gift aeroplanes presented by the British government to the newly formed RAAF, including thirty DH.9a (Source: Australian War Memorial)
[1] National Archives of Australia (NAA), A705, 4/1/35, Secretary, Department of Defence to the Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 14 October 1922.
[2] NAA, A705, 4/1/35, Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department to the Secretary, Department of Defence, 17 October 1922.
[3] NAA, A705, 4/1/35, Memorandum by the Governor-General to the Prime Minister, 11 November 1924.
[4] NAA, A705, 4/1/35, Memorandum by the Governor-General to the Prime Minister, 11 November 1924.
[5] John MacCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, 1918-39: A Study in Air and Sea Power (St Lucia, QLD: University of Queensland Press, 1976), p. 27.
[6] MacCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, pp. 34-43.
Editorial note: This post was originally posted on my website and has been cross-posted here to generate further discussion. Minor editorial changes have been made to the post.
Ok, this post stems from a question I asked on BlueSky: ‘Who is the most significant air power historian of our generation? Discuss #airpowerhistory.’ The question stemmed from the call for contributors I posted last week and is related to my ongoing research into writing about air power. For the purpose here, ‘generation’ is to be considered to have been in the past 20-30 years. As such, the books listed here have been published since 1990.
In response, one poster asked me to list the top ten books I consider the most significant. I did a similar exercise for From Balloons to Drones back in 2017. The difference between the two lists is that the list produced in 2017 reflected those books that influenced and shaped my writing as an air power historian. In contrast, this list is more focused on those that I consider significant for their impact, though the list is still biased as I selected books from my library, and as such, they reflect my own research interests to some extent. I have also excluded edited books except for John Andreas Olsen and Philip Meilinger’s work for reasons I hope will be apparent. Other works, such as Tami Davis Biddle’s Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare (2002), would have made an expanded list. For an Air Power Reading list, visit the one from From Balloons to Drones.
Here is the list…
Tony Mason, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal (London: Brassey’s, 1994). As I wrote here, Mason was one of the doyens of air power studies and undoubtedly crucial in developing the field in the UK. This work represented the culmination of his thinking, even though he would continue to write after its publication. He used history as a tool to explore the development of air power, and it is a significant volume and still requires reading to this day.
Philip Meilinger (ed.), The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997). One of the two edited works in this list. Written as a primer by the United States Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies faculty, this charts the evolution of air power theory and doctrine and is a necessary starting point for anyone researching the subject.
John Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War (London: UCL Press, 1999). Despite its age, this remains an excellent examination of the rise of air power in the first half of the 20th Century, and it is vital reading for anyone wanting an introduction to the subject.
Richard Hallion, Taking Flight: Inventing the Aerial Age from Antiquity through the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). I could have selected any of Hallion’s work, for he is probably the United States’ preeminent air power historian. However, this book offers an excellent history of air power before the First World War.
John Andreas Olsen (ed.), A History of Air Warfare (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2010). This edited book is listed for two reasons. One, Olsen is adept at bringing together leading air power scholars and any of his edited or single-authored books should be on your bookshelf. Second, the book is an excellent introduction to the use of air power in the major conflicts of the 20th and early 21st Centuries, written by leading experts such as Tony Mason, Richard Hallion, Richard Overy, John Morrow Jr, Alan Stephens, Benjamin Lambeth and Williamson Murray.
Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe, 1939-1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2013). The result of Overy’s voluminous research, this volume is required reading for anyone looking to understand the strategic bombing campaigns of the Second World War.
Thomas Hippler, Bombing the People: Giulio Douhet and the Foundations of Air-Power Strategy, 1884-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). If one name is associated with the early development of air power thinking, it is the Italian Giulio Douhet. In this volume, Hippler does a thorough job of examining the evolution of Dohet’s strategic thought. It is necessary reading for anyone looking at the evolution of air power theory.
Peter Dye, The Bridge to Airpower: Logistics Support for the Royal Flying Corps on the Western Front, 1914-18 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015). This excellent work shows that air power history is not just about aeroplanes. Dye does a superb job of showing how logistics shaped the character of the air war over the Western Front and how the RFC/RAF’s system helped it prevail in 1918.
Phillips Payson O’Brien, How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). While not solely focused on air power, O’Brien’s work is essential in examining the role played by air power in conjunction with sea power in the Allied victory of the Second World War. The work challenges many preconceptions and should be required reading for anyone interested in the Second World War.
Peter Gray, Air Warfare: History, Theory and Practice (London: Bloomsbury, 2016). This book was the outgrowth of the old MA in Air Power run by Gray at the University of Birmingham. Gray gives an excellent overview of critical issues related to air power and is a necessary reading for those just getting into the subject.
What would you include? What would you remove?
Dr Ross Mahoney is an independent scholar specialising in the history of war with particular reference to the use of air power and the history of air warfare. He is currently the Senior Historian within the Heritage Policy team at Brisbane City Council in Australia. He has nearly 20 years of experience in the education, museum and heritage sectors in Australia and the United Kingdom. Between 2013 and 2017, he was the inaugural Historian at the Royal Air Force Museum in the UK. In Australia, he has worked as a Historian for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs and taught at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University based at the Australian War College. His research interests are focused on the history of war, specifically on the history of air power and air warfare, military leadership and command, military culture, and the history and development of professional military education. He also maintains an interest in transport history. He has published numerous articles, chapters and encyclopedia entries, edited two books, and delivered papers on three continents. His website is here, and he can be found on Twitter at @airpowerhistory.
Header image: Vertical aerial photograph taken during a daylight attack on German warships docked at Brest, France. Two Handley Page Halifaxes of No. 35 Squadron RAF fly towards the dry docks in which the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are berthed (right), and over which a smoke screen is rapidly spreading. (Source: Imperial War Museum)
Editorial Note: Led by Editor Dr Mike Hankins, From Balloons to Drones, produces a monthly podcast that provides an outlet for the presentation and evaluation of air power scholarship, the exploration of historical topics and ideas, and provides a way to reach out to both new scholars and the general public. You can find our Soundcloud channel here. You can also find our podcast on Apple Podcasts and Google Podcasts.
In our 50th episode, Dr Mike Hankins and Dr Brian Laslie review the first 50 episodes of the From Balloons to Drones podcast, revisit our favourites, and consider where we’re headed in the future!
Dr Michael Hankins is the Curator for US Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps post-World War II Aviation at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum and the author of Flying Camelot: The F-15, the F-16, and the Weaponization of Fighter Pilot Nostalgia (2021). In addition, he is a former Professor of Strategy at the USAF Air Command and Staff College eSchool, and a former Instructor of Military History at the US Air Force Academy. He earned his PhD in history from Kansas State University in 2018 and his master’s from the University of North Texas in 2013. He has a web page here.
Dr Brian Laslie is a US Air Force Historian and Command Historian at the United States Air Force Academy. Formerly, he was the Deputy Command Historian at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). A 2001 graduate of The Citadel and a historian of air power studies, he received his Masters’ from Auburn University Montgomery in 2006 and his PhD from Kansas State University in 2013. He is the author of Air Power’s Lost Cause: The American Air Wars of Vietnam (2021), Architect of Air Power: General Laurence S. Kuter and the Birth of the US Air Force (2017) and The Air Force Way of War (2015). The latter book was selected for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force’s 2016 professional reading list and the 2017 RAF Chief of the Air Staff’s reading list. He can be found on Twitter at @BrianLaslie.
Header image: A replica Albatros DVa at the Royal Air Force Museum at Hendon (Source: Author’s Collection)
Editorial note: This piece was originally drafted not long after the passing of Air Vice-Marshal Mason. However, several personal reasons led to a delay in its publication.
On 12 November 2023, Air Vice-Marshal Professor R.A. Mason, one of the doyens of air power studies, sadly passed away. Known as Tony by most who knew him personally and professionally, Mason can be considered one of the fathers of air power studies in the UK. As I have argued elsewhere, Mason was arguably the critical British air power thinker of the late 20th Century. From being the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) first Director of Defence Studies (DDefS) to his writing and commentary work, Mason was consistently at the forefront of the field until the 2010s. Indeed, his consistent commitment to the field and the length of his career made him stand out. He was also generous with his time and knowledge and always happy to share material with those who shared his interests.
Mason joined the RAF in 1956 and entered the Education Branch. He gradually rose through the ranks in his branch and undertook various assignments, including attending King’s College London, the United States Air War College and the RAF Staff College. Eventually, in 1976, Mason was informed that he would be the RAF’s first DDefS. Mason took up the role at the start of 1977. The position of DDefS was established due to the perceived state of thinking on air power within the RAF and public awareness of the Service’s role. In a letter to Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Support Command, Air Marshal Sir Reginald Harland, Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Neil Cameron noted that the position was being established ‘to help provide a new stimulus to air power thinking’ throughout the RAF.[1] This point was also emphasised in the terms of reference for the DDefS post, as there was a need to ‘write on air power and defence issues,’ which was to be encouraged.[2]
The establishment of the post of DDefS at the RAF Staff College at Bracknell and Mason’s perceived suitability for the role caused some debate. While this is not the place to consider that debate, the view of Mason’s successor, Group Captain Timothy Garden, is worth noting. Garden, a pilot and later Air Marshal Baron Garden, noted in 1982 in Air Clues that a colleague had questioned why he would want to take over what was perceived by 1982 as an ‘admin branch’ role. Garden reflected that the most appropriately qualified person should essentially hold the post to achieve its aims and that it ‘should not be the prerogative of any branch.’[3] That Garden, as a pilot, viewed the post in such a way was as much down to Mason’s hard work in the role as it was to the importance of the RAF’s intellectual development.
Mason nonetheless quickly sought to encourage discussion and debate and discussion about the role of air power within the service on taking up the role of DDefS. Despite the demise of the RAF Quarterly in 1977, Mason regularly contributed to Air Clues, which, up to the 1970s, had primarily been a technical publication for the RAF. In 1980, he established the Air Power Supplement to Air Clues, the spiritual ancestor to the RAF’s current professional flagship journal, Air and Space Power Review.[4] He also regularly contributed to other publications, such as The RUSI Journal. Perhaps his critical success in this period was organising an academic symposium in his first year in post. This symposium was entitled ‘Air Power in the Next Generation.’ It was well attended and laid the basis for similar endeavours by his successors. It was also published as Air Power in the Next Generation, co-edited with Edgar Feuchtwanger and published by The Macmillan Press in 1979. The book included contributions from the senior USAF, Luftwaffe, and Israeli officers, as well as civilian academics such as John Erickson. Much of Mason’s work started a process whereby his successors have continued to contribute to the collegiate intellectual development of the RAF through various schemes such as publications, conferences, and the management of defence fellowships.[5] Many former post-holders, such as Air Commodore (ret’d) Professor Peter Gray, are also notable for their contribution to developing British air power thinking through their engagement with academia after leaving the post of DDefS and the RAF.
Mason’s contributions to air power studies continued after moving on from the DDefS role. In 1983, Mason published Air Power in the Nuclear Age in conjunction with Air Marshal Michael Armitage. This publication helped cement Mason’s position as a leading air power thinker. As Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Cameron noted in the foreword to the book, ‘[t]he joint authors of this book are advanced and enlightened thinkers about the doctrine of air power as a vital and perhaps the most important element of modern and future warfare.’[6] This view was not hyperbole. For example, in his 1984 overview of air power literature, historian Richard Hallion described the book as an ‘excellent survey’ of the development of air power during the Cold War.[7] The book was updated as a second edition in 1985. Mason’s other notable works in this period were the edited book War in the Third Dimension and the establishment of the Brassey’s Air Power: Aircraft, Weapons Systems and Technology Series. This latter series was interesting because it was explicitly directed at developing an awareness of air power amongst junior military personnel.
After retiring from the RAF in 1989, Mason moved into academia. He became the Leverhulme Air Power Research Director for the Foundation for International Security and took up a post as a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy at the University of Birmingham, where he was director. In 1996, he was made an Honorary Professor of Aerospace Policy at the University of Birmingham.
In 1994, Mason published what might be considered his magnum opus, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal. This book confirmed Mason’s place as one of Britain’s leading air power thinkers. In this book, Mason examined the development of air power between 1989 and 1994. In doing so, he took a historical approach to examine how air power developed in the years up to this period. Mason then conceptualised the period 1989 to 1994, focusing on several key themes, such as the place of air power in arms control. Notably, he sought to contextualise much of the then-contemporary debate about the role of air power in the First Gulf War. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the book lay in Mason’s conceptualisation of what he called ‘differential air power.’[8] In short, Mason argued that while many nations shared ideas around the implementation of air power, only one in 1994 might be able to fully apply the advantages afforded by air power – the US. Using the idea of differential air power, Mason explored why the US stood out as a unique user of air power capabilities. These were important views for the time; however, while the book remains a significant contribution to air power studies, given factors such as the rise of China in the 21st Century and the distributed use of off-the-shelf technology such as drones, it remains to be seen whether his view remains applicable. Nevertheless, Mason concluded that:
One enduring concept underlay all air power thinking and all operations from the first day of the century to the last, and will continue to do so. Any nation intent on going to war to pursue an interest or defend a principle must first secure the air above it.[9]
Mason’s book was well received at publication and has become a commonly cited work. In his 1995 review in The RUSI Journal, Garden described the book as ‘excellent [and] thought-provoking.’[10] Thomas Keaney, who had worked on the Gulf War Air Power Survey, noted that the book made an ‘important contribution to any discussion on the future of airpower in the United States or elsewhere’ in a 1996 review for the US Joint Forces Quarterly.[11] However, historian Philip Sabin, reviewing the book in the Journal of Strategic Studies in 1995, offered a more tempered view. While recognising that the book had certain strengths, particularly Mason’s ‘balanced insights into many of the controversial issues regarding air power,’ Sabin also highlighted the challenge of reading a book that was ‘dense and difficult to follow without careful reading.’[12]
After the publication of Air Power, Mason continued to contribute to both the public’s and the RAF’s understanding of air power through his continued contribution to publications.[13] He also served as an expert member of the House of Commons Defence Committee in the early 2000s and helped inform British defence policy. He was also an inveterate media commentator and was often called to provide expert opinion. Mason’s contribution to air power studies was wide-ranging. While he had retired several years before his passing, his expertise will undoubtedly be sorely missed by many air power scholars for decades to come.
Dr Ross Mahoney is an independent scholar specialising in the history of war with particular reference to the use of air power and the history of air warfare. He is currently the Senior Historian within the Heritage Policy team at Brisbane City Council in Australia. He has nearly 20 years of experience in the education, museum and heritage sectors in Australia and the United Kingdom. Between 2013 and 2017, he was the inaugural Historian at the Royal Air Force Museum in the UK. In Australia, he has worked as a Historian for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs and taught at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University based at the Australian War College. His research interests are focused on the history of war, specifically on the history of air power and air warfare, military leadership and command, military culture, and the history and development of professional military education. He also maintains an interest in transport history. He has published numerous articles, chapters and encyclopedia entries, edited two books, and delivered papers on three continents. His website is here, and he can be found on Twitter at @airpowerhistory.
Header image: Ramslade House, the home of the RAF Staff College in Bracknell when Mason took up the role of Director of Defence Studies. (Source: Wikimedia)
[1] Author’s Personal Collection, Letter from the Chief of the Air Staff to AOC-in-C Support Command, 2 November 1976. I am grateful to the late Air Vice-Marshal Professor R.A. Mason for a copy of this and other documents linked to the establishment of the DDefS post.
[2] Author’s Personal Collection, Terms of Reference for Director of Defence Studies appended to a Letter from the Chief of the Air Staff to AOC-in-C Support Command, 2 November 1976, p. 1.
[3] Group Captain Timothy Garden, ‘Why don’t we forget Defence Studies and get on with the job?’ Air Clues 36, no 10 (1982), p. 364.
[4] Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason, ‘Air Power Review’s Place in RAF History,’ Air Power Review 21, no. 1 (2018), p. 10.
[5] For a variety of publications produced under the guidance of DDefS, see: Andrew Lambert and Arthur C. Williamson (eds.), The Dynamics of Air Power (London: HMSO, 1996); Stuart Peach (ed.), Perspectives on Air Power: Air Power in its Wider Context (London: The Stationary Office: 1998); Peter W. Gray (ed.), Air Power 21: Challenges for the New Century (London: The Stationary Office, 2000); Peter W. Gray and Sebastian Cox (eds.), Air Power Leadership: Theory and Practice (London: The Stationary Office, 2002).
[6] Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Cameron, ‘Foreword’ in M’J’ Armitage and R.A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age: Theory and Practice, Second Edition (Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1985), p. vii.
[7] Richard Hallion, The Literature of Aeronautics, Astronautics, and Air Power (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1984), p. 36.
[8] Tony Mason, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal (London: Brassey’s, 1994), pp. 235-278.
[10] Timothy Garden, ‘Book Reviews – Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal,’ The RUSI Journal 140, no. 3 (1995), p. 60.
[11] Thomas Keaney, ‘A Jubilee for Airmen: A Book Review,’ Joint Forces Quarterly 11 (1996), p. 134
[12] Philip Sabin, ‘Book Review – Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 18, no. 4 (1995), pp. 141-2.
[13] For example, see: Tony Mason, ‘British Air Power’ in John Andreas Olsen (ed.), Global Air Power (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2011), 7-62; R.A. Mason, ‘The Response to Uncertainty’ in John Andreas Olsen (ed.), European Air Power: Challenges and Opportunities (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2014), pp. 215-30; Mason, ‘Air Power Review’s Place in RAF History,’ pp. 10-1.
Editor’s note: In 2024, From Balloons to Drones will publish a series of articles that seek to provide a new perspective on the air war in 1944. If you are interested in contributing, please see our call for submissions here.
The US Navy was unprepared for electronic warfare when the Second World War started. After the US Marines landed on Guadalcanal in August 1942, they were surprised to discover the presence of a Japanese early warning radar, something the US Navy was unaware of. Although several radar countermeasures (primarily radar receivers designed to detect enemy radars) were quickly devised by the Naval Research Laboratory, little or no provision was made for installing the gear in the US Navy’s aeroplanes. It was done on an ad hoc basis. It took two years of trial and error before the US Navy realised that to conduct radar countermeasures (RCM) effectively, it needed aeroplanes specifically outfitted for this purpose with crews that were trained in the use of the latest equipment. This article explores that experience of learning. Once this was achieved, the US Navy could locate and plot the enemy’s early warning radars. This enabled attacking aeroplanes to avoid them, thus reducing the likelihood of their interception from Japanese fighters. Though the equipment supplied to these aeroplanes was never intended for use in air-to-air encounters (radar-equipped night fighters had their own specialised equipment), the well-equipped, well-trained crews of the RCM Consolidated PB4Y-1 Liberators that began arriving in the Pacific towards the end of 1944 discovered that they could use their RCM receivers to guide them to enemy aeroplanes also equipped with radar allowing it to be intercepted and shot down.[1]
A US Navy Consolidated PB4Y-1 Liberator patrol bomber taking off from Eniwetok Airfield (Stickell Field), 16 April 1944. (Source: Wikimedia)
VP-104 and Learning Lessons
In the spring of 1943, Lieutenant Lawrence Heron, one of several newly trained naval officers in the use and maintenance of the ARC-1 radar receiver (the primary RCM equipment available at that time), was sent to Guadalcanal and assigned to join VP-104 operating PB4Y-1 Liberators out of Carney Field (also known as Bomber 2). When Heron arrived in Guadalcanal, none of the PB4Y-1s were equipped with any RCM equipment. He had to figure out how to install the only radar receiver to transfer it from aeroplane to aeroplane. He solved this problem by mounting the ARC-1 receiver (the US Navy version of the US Army SCR-587) and its power supply on pieces of sawn plywood sized to fit through the aeroplane hatches. These were fastened to a table in the aeroplane interior, and a power cable was connected to the electric power system. He flew twenty missions to such places as Truk, Kapingamarangi in the Caroline Islands, and Rabaul – the latter particularly harrowing as it was so heavily defended.[2]
Forming Field Unit No. 3
By April 1944, it was clear to the leadership in the Southwest Pacific Command that permanently modified aeroplanes, such as the US Army Air Force’s Ferrets (modified aeroplanes such as the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress and Consolidated B-24 Liberator) flown by crews to intercept radar signals, were far more effective in finding enemy radars than the makeshift radar receiver installations on US Navy bomber and reconnaissance aeroplanes operated by ‘gypsy’ crewman like Heron and his predecessors in Cast Mike 1 (the first US Navy RCM unit deployed to the Pacific Theatre in September 1942). Recognising this shortcoming, the Command’s headquarters was directed to form a dedicated airborne US Navy RCM unit. Lieutenant Heron was sent to the seaplane base at Palm Island near Townsville, Australia, with orders to establish and command Field Unit No. 3, a US Navy RCM unit using two PBYs specifically modified for this purpose.[3]
After arriving in Palm Island, Heron had no difficulty installing the ARC-1 receivers, but no direction-finding antennae were available. He solved the problem by having his men make their own from aluminium tubing. They melted the insulation from spare coaxial for the mount, machining it after it had hardened. The rotating antenna was mounted in the bottom of the flying boat’s fuselage behind the rear tunnel gun hatch and had to be attached after the aeroplane was airborne. As Heron recalled:
I would go back to the tunnel hatch of the aircraft – I wouldn’t ask an enlisted man to do it – and put on a safety belt fastened with a steel cable to the frame of the aircraft, then, with one of the enlisted men holding my feet, I would hang out the bottom of the airplane and fasten the antenna with wing nuts on the bottom of the fuselage. There were lots of occasions when I dropped wing nuts into the water 700 or 1,000 feet below. It wasn’t very pleasant […] Once the antenna was in place, somebody had to sit over the open tunnel hatch and operate the handle which rotated the dipole, using the interphone to coordinate with the RCM operator to get bearing information.[4]
When the modifications to Heron’s PBYs were complete, he took the unit to New Guinea and began flying RCM missions from seaplane bases at Port Moresby and the Samarai Islands. Although the jury-rigged direction-finding antenna gave satisfactory results, installing it was an extremely hazardous operation. During one flight, Heron’s aeroplane came under friendly ground fire. As the pilot maneuvered wildly to avoid being hit, Heron was thrown out of the hatch and back again several times. “If it hadn’t been for the steel safety cable,” he said, “I would probably be somewhere at the bottom of the ocean.”[5]
As the US Navy’s island-hopping campaign advanced toward Japan, RCM operations (today called electronic intelligence or ELINT) were organised from newly established bases on the captured islands. When Enewetak Atoll was secured on 20 February 1944, control of the Marshall Islands, which had been in Japanese hands since 1914, passed to the United States. Within a week, engineers from the US Army’s 110th Battalion were hard at work constructing a bomber airstrip, later named Stickel Field. When completed in March, it had a 400-foot-wide, 6,800-foot-long runway with two taxiways, facilities for major engine overhaul, and Quonset huts for housing personnel.
VPB-116 and Operations in the South Pacific
On 7 July 1944, PB4Y-1 Liberators of VPB-116, under the command of Commander Donald G. Gumz, began arriving on Enewetak. At least three of the planes in the squadron were equipped with specialised radar receivers and search radar. However, they were not equipped with the new APR-5 receiver, which would have greatly simplified the task of locating enemy radars. The squadron commenced operational patrols and sector searches on 12 July and was conducting missions against Truk, Japan’s main naval base in the South Pacific, by the first week in August. By then, the US Navy was aware of the shore-based air-search radars the Imperial Japanese Navy deployed. It had developed techniques for locating them with RCM aeroplanes to minimise their effectiveness. Although Truk had been pounded in February, its airfields continued to be a threat to US forces in the area, so bombings of the atoll continued. To ensure the attacking forces’ safety, the US Navy air force commander in the forward area asked Gumz to attempt to pinpoint the location of the Japanese radar equipment on Truk. Unbeknownst to Gumz or the higher authorities in the US Navy, there were no less than nine enemy air-search radars installed at various locations around the atoll.[6]
Gumz quickly discovered that getting a bearing on the Japanese radar transmissions operating below or just above the 100 MHz minimum range of the ARC-1 receiver was very difficult. To locate the radars, Gumz produced a plan to search for holes in the enemy’s radar screen using three RCM planes simultaneously running concentric circles around Truk lagoon at different altitudes. It took six-night sorties and a low-level morning strike on shipping to locate the radar source on Moen Island and the radar shadows created by certain islands. The information gained during this and other ELINT flights in the area allowed for follow-on raids to be planned so that the Japanese radars would provide minimum warning of the attacking forces’ approach.
An Air-to-Air Engagement
On 1 November 1944, one of the most remarkable air-to-air engagements of the Second World War occurred between an RCM PB4Y-1 under the command of Lieutenant Guy Thompson and a Japanese Kawanishi H8K Emily flying boat. It was also the first time in the history of electronic warfare that ELINT was used to locate and identify an enemy aeroplane so that it could be engaged and shot down by the sensing aeroplane.
Thompson took off that morning from Stickel Field on a mission to escort the submarine USS Salmon (SS-182), which could not submerge after severe damage and was making its way to Saipan. Tompson’s PB4Y-1 was equipped with an APS-15 search radar, which replaced the bottom gun turret, and the newest radar receivers and analysers, including the APR-5 radar receiver that picked up signals in the S-band used by search and early warning radars. On the way to the estimated location of the Salmon, at approximately 1100 hours, Aviation Chief Radio Technician W.T. Kane, monitoring the RCM gear, intercepted an enemy radar transmission that he estimated to be 75 to 90 miles away. The signal received on his instruments indicated that the emissions were not coming from a rotating antenna, as used in ground-based early warning radars, indicating that it was coming from another aeroplane.[7]
As the PB4Y-1 headed towards the emission source, Aviation Chief Radioman E.F. Bryant, operating the APS-15 radar, began searching for the enemy aeroplane. Thirty minutes after the initial contact, the radar screen revealed a contact nine-and-a-half miles distant at 1:30 o’clock low. As Bryant reported the contact, another crew member called out a visual sighting. Thompson let the Japanese plane pass to starboard before initiating a 180-degree turn to come in behind the flying boat, nosed over into a glide to pick up speed, and began closing the gap to the enemy plane below him. To catch the enemy plane, which had picked up speed, “Thompson put on more power and went into a steeper dive, building his sped up to 299 mph and closing to a point 2,000 feet behind and 500 feet above the Emily.” Thompson’s bow turret gunner immediately opened fire, initiating a dogfight that saw both flying boats wildly manoeuvring as Thompson fought to bring all the PB4Y-1’s guns to bear. At the same time, the enemy tried to evade. To gain speed, both aeroplanes dropped their depth bombs. Thompson’s gunners rake the Emily from point plane range, setting both engines on fire. Moments later, its starboard wing float hit the water, tearing off the wing and sending the flying boat cartwheeling into the ocean.[8]
Conclusion
As the US Navy advanced across the Pacific, new radar countermeasures units arrived in the theatre, providing detailed maps showing the location of all the Japanese radars, such as the one below.
Japanese radar coverage of the Philippines (Source: Author’s Collection)
This information allowed attacking raids to follow flight plans that would provide a minimum warning to the Japanese. By the end of the Second World War, 18 land-based US Navy patrol squadrons had been modified to carry improved radar receivers and one of the three airborne jammers the Radar Research Laboratory developed.[9] These units were built upon the experience and lessons learned by Heron and Gumz in 1943 and 1944.
Thomas Wildenberg is an award-winning scholar with special interests in aviators, naval aviation, and technological innovation in the military. He is the author of several books on various naval topics and biographies of Joseph Mason Reeves, Billy Mitchell, and Charles Stark Draper.
Header image: A US Navy Consolidated PB4Y-1 Liberator patrol bomber taking off from Eniwetok Airfield (Stickell Field), 13 April 1944. The photo was taken from the top of the observation tower. (Source: Wikimedia)
[1] For more on this topic see: Thomas Wildenberg, Fighting in the Electromagnetic Spectrum: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Electronic Warfare Aircraft, Operations, and Equipment (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2023), pp. 9-19.
[2] Alfred W. Price, The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare – Volume I:The Years of Innovation—Beginnings to 1946 (Arlington, VA: Association of Old Crows, 1984), pp. 137-8; Craig A. Bellamy, ‘The Beginnings of the Secret Australian Radar Countermeasures Unit During the Pacific War’ (PhD Thesis, Charles Darwin University, 2020), p. 192.
[3] Price, The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare – Volume I, p. 138.
[4] Lawrence Heron, cited by Price, The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare – Volume I, pp. 145-7.
[5] Price, The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare – Volume I, p. 147.
[6] Michel D. Roberts, Dictionary of American Naval Squadrons – Volume I: The History of VA, VAH, VAK, VAL, VAP and VFA Squadrons (Washington DC: Naval Historical Center, 1995), p. 623; Price, The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare – Volume I, p. 144.
[7] Edward M. Young, H6K “Mavis”/H8K “Emily VS PB4Y-1/2 Liberator/Privateer Pacific Theater 1943-45 (London: Osprey Publishing, 2023).
[9] Thomas Wildenberg, ‘Fighting in the Electromagnetic Spectrum: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Electronic Warfare Aircraft, Missions, and Equipment,’ lecture given at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, 14 June 2024.
Editorial Note: Led by Editor Dr Mike Hankins, From Balloons to Drones, produces a monthly podcast that provides an outlet for the presentation and evaluation of air power scholarship, the exploration of historical topics and ideas, and provides a way to reach out to both new scholars and the general public. You can find our Soundcloud channel here. You can also find our podcast on Apple Podcasts and Google Podcasts.
For every military aircraft that takes to the skies, many others never get off the drawing board or make it into full production. Renowned and prolific aviation historian Kenneth P. Werrell talks to us in his new book, Air Force Disappointments, Mistakes, and Failures, 1940-1990, about some of these projects and why some aeroplanes never seem to take off.
Dr Kenneth P. Werrell is the author of Death from the Heavens: A History of StrategicBombing, Sabres over MIG Alley: The F-86 and the Battle for Air Superiority over Korea, Chasing the Silver Bullet: US Air Force Weapons Development from Vietnam to Desert Storm, Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers Over Japan During World War II, and other books.
Header image:A North American XB-70A Valkyrie rolling out after landing, employing drag chutes to slow down. In the photo, the outer wing panels are slightly raised. The panels were lowered to improve stability when the XB-70 was flying at high speed. (Source: Wikimedia)
The Iranian HESA Saheed 136 suicide drone (unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)) entered the war between Ukraine and Russia with undeniable effects. The influence of the same Iranian drones on Red Sea shipping in 2024 is equally undeniable, as Houthi militias utilised drones to threaten world shipping the same way they threatened Saudi Arabian defences in prior years. Russia has purchased thousands of Shahed 136 drones and received training for Shahed 136, HESA Ababil-3 and Raad drones through Iranian proxies and military forces in Syria.[1] Thus, Iran has quickly become a drone exporter and power broker, using regional proxies to provide lethal drone firepower to hard-pressed governments in East Africa. Iran now employs drones as a foreign policy tool to demonstrate its viability as a significant influence and a capable partner in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. Iran’s efforts have undercut Western security guarantees and exploited the weakness of Ethiopian and Sudanese governments engaged in their internal efforts to defeat insurgent forces. The 2024 Nigerien junta’s rejection of United States forces currently hosted in Niger, and the likely denial of the critical drone airbases therein, allows Iran to attempt to influence an African state that has chosen to sever ties with the West. Looking at the situations in Ethiopia and Sudan can assist with understanding how Iranian drone capabilities, cost, and performance have earned Iran a place at the table.
Iranian drones offer hard-pressed states much-needed reconnaissance and attack capabilities with no questions about employment doctrine or human rights guarantees. Iranian drones also give potential customers access to various platforms at costs below that of most conventional aircraft. Although costs vary widely depending on the source, an Iranian Saheed 136 goes for between $20,000-$40,000. Multi-role drones like the Mohajer-6 also have lower prices than Western drones.[2] Iran’s goal is not to displace China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates as drone competitors in Ethiopia but to demonstrate its ability to compete successfully on the international stage and prove that its drones are effective options for potential international allies.[3] When Ethiopia needed drones in 2021, Iran could offer Ethiopia drones and munitions that helped defeat insurgents through precision strike and reconnaissance capabilities. However, Iranian assistance comes at a price for countries unwilling to risk extended diplomatic pressure. Despite being reported by Bellingcat at Semara airport in late 2021, by late 2023, Ethiopia’s two Iranian Mohajer-6 drones and their single ground control station (capable of controlling two drones at a time) were hard to find on overhead imagery. This is likely due to the drones and associated materials being pulled back under cover or into hangars until needed for operations. In contrast, Ethiopia’s Turkish and Chinese models have been seen in the open on the runways of at least two Ethiopian Air Force base runways. This may have been in whole or in part due to US protests to the UN about Iran’s violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 and the delivery of unmanned warplanes.[4] UN SCR 2231, although written as a diplomatic effort to find a solution to Iran’s nuclear issues, contains within the resolution Paragraph 6, Annex B that specifically enjoins all states to prevent ‘the transfer of arms or related material from Iran by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran.’ The transfer of drones falls within this set of restrictions. By transferring drones to Ethiopia, UNSCR 2231 was violated, with Iran and Ethiopia as knowing participants.
It is undeniable that Iran was willing to defy UN opposition to provide Ethiopia with drones; what is surprising is that Ethiopia chose to work with Iran despite being a US ally. Iran’s window of opportunity may have materialised partly due to the United States’ policy of not selling armed drones to allies without extensive vetting and Congressional approval.[5] In contrast, when Ethiopia’s military needed a rapid response and a technological solution to rebel threats, Turkey and China were already supplying to the African and Middle East markets. Although it is hard to gauge if Iran will be able to have the same influence that it had with Ethiopia in 2021, Iran could look to the situation in Sudan as another success in efforts to disrupt US regional goals and Western security assurances. As the United States attempts to counter drone proliferation, Iran displays technical and technological skills through its drone sales. Its drive for prestige and relevancy in the arms trade has been rewarded by the Russian and African adoption of Iranian drones to affect the sort of damage previously restricted to more conventional aircraft.[6]
Despite severing diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016, Sudan is interested in Iran’s assistance in combatting its main rival in the ongoing civil war, the Rapid Support Forces. Iran’s relationship with Sudan is evolving as Sudan’s government struggles against the rebel Rapid Support Forces, US sanctions, and a lack of international assistance. However, some countries, namely Iran and Turkey, have supplied Sudan with drones despite sanctions. In Sudan, as in Ethiopia, drones may be the factor that enables the government to contest and eventually defeat insurgents. The Sudanese government’s forces employ a variety of Iranian drones: the Ababil-3, Mohajer-2, Mohajer-4, and the latest Mohajer-6. These drones are part of Iran’s policy toolkit and have helped Iran maintain access and influence in Sudan despite Sudan becoming a signatory to the 2019 Abraham Accords, which included policies that were diametrically opposed to Iran’s stated interests.[7] Iranian interests in the region and globally can best be understood from a combination of Iranian policy goals: posturing Iran as an option to Western states for arms and technological assistance and providing an Islamic champion to former al-Bashir loyalists.[8]
Iran’s policy goals in Sudan include turning Sudan away from Saudi Arabia and UAE as part of Iran’s challenge to regional rivals.[9] Iran has exploited the Sudanese regime’s need for drone platforms, and news stories of alleged offers of additional drones and a helicopter carrier in exchange for a Port Sudan base cloud Iran’s history with Sudan. Iran can use drones to gain influence and restore Sudan as a partner in Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ to the West.[10] The other obvious advantage of a Sudan-Iran alliance, from Iran’s perspective, is a scenario in which Iran could threaten Red Sea shipping and cause worldwide disruptions. An Iran-Sudan alliance would also sandwich Saudi Arabia between Sudan, Iran, and Yemen’s Houthi rebels. A Sudan-Iran diplomatic and defence alliance gives Sudan and Iran the tools to achieve their goals. Sudan’s Armed Forces-led government wants to extract concessions from the West, defeat the Rapid Support Forces, and establish itself as a drone power with the technological sophistication that implies. Iran continues to force the West to bleed resources to prevent a Sudan-Iran alliance from becoming a reality. The multiple threats to the Red Sea, combined with the ecological crisis that is challenging the Panama Canal’s shipping capacity, have great potential to cause Iran’s rivals severe economic and political embarrassment.
An Iranian HESA Ababil-3 drone. (Source: Wikimedia)
Iran has demonstrated their will to defy United Nations sanctions. It should be expected to do so in the future, especially if doing so will bring Iran revenue and influence with new diplomatic and defence partners. The recent coup in Niger demonstrates how Iran readily offered assistance and drones to the Nigerien junta despite ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) sanctions. Other African states have similarly courted in Iranian efforts to bust United Nations sanctions. Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe, for example, for gold exports.[11] Iran has a valuable negotiating tool in the form of its family of armed drones. Sources including CNBC, Voice of America, senior Iranian officials, and the Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant claim Iran now has customers and interested countries (for example, Bolivia and Venezuela) across the world, with Iran claiming 22 interested countries and Israel as many as 50.[12] As of 2023, Venezuela manufactures armed Mohajer-2 surveillance drones and operates armed Mohajer-6 drones. Considering Iran’s support for terrorist organizations and their willingness to sell drones with little regard for the consequences, the risks of international disruptions grow with each country that adopts Iranian technology.[13] International sanctions have limited Iran’s ability to obtain and export parts for drones. Suppliers who provide clandestine support are thus complicit in Iran’s arms industry. Attempts to interdict drone deliveries to Iran’s allies have been ineffective because most users of Iranian drones choose to manufacture in-country or build drones from parts.[14] Drone sales have helped Iran gain partner states. Iran will take advantage of situations where Western partners have been rejected and ejected by their former regional allies or Western states have cut off diplomatic relations due to coups. Iranian influence across the Sahel will grow as states seek sources for drones, and states that have little to deter them will find Iranian drones to be an attractive combination of proven capability and low cost.
Iran is opportunistic, and the situation in Niger, where the regime has rejected the West and joined with the ECOWAS-spurning Association of Sahel States (AES), opens a new avenue for Iran to counter Western influence and gain new allies.[15] Niger is an attractive destination for Iranian influence because of Niger’s uranium deposits. Iran has been engaged in diplomatic exchanges with Niger, offering Niger an ally against the West as well as assistance in mitigating the effects of ECOWAS sanctions.[16] In April 2024, the news site Africa Intelligence reported that ‘Iran and Niger were negotiating for Niger to provide 300 tons of uranium yellowcake to Iran in exchange for drones and surface-to-air missiles.’[17] That alone would demonstrate the utility of Iranian drones as diplomatic bargaining tools. However, in March of 2024, Iran International News and the Wall Street Journal alleged that United States opposition to the trade was one reason for the Nigerien junta deciding to close the facility known as Airbase 201 in Agadez, Niger, a major drone base for counterterrorism operations in the Sahel.[18] Although the junta closed the airbase and ordered the United States to withdraw its drones, the decision was most likely driven by the need to demonstrate sovereignty and strength when the Nigerien junta was weak and under foreign pressure to change its policies. The developing ties with Russia and neighbouring junta-led states were also likely factors in the decision.[19] However, this development left a prime drone base in the hands of the Niger coup junta just as its relationships with Russia and Iran deepened. We can expect the Nigerien government to seek to take advantage of the $100 million facility at Agadez for new drones delivered by new security partners.
Niger still needs drones to patrol its vast territory and strike at terrorist groups. As Iran’s influence rises in Africa, so too may its drone presence in the service of governments where expediency is valued over human rights, transparency, and sustainability. Iranian drones are an effective policy tool, an asymmetric warfare solution scalable to many situations, and responsive to the needs of states and non-state actors. Iran’s drones will continue to create pockets of regional instability and serve Iran’s need for prestige, credibility, and allies for years to come unless countered by effective policies that neutralize Iran’s disregard for UN sanctions and undercutting of peace initiatives. The challenge for the US and its allies is not simply how to shoot down drones or where to direct diplomatic initiatives but to provide states with better options and to deny terrorists access to advanced systems. The United States is improving Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems, but allies need assistance countering the whispers of a regime that offers advanced technology without warning of the inevitable repercussions.
Dr John Ringquist is a retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel, Africa Foreign Area Officer, and historian. He currently teaches at the Command and Staff School at the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has written about topics related to security, terrorism, and military history for various publications.
Header image: An Iranian HESA Ababil-3 UAV at an arms expo in Iran. (Source: Wikimedia)
Established in 2016, From Balloons to Drones has successfully developed into a well-regarded online scholarly platform dedicated to analysing and debating air power history, theory, and contemporary operations in their broadest sense, including space and cyber power. Our outputs include articles ranging from scholarly pieces to book reviews and a successful podcast series.
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To help us develop further, From Balloons to Drones is looking to recruit an emerging and passionate air power specialist to join our editorial team. This voluntary role’s primary purpose is to work with the editorial team to peer-review submissions while supporting the aims and objectives of From Balloons to Drones in other areas.
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From Balloons to Drones welcomes and encourages applications for this new role from applicants working in a wide range of fields, including but not limited to military history, international relations, strategic studies, law, and archaeology. The role is open to postgraduates, academics, policymakers, service personnel, and relevant professionals who are involved in researching the subject of air power and military aviation.
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You can learn more about the From Balloons to Drones editorial team here.
Editorial Note: Led by Editor Dr Mike Hankins, From Balloons to Drones, produces a monthly podcast that provides an outlet for the presentation and evaluation of air power scholarship, the exploration of historical topics and ideas, and provides a way to reach out to both new scholars and the general public. You can find our Soundcloud channel here. You can also find our podcast on Apple Podcasts and Google Podcasts.
The Pacific Theater of the Second World War was massive and had vast numbers of ships and aeroplanes. Keeping a force like that operational and effective takes tremendous work behind the scenes. In our latest episode, Dr Stan Fisher takes us through his new book, Sustaining the Carrier War: The Deployment of U.S. Naval Air Power to the Pacific, to show the often overlooked people behind the scenes: the mechanics and maintainers who kept the planes working and kept the carriers able to keep air power in the air in the war against Japan.
Dr Stan Fisher, a commander in the U.S. Navy, is an assistant professor of naval and American history at the United States Naval Academy. Before transitioning to the classroom, he accumulated over 2,500 flight hours as a US Navy pilot, mainly in SH-60B & MH-60R Seahawk helicopters. He earned a commission through the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1997 and has multiple deployments on frigates, cruisers, and aircraft carriers. Fisher has also served as a weapons and tactics instructor, squadron maintenance officer, and operational test director. Additionally, he has completed tours of duty in engineering and acquisitions at the Naval Air Systems Command. He is a past recipient of the Samuel Eliot Morison Naval History Scholarship and earned his PhD from the University of Maryland.
Header image: USS Intrepid (CV-11) operating in the Philippine Sea in November 1944. Note the Grumann F6F Hellcat fighter parked on an outrigger forward of her island. (Source: NH 97468, US Naval History and Heritage Command)
Editorial note: On 26 January 2024, Apple TV+ launched the much-anticipated series Masters of the Air. This series follows the actions of the US 100th Bomb Group during the Combined Bomber Offensive in the Second World War. As the series is being aired, our Book Reviews Editor, Dr Luke Truxal, the author of Uniting against the Reich (2023), will critically review each episode.
In the final episode of Masters of the Air, we see the episode successfully bringing the plots of the US 100th Bomb Group to a satisfying conclusion. It did well as an episode designed to finish the series and bring it to a successful landing. During the episode, we see the major characters resolve their past and begin to face their futures. Major Harry Crosby struggles with the nature of the air war and toils with how he has changed during the war. This is something that he struggled with after the war, like most veterans. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Rosenthal saw the Holocaust first-hand as he toured a concentration camp after he was shot down and rescued by troops from the Soviet Union’s Red Army. After the war, Rosenthal participated in the prosecution of Nazi officials at Nuremberg for their roles in the Holocaust. Finally, we see Majors Gale Clevan and John Egan face the horrors of the march from Stalag Luft III to their new camp at Mooseberg. During the march, Egan finally embraces the leadership role he had tried to avoid throughout the series.
The episode begins with Rosenthal and the 100th Bomb Group attacking Berlin in February 1945. During the raid, Rosenthal is shot down for the second time in the war. As his plane falls out of formation, he makes his way towards the Soviet lines east of Berlin. By buying this time, he gave his crew the best opportunity to be rescued by the Soviets. After Rosenthal bails out and lands behind the Soviet lines, the viewers get their first glimpse of the nature of the fighting on the Eastern Front. German soldiers are shot as they are surrendering. This might be the only time we see the Eastern Front in a series produced by Tom Hanks and Stephen Spielberg, and they execute it well. The fighting on the Eastern Front was one without mercy, and the writers did not shy away from showing Soviet war crimes. After Rosenthal is rescued, he spends time behind the Soviet lines. At one point, he tours a concentration camp that the Red Army had liberated. He is clearly shaken by what he has seen. Later, before he is put on an aeroplane to begin his long circuitous route back to Thorpe Abbotts, he meets with a Jewish family. He starts to ask questions about what happened during the German occupation. As he begins to learn about the nature of the genocide conducted by the Germans, he is clearly shaken and changed by this experience. By the time he returns to Crosby at Thorpe Abbotts, he has no remorse for the German people suffering under the bombs after what he has seen.
Nate Mann in Masters of the Air. (Source: Apple TV+)
Crosby himself is dealing with many changes in his life. During the latter months at Thorpe Abbotts, we can see that he is becoming more challenging to live with as the only original group member to remain with the 100th Bomb Group throughout the war. At one point, he physically assaults another officer for failing to have the equipment room ready for the combat crews as they are trying to get their parachutes for the upcoming raid. This is something that Crosby notes in his book, A Wing and a Prayer, on several occasions, which is partially why he was sent on leave to the United States. When Rosenthal returns, Crosby updates him on his life and the fact that he will become a father. Crosby doubts whether he will be a good father after everything he has gone through. He also hints at his doubts about the morality of some of the bombings that they are doing. Rosenthal lets Crosby know he will be a good father and tries to get him to put aside his doubts about the air war. This is another good discussion because it shows the divisions airmen felt over their attacks against Germany. It also shows how the war has changed Crosby and Rosenthal. Rosenthal gains confidence that they are doing the right thing in the air war after his experiences on the ground, but Crosby has doubts due to the destruction of German cities and significant losses of life.
Clevan and Egan are given short notice that they have only minutes to pack as they are about to leave Stalag Luft III with the Soviets driving towards the camp. This is the beginning of their march to a new camp, Stalag VII-A, located in Moosburg, Germany. On the march, we see the Americans witness the downfall of Nazi Germany within Germany itself. We still see the prisoners attacked and strafed by United States Army Air Force P-51 Mustangs, which misidentified them as a troop column. In another instance, we see the fanatical support for Hitler’s Germany in one of the guards participating in the march. At the same time, we see an armoured column of German soldiers pass the prisoners. Those in the armoured column clearly look beaten. In addition to the veterans who have seen too much combat in a war that they have clearly lost by this point, we also see the images of young boys and older men in the armoured formation. As the column gets closer to Moosburg, Clevan sees an opportunity for a number of other prisoners to attempt to escape. Realising that he will not make it, Egan obstructs the German guards pursuing Clevan and his comrades. This is where Egan really shines. Instead of trying to make a bolt for it, he helps his friend and comrades escape. Thus ensuring he would remain a prisoner for the remainder of the war. The story for Egan ends when he is liberated from Moosburg with the other prisoners by the US 14th Armored Division.
Callum Turner and Austin Butler in Masters of the Air (Source: Apple TV+)
The episode ends with the ground personnel packing up Thorpe Abbotts and the 100th Bomb Group taking off to return home to the United States. While the aircrews fly back on their planes, the ground echelon returns to the United States via troop transport across the Atlantic. The series ends on a sombre note. During their final pre-flight check, Egan asks Clevan what he is thinking. Clevan responds by stating that he is thinking about the airmen they left behind. Due to the high attrition rate in the air war, many viewers struggled to connect with many of the new crews as the original members of the 100th Bomb Group were shot down. For men like Egan and Clevan, the losses of their comrades like Biddick and Bubbles, stuck with them long after the war. This brief moment tries to remind viewers of the high losses that the 100th Bomb Group and US Eighth Air Force suffered throughout the war.
Like previous episodes, this one has a couple of missed opportunities. First, seeing more of the US 332nd Fighter Group in this episode and the rest of the series would have been nice. Viewers never really saw the group conduct bomber escort missions, which it became known for throughout the air war. Additionally, there was an opportunity to cover Operation Thunderclap and the firebombing of Dresden from 13 to 15 February 1945. This would have provided better context for the viewers as Crosby and Rosenthal discuss the merits of the air war itself. Finally, I will state that the British spy plot that was dropped during the episode was the smart call to save airtime from tying off the other plot lines developed throughout the series. This decision did make me wonder why that story was even being told in the first place.
Overall, Masters of the Air has now become the best depiction of the American experience in the air war over Europe on screen. While this series has a lot of flaws, which I have noted throughout these reviews, it covers more ground than other depictions of the air war well. Also, it captures the nature of the fighting in ways that previous depictions could not be due to the technological limitations of their times. This series did a good job of paying homage to the experience of the American airman while also showing the brutality of air combat. Whereas previous depictions of air warfare chose to depict combat in the skies as more knightly duels or did not have the technological capabilities to fully capture the horrors of the air war, this series brought the struggles of the American airman front and centre. Scholars now have a series they can better use to talk about the air war with students and the public. I hope this series will inspire many young viewers to be the next generation of air power historians who usher in more scholarship on this subject at a time when it is most needed. While it is too early to tell, this series has renewed interest in the air war and the men who flew these planes into combat. If that is the only legacy of the television series, it has already contributed significantly to the field by renewing interest in the topic.
Dr Luke Truxal is an adjunct at Columbia State Community College in Tennessee. He completed his PhD in 2018 at the University of North Texas with his dissertation, ‘Command Unity and the Air War Against Germany.’ His previous publications include ‘Bombing the Romanian Rail Network’ in the Spring 2018 issue of Air Power History. He also wrote ‘The Politics of Operational Planning: Ira Eaker and the Combined Bomber Offensive in 1943’ in the Journal of Military Aviation History. In addition, Truxal is researching the effectiveness of joint air operations between the Allied air forces in the Second World War. He can be reached on Twitter at @Luke_Truxal.
Header image: Austin Butler in Masters of the Air. (Source: Apple TV+)
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