Learning Lessons: The Development of US Tactical Air Power and Air-to-Ground Coordination during the North African Campaign, 1942-1943

By Major Darren Johnson

During the Second World War, the United States (US) achieved success on the battlefield, largely due to its effective coordination of air and ground forces. The integration of these elements did not come easily; personality conflicts, misinterpretation of doctrine, and a lack of joint training opportunities had hindered innovation during the interwar period and the early stages of the war. After initial setbacks following Operation TORCH in November 1942, US air and ground commanders and staffs utilised pre-existing doctrine and developed a force structure, in conjunction with Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF), that not only won the campaign in North Africa by May 1943 but also set the conditions for continued success in mainland Europe. This article argues that pre-existing air-ground coordination doctrine, developed in the interwar period, tested in training, and implemented in the latter stages of the North Africa campaign, sufficiently provided support to ground forces and achieved air superiority by degrading deep targets.

The Interwar Period and the Development of Air Doctrine

During the First World War, the United States Army Air Service (USAAS) supported the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France by destroying German aircraft, interdicting enemy rear areas through strafing and bombing, observing enemy movements, and performing other supporting missions. Aerial warfare proved to be immensely valuable in achieving results on the battlefield at the tactical and operational levels of war. It demonstrated its potential to influence war at the strategic level. German, British, and French air forces conducted ‘terror’ bombings to demoralise the home front and disrupt war production in World War I. However, at the conclusion of the First World War, the role of the USAAS in future conflicts was ill-defined. Advocates for an independent air force, seeking equal status with the US Army and US Navy, argued that strategic bombardment, not direct support of ground forces, should be the primary mission of the US Army Air Corps (USAAC). The USAAC was formed in 1926 by renaming the USAAS and given greater autonomy than its predecessor.

The Italian officer Giulio Douhet, who had commanded an air unit in 1915, was an air-war visionary who advocated a more expansive and independent role for the air arm. Military theorists like Douhet were the inspiration behind the creation of an independent American air force focused on strategic bombardment.^[2] Notably, in 1921, Douhet published The Command of the Air, which advocated for independent air forces ‘capable of launching powerful offensives on land and sea.’^[3] A key principle for an independent air force was the ability to concentrate its forces to ‘inflict the greatest damage in the shortest possible time.’^[4] Officers attending the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) at Maxwell Field, Alabama, for their professional military education (PME), along with their regular academic courses and practical exercises, discussed theories on strategic bombardment against adversaries’ economic and industrial bases to achieve strategic success. Air power enthusiasts believed that strategic bombing could deliver decisive blows, eliminating the need for another bloody struggle on land and effectively win the war through air power alone.^[5]

A Junkers Ju 87A of the German Condor Legion during the Spanish Civil War. (Source: Wikimedia)

Based on their experiences during the First World War, interwar German air power theorists recognised the potential of strategic bombing and developed doctrine to enhance their air arm’s capabilities. The Germans, having ignored the restrictions in the Treaty of Versailles by building the Luftwaffe in 1933, ’envisioned the use of bomber fleets against an enemy’s air force, industry, communications, and supply systems.’^[6] However, the Germans also recognised that close air support (CAS), albeit a secondary mission, is vital to ground campaigns. Covertly, the Germans developed a CAS doctrine that included ‘the use of air liaison officers, recognition signals, and communication channels,’ which proved effective in their campaigns in Poland, France, and the Soviet Union between 1939-1941.^[7] The Luftwaffe also gained significant combat experience during the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s.

Similarly, the British recognised the value of CAS; however, many of the lessons they drew from the First World War focused on its downsides, given the immense losses of pilots and aircraft in conducting those missions. Additionally, British military budgets in the interwar period were strained, and attention within the RAF remained focused on fighter aircraft for air-to-air missions rather than on a dedicated ground-support mission.[8] The British recognised the positive morale effect that CAS missions had on friendly troops but considered their use only under ‘certain and rare circumstances.’^[9] However, the cooperation and liaison between RAF officers and ground commanders conducting operations in India and Palestine in the 1930s indicated potential successful use on a larger scale, even against a well-trained adversary.^[10] It is, however, important to note that nations interpreted lessons from the interwar period differently. National will, economic constraints, and a nation’s political climate influenced how modern technology was incorporated into its doctrine before the Second World War.

The German invasion of Poland in September 1939 provided American and British analysts with examples of effective CAS of ground forces at the decisive point of a battle. However, challenges remained for the Germans in coordinating between air and ground commanders and planners. For example, German CAS was often pre-coordinated to support the advance of ground forces, and there was limited communication between air and ground elements, which contributed to incidents of fratricide. Nevertheless, German efforts in Poland and subsequent campaigns in Western Europe indicated that the Americans and British were inferior to the Germans in providing effective CAS.^[11]

In the US, the concept of strategic bombing also raised questions about aircraft commanders’ authority in combat. To achieve the greatest effect in strategic bombing, theorists believed bombers should be centralised and concentrated under a single air commander. In 1940, this led the Army to publish the Air Corps Field Manual (FM) 1-10 Tactics and Technique of Air Attack, which outlined how commanders and forces would conduct air attacks, with special reference to command authority, bombardment, and planning. FM 1-10 also outlined the differences in air missions and how air superiority was achieved through strategic bombing, interdiction, and close support for ground forces. Specifically, regarding tactical air power, FM 1-10 emphasised that ‘temporary decentralization of control of combat aviation in direct support of armoured forces may be necessary in order to ensure the timely employment of aviation in close coordination with the supported forces for the accomplishment of a specific task.’^[12]

Nonetheless, ground commanders continued to view aircraft as an enabler in the combined arms team, much like an engineer or artillery asset that’s assigned to support a specific mission.^[13] The key outgrowth of this viewpoint was that ground force commanders should have tactical control of the aircraft. Ground force commanders feared that, if left concentrated under a single air commander, aviation assets would be delayed or unable to provide timely CAS. Ground commanders’ anxiety about delays in CAS was heightened during large-scale manoeuvre training in the Spring of 1942.[14] Conversely, airmen argued that without concentrating air assets, the USAACs would not achieve air superiority, resulting in further air and ground losses.^[15] Additionally, with increased demand for aviation units, fewer were available to participate in air-to-ground training manoeuvres. Moreover, air and ground commanders needed opportunities to train as combined arms teams to alleviate tension and solidify the newly developed doctrine through practical application.^[16]

Testing the Doctrine

In September 1941, the US Army Ground Forces (AGF) organised the Louisiana Maneuvers, led by its Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Lesley McNair. The Louisiana Maneuvers were a multi-week training exercise pitting the US Second Army against the US Third Army to test Army doctrine on a large scale.^[17] The manoeuvres recreated battlefield conditions to prepare leaders and units for combined-arms warfare by bridging the gap between doctrine and practice in large-scale training.^[18] Hundreds of aircraft ranging from medium and light bombers to US Navy dive bombers and fighters participated in the manoeuvres, demonstrating their capabilities to senior army commanders. Participating aircraft were evenly distributed between the two forces and organised under the Air Support Command (ASC). Air assets were centralised under the ASC for the exercise but remained available to support ground commanders’ missions, which was a doctrinal compromise specific to the Louisiana Maneuvers. The ASC focused heavily on achieving air superiority and conducting interdiction operations before the ground elements engaged each other, which aligned with the US Army Air Forces (USAAF) concept of employment in combat. The USAAF had been formed in 1941 and superseded the USSAC. It was one of three autonomous components of the US Army, each with its own chief of staff.

The Louisiana Maneuvers provided ground commanders with a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of aircraft at both tactical and operational levels of war. While air forces demonstrated their ability to attack fixed targets such as airfields, bridges, and key intersections, communication between air and ground elements remained difficult.[19] Additionally, due to communication delays, CAS requests took an average of 90 minutes to execute. The subsequent Carolina Maneuvers in November 1941 remedied this delay by implementing a ‘combat air support unit’ tasked with immediately responding to ground support requests.^[20] However, despite some successes in the Louisiana Maneuvers, conflict persisted between air and ground commanders over the lower priority of CAS missions relative to air superiority and interdiction.^[21]

The AGF had organised the Carolina Manoeuvres to test US Army armour and anti-tank doctrine. From an air power perspective, these manoeuvres differed from the Louisiana Maneuvers in that they created an imbalance of air assets, with IV Corps fighting against First Army, simulating the German assault across Europe from 1939 to 1941. As with the Louisiana Maneuvers, the ASC managed CAS requests; however, the preponderance of air missions still focused on gaining and maintaining air superiority and interdiction operations, thereby validating already published doctrine on the priority of air missions to isolate the battlefield in support of ground forces.^[22] Of the 167 raids flown by the 1^st and 3^rd ASCs, 99 went against aerodromes, railroads, and bridges, 37 against armoured and mechanised units and 31 against miscellaneous targets. As FM 1-10 stated, ‘the mission of first priority of combat aviation in support of ground force units is, whenever possible, the destruction or neutralization of effective hostile air resistance.’^[23] In an ideal environment, combat aviation eliminated hostile air threats before ground forces entered the battlefield. FM 1-10 provided for the use of combat aviation for CAS missions when ‘the operation is critical and the end to be accomplished warrants the acceptance of the risk of heavy losses in the friendly aviation forces.’^[24] The Carolina Maneuvers also demonstrated the potential of combat aviation to ‘set conditions’ before ground forces enter the battlefield by destroying hostile aircraft and disrupting sustainment efforts. While the issue of aircraft control persisted, advances in air-ground integration during the manoeuvres underscored combat aviation’s vital role within the combined-arms team in shaping the battlefield.

Another significant output from both manoeuvres was the publication of FM 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, which refined guidance on how combat aviation could support ground forces. As with FM 1-10, FM 100-5 Operations, and FM 100-15 Larger Units, FM 31-35 emphasised the need for close coordination and liaison between air and ground commanders during the planning and execution phases of operations. Likewise, the updated doctrine, while acknowledging the benefits of increased firepower and improved soldier morale from CAS, emphasised that combat aviation should not engage targets within the effective range of artillery or mortars.^[25] FM 31-35 exempted armour and mechanised forces that outpaced their organic or attached artillery or mortars, which required urgent CAS to maintain the initiative on the battlefield.^[26] FM 31-35 also codified the use of observation aircraft to support artillery missions and for area and route reconnaissance by all ground forces. During the Louisiana Maneuvers, pilots directed artillery fire and conducted reconnaissance missions in light aircraft to support the Third Army. This proved so successful in support of Third Army’s mission that the umpires of the exercise banned its use, as it gave an ‘unfair advantage to Third Army.’^[27] The use of observation aircraft magnified a unit’s ability to adjust fire and observe the enemy’s composition and disposition on the battlefield.^[28] Indeed, in North Africa, ‘air observation posts proved their value by their ability to bring the far side of hill masses, hidden to ground observation posts, under observed fire […] the German artillery did not fire as long as one of the (45th) division’s L-4s (observation aircraft) was in the air.’[29] Furthermore, FM 31-35 highlighted the issue of communication between support aircraft and ground units. Significantly, however, the highly secret and sensitive manual failed to detail specific methods for marking friendly or enemy units – much as the wider issue of incorporating unproven doctrine remained throughout the war.

The British experience of coordinating CAS during fighting in France and Africa since 1940 provided the Americans with applicable lessons. As with their USAAF counterparts, the British believed that achieving air superiority was the RAF’s priority and a precondition for conducting CAS, particularly in support of armoured or mechanised formations.^[30] The RAF viewed CAS as a tool to support ground forces beyond artillery range, enabling them to defeat hostile forces when organic means were unavailable.^[31] Indeed, Lieutenant Colonel J.D. Woodhall, one of the key figures in the development of British tactical air power after the Fall of France, wrote on September 3, 1940, that ‘in recent operations the Germans have employed air bombardment most effectively in co-operation with their army to sustain the impetus of advance of almost all types of formation and especially that of their armoured units.’[32]

RAF leaders, however, recognised the limitations of CAS as a reliable method of aiding the ground fight. The aircraft’s speed, the lack of effective communication between air and ground elements, and limited means for differentiating friendly from enemy forces often contributed to inaccuracies in CAS and incidents of fratricide on the battlefield.^[33] For example, during the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, the Luftwaffe provided CAS for advancing ground forces. Still, it relied upon Nazi flags draped across German vehicles to prevent incidents of fratricide.^[34] While there were instances of German innovations in air-to-ground coordination in Poland, it remained primitive. The inability to communicate effectively between air and ground forces negatively affected the Germans’ missions. Similarly, within the RAF, debate raged over which level of command would be delegated for CAS missions.^[35]

In October 1940, the RAF conducted an inter-service training exercise with ground and air personnel in Northern Ireland. The training scenario replicated the ideal British response to a German amphibious invasion of a British beach. The scope of the exercise focused on three challenges British commanders foresaw in conducting CAS for ground forces: first, the tactical employment of bombers in CAS for small forces; second, requesting CAS missions; and third, fighter cover or escort for bombers conducting CAS.^[36] After the exercise, the RAF and British Army identified communication between elements as a particular challenge, especially in a rapidly changing, dynamic combat environment. To ensure effective targeting of enemy forces, wireless communication between aircraft, ground forces, and command nodes had to be maintained. Additionally, the British recognised the value of attaching air reconnaissance squadrons to armoured formations to enhance situational awareness within units and battlefield effectiveness.^[37]

Another lesson with their Allied partners, once the United States entered the war, was the importance of close coordination between air and ground forces. The use of liaison officers at division-level echelons and above proved essential to the RAF’s successful CAS missions against Axis forces in Egypt and Libya in 1941. Furthermore, the RAF employed a system of ‘tentacles’ or forward control teams to maintain connectivity between air and ground forces via wireless communications.^[38] This system, which the British established, remained in place throughout the war. The concept of liaison personnel embedded in inter-service command posts was already in FM 31-35, confirming their effectiveness outside the training environment. The use of mobile forward control teams to manage the CAS fight was a novel idea for the Americans that gained traction in North Africa. The use of liaison officers provided significant value for the gaining command, and the forward control teams were the vital connection between air and ground forces.

Operation TORCH and the North Africa Campaign

Despite some experience in manoeuvres and benefits from British training and conceptual development, American forces entered the Second World War with an unproven doctrine of air-ground integration. Germany declared war on the US on 11 December 1941, four days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Once British and American leaders adopted a ‘Germany First’ strategy at the ARCADIA Conference in Washington, D.C., they postponed a cross-channel invasion of northwest Europe in favour of an Allied attack on the periphery of occupied Europe in northwest Africa.

Planning for TORCH envisaged an amphibious landing of over 100,000 Allied soldiers establishing a lodgement inland, seizing ports and aerodromes, consolidating forces, and eventually moving east into the rear area of Axis forces in Tunisia. Before the invasion, Allied heavy bombers carried out raids against Axis supply lines and facilities in Italy and Sicily while medium bombers interdicted Axis shipping in the Sicilian Strait.^[39] The air elements for TORCH consisted of two air forces: the American Twelfth Air Force, supporting the Western and Centre Task Forces (the US Fifth Army) landing at Casablanca and Oran, and the RAF Eastern Air Command supporting the Eastern Task Force (the British First Army) landing at Algiers. Initial air support for the Allied soldiers landing in North Africa came from carrier-based fighters; the Twelfth Air Force and Eastern Air Command relieved naval aviation once aerodromes were seized by ground forces.^[40] However, before TORCH, Allied leaders were unsure if the Vichy French forces would resist the invasion in French Morocco and Algeria. In addition, there were questions about whether Spain would remain neutral or join the fighting against the Allies alongside Axis forces.

Lieutenant General Dwight Eisenhower, serving as the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Mediterranean Theatre, envisioned the Twelfth Air Force conducting strategic and tactical missions, including CAS and the bombing of Axis shipping, ports, communication centres, and airfields beyond the horizon. Eisenhower believed the USAAF should centralise its air assets to target theatre-level threats and opposed distributing these assets to corps and division commanders.^[41] Further complicating the USAAF’s role during the North African invasion were the planned geographically separated landings. The Twelfth Air Force and Eastern Air Command could not support or coordinate their efforts to achieve air superiority.

On 8 November 1942, TORCH commenced with amphibious landings near Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. With the support of naval gunfire and carrier-based aircraft, Allied ground forces advanced inland and established secure lodgements beyond the beachhead. The Vichy French resistance was sporadic yet stubborn across multiple Allied landing sites. However, on 10 November, Eisenhower secured peace with Vichy French Admiral François Darlan, relegating Axis forces to positions in Tunisia, between predominantly American ground forces from the west and British ground forces from the east. In response, Germany occupied Vichy France.

As Allied forces advanced eastward towards Tunisia, they encountered stiff resistance from German Stuka dive-bombers, fighters, and medium bombers based at aerodromes near the front line and on Sicily, Sardinia, and the Italian mainland. To compound the problem, Allied fighter aerodromes were located more than 100 miles from the front lines, and bomber aerodromes more than 600 miles away, severely limiting Allied dwell time in support of ground forces. Due to the Allied air forces’ initial failure to achieve air superiority and interdict Axis lines of communication, the Germans were able to reinforce their African forces, unimpeded, with up to 1,000 soldiers and shiploads of equipment each day after TORCH.^[42] Allied ground force commanders pleaded for aircraft to provide air cover for their ground operations against German aircraft.^[43] For example, a member of the US 1st Armoured Division described how ‘the Germans can call for air support with only three rounds of smoke, and when they do, the Stukas are over immediately.’^[44] His experience was representative of many Americans throughout the North Africa campaign.

Soldiers and leaders on the ground expected air cover to protect them from the repeated German air attacks. Hearing of attacks on Axis harbours or aerodromes, essentially ’deep targets’ did little to boost the morale of the average soldier.^[45] Major General Terry Allen, the commander of the US 1^st Infantry Division, advocated for a division-level air advisor to expedite CAS requests.[46] Brigadier General Paul Robinett, commander of Combat Command B of the 1st Armoured Division, insisted, ‘that men cannot stand the mental and physical strain of constant aerial bombing without feeling that all possible is being done to beat enemy air efforts.’^[47] The incessant calls for air cover by ground commanders were granted, despite the need to establish air superiority against Axis forces.

Requests for air cover or CAS were prioritised over air-superiority missions, despite objections from RAF and USAAF leaders and the violation of both Allied air forces’ doctrines.^[48] The Luftwaffe maintained air superiority during the opening weeks of the North Africa campaign due to the proximity of its aerodromes to ground forces, its experience in CAS, and Allied mismanagement of aerial assets.^[49]

Part of the problem was the limited number of aircraft available to provide defensive air cover for ground forces while simultaneously seeking air superiority. After months of the ineffective use of CAS, including the tactical setback at Kasserine Pass, which resulted in aircraft losses from enemy and friendly fire, Eisenhower was convinced that the theatre air plan was insufficient.^[50] Indeed, the Battle of the Kasserine Pass was a low point for the Allies, especially American forces, in North Africa, as German forces advanced against inexperienced US troops and pushed them back more than 50 miles from their original positions. Allied reinforcements and air support, though ill-coordinated and delayed, attacked the overextended Germans, forcing them to withdraw. However, Allied inefficiencies in CAS, their inability to achieve air superiority, and significant coordination challenges necessitated a reorganisation of the Allied air forces in North Africa.^[51] This led Eisenhower to conclude that placing air elements under a centralised air commander could resolve the issues the Allies were facing in the theatre. At Kasserine, air reconnaissance provided little help to forward ground units; bombing missions were untimely; and CAS was in short supply. The deviation from interwar air-to-ground coordination doctrine resulted in the American inability to coordinate their air efforts during the first four months of the North African campaign. The subsequent organisational change, which reflected American interwar doctrine and the RAF’s utilisation, paid immediate dividends in North Africa, resulting in a more effective application of air-to-ground coordination and CAS for ground forces.

Senior Allied air commanders gathered at the Headquarters of the North African Tactical Air Force, Ain Beida, Algeria in 1943. Left to right: Air Marshal Sir Arthur ‘Mary’ Coningham, Air Officer Commanding, North African Tactical Air Forces (NATAF), Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, Northwest African Air Forces, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Mediterranean Air Command, and Brigadier General Laurence Kuter, Deputy Commander, NATAF. The meeting was probably called to defuse the public quarrel between Coningham and General George Patton, the Commander of the US II Army Corps in Tunisia, over the provision of air support to his troops. (Source: IWM (CNA 408))

On 18 February 1943, following the Casablanca Conference, which saw the American President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, along with their staffs, solidify Allied strategy for the remainder of 1943, the Northwest African Air Force (NAAF) was formed under Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz. The formation of NAAF centralised control of aircraft from the Twelfth Air Force and the Eastern Air Command under one theatre air commander.^[52] The Twelfth Air Force remained an administrative headquarters commanded by Spaatz. This organisational change reflected the doctrinal developments during the interwar period and experiences of both the American and British air forces before the North Africa campaign. The lessons the USAAF learned were Allied ones, given the joint nature of the Allied command structure during the war. NAAF consisted of seven subordinate units, each with a unique task to support theatre operations: the Tactical Air Force, Strategic Air Force, Coastal Air Force, Photographic Reconnaissance Wing, Troop Carrier Command, Training Command, and Service Command.^[53] Brigadier General Laurence Kuter, deputy commander of the Northwest African Tactical Air Forces (NATAF), wrote that in the previous structure, aircraft ‘were employed in direct support roles to the neglect of the proper offensive task of obtaining air superiority and thus assisting the theatre task as a whole. Each commander agreed that superiority in the air was necessary, but that someone else’s air force should fight the air war which could gain that superiority.^[54] The establishment of NAAF facilitated better coordination and unity of effort in allocating the appropriate number of aircraft for both strategic- and tactical-level targeting.

Under the new organisation, air commanders received co-equal status with ground commanders, ensuring that the limited number of aircraft was used efficiently in line with the prescribed doctrine and battlefield conditions.^[55] Moreover, in a letter from Major General Carl Spaatz to Lieutenant General Hap Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces, he wrote, ‘Air support of the ground forces on the other hand, cannot be made effective in the face of air supremacy, superiority and under certain conditions, even parity on the part of the enemy’s air forces. It follows from this that for the army to advance, the air battle must be won first […] Since air formations can move freely in the air without regard to terrain, it is evident from the above that the control of the air units must be centralised’ and cannot be divided into small packets among several armies or corps.’[56]

Leading NATAF was British Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, who was instrumental in developing the British forward air control parties in 1941. Opposing the employment of tactical aircraft in defensive air-cover missions, Coningham advocated the offensive pursuit of the enemy’s air force and bases, similar to the way the RAF employed its aviators against German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s forces in Libya.^[57] Coningham’s ideas on tactical-level air support were not new to the British contingent of officers on the NATAF staff, but they were for the American ones. As expected, ground commanders bristled at CAS being relegated to a secondary role in favour of air-superiority missions. Major General Omar Bradley, serving as the Deputy Commander of the American II Corps under General Lloyd Fredendall at the time, stated regarding CAS, ‘by the time our request for air support goes through channels the target’s gone, or the Stukas have come instead.’[58] To ease their concerns, Coningham distributed a pamphlet endorsed by British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery that advanced the British principle of concentrated air power. Highlighting the battle-winning factor of concentrated air power, the pamphlet read that ‘nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resources into small packets placed under command of army formation commanders, with each packet working on its own plan.’^[59] Coningham also received support from Eisenhower and Field Marshal Harold Alexander, the senior British army commander in North Africa, for the priority he placed on air superiority, despite continued complaints by Allied commanders for the lack of close air support aircraft. With the Kasserine Pass debacle behind them, the Allies began their counteroffensive against Axis forces with renewed vigour.

Central to Allied success in air-to-ground integration was inter-service and inter-Allied coordination. Coningham and Alexander, commander of the Allied 18^th Army Group, met daily to ensure that the air and land plans were synchronised to achieve a general victory on the battlefield.^[60] Concentrating air elements enabled greater flexibility to support prioritised ground forces while simultaneously fighting to gain air superiority. Eisenhower understood ground commanders’ demand for immediate air support but also recognised the far-reaching impact of air power beyond the tactical ground fight. Ground commanders’ vision was limited to their immediate operational area, preventing them from recognising the theatre’s needs.^[61] Improved communication between air and ground forces remained a critical need for the Allies as well. Spaatz encouraged increasing the number of air support parties assigned to ground forces to support CAS missions. Air support parties used radio communication with pilots, but its unreliability necessitated communication redundancy through landmarks, ground smoke, or coloured panels.^[62]

Despite operational setbacks and continued tension regarding the allocation of close support aircraft, the Allies achieved positive results by concentrating their strategic and tactical air formations in defeating the Axis forces in the air, interdicting Axis lines of communication between Tunisia and sustainment centres in Sicily, Sardinia, and mainland Italy, and through CAS, which enabled ground forces to isolate the increasingly tenuous Axis position on the continent.^[63] In late April 1943, the Allies successfully targeted German aerodromes at night and destroyed ‘129 Axis planes, including 72 out of 100 enemy transports. On 22 April, the Tactical Air Force destroyed 20 ME-323 6-engine transports carrying the equivalent of a regiment into Tunisia.’[64] The Allies’ greater focus on applying published doctrinal principles of airpower in North Africa enabled them to achieve air superiority and greater freedom of movement for the ground forces. NATAF aircraft conducted 1,500 sorties over ten days in the Medjerda Valley and other Axis strongholds to support the advance of Allied ground forces in their final push towards Bizerte and Tunis.^[65] The Allies achieved air superiority by early May, enabling the Allied breakthrough towards Tunis, which eventually fell on 13 May 1943, setting the stage for subsequent Allied operations in Sicily and mainland Europe.

Conclusion

The reorganisation of the Allied air forces in North Africa did not solve every problem in air-to-ground coordination during the Second World War. However, it established the path forward for the air component within the combined-arms team. In July 1943, during the height of the fighting in Sicily, the War Department published FM 100-20, ‘Command and Employment of Air Power.’ Identified as the USAAF ‘declaration of independence’ from ground forces, FM 100-20 harnessed the lessons from North Africa and directly influenced how the war was fought in Sicily and mainland Europe.^[66] FM 100-20 emphasised the primary role of the USAAF was to establish air superiority before interdicting enemy movement in rear areas and CAS for the ground component. The document codified command authority for aircraft in theatre, outlined their role as members of the combined arms team, and advocated increased interoperability with ground forces through liaison and training exercises.^[67]

As a result of the experience in North Africa, the USAAF’s role as part of the combined-arms team was solidified, and the air-ground doctrine written before the United States entered the war was validated.^[68] Indeed, tactical air forces are a theatre resource to serve at the behest of the theatre commander, not any one specific ground element. Major General Karl Truesdell, the Commandant of the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) at Fort Leavenworth, KS, wrote to Spaatz in March 1943 to inquire about the advancements in air-ground integration. Spaatz replied that, ‘until air supremacy has been established the commander of the Tactical Air Force may refuse any but the most urgent targets to concentrate his effort on the enemy aerodromes and installations necessary to secure air supremacy.’^[69] As a result of Spaatz’s letter and overall air-to-ground experiences in North Africa, students at CGSS in 1943 and after received more lessons on USAAF doctrine and its practical application than their predecessors, which proved essential for the success of planning and coordinating combined arms fighting on a massive scale in the European Theatre of Operations until the end of the war.

Major Darren Johnson is a US Army infantry officer currently serving as a Brigade Executive Officer in the 11^th Airborne Division. He’s previously served as a platoon leader, company commander, and instructor of military history at the United States Military Academy at West Point.

Header image: Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Air Command (left), in conference with Major General Carl Spaatz, Commander of the North-West African Air Forces, at Tedder’s Headquarters in Algiers, 1943. (Source: IWM (CNA 181))

[1] Peter R. Faber, ‘Interwar US Army Aviation and the Air Corps Tactical School: Incubators of American Airpower’ in Phillip Meilinger (ed.), The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (USAF. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997), p. 213.

[2] Kent Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team Including Organic Light Aviation. History of the Army Ground Forces Study No. 35 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948), p. 1.

[3] Guilio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2019), p. 49.

[4] Ibid., p. 47.

[5] Edgar Raines Jr., Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2000), p. 17.

[6] Richard Muller, ‘Close Air Support: The German, British, and American Experiences, 1918-1941,’ in Williamson Murray and Alan Millett (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 160.

[7] Ibid., p. 157.

[8] Ibid., pp. 164-5.

[9] Ibid., p. 165.

[10] Ibid., p. 171.

[11] Ibid., p. 181.

[12] FM 1-10 Air Corps Field Manual: Tactics and Techniques of Air Attack (Washington D.C.: War Department, 1942), p. 118.

[13] Christopher Rein, Forging the Ninth Army-XXIX TAC Team: The Development, Training, and Application of American Air-Ground Doctrine in World War II (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2019), p. 15.

[14] Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team, p. 7.

[15] Ibid., pp. 15-6.

[16] FM 1-10 Tactics and Techniques of Air Attack, p. 119.

[17] Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team, p. 88. McNair later became the Commanding General of the AGF after the War Department’s reorganization in March of 1942. Tragically, McNair was killed while observing close support bombing during the breakout from Normandy in July 1944.

[18] Christopher Gabel, ‘The 1941 Maneuvers: What did they Really Accomplish?’ Army History 14 (1990), p. 5.

[19] Rein, Forging the Ninth Army-XXIX TAC Team, p. 36.

[20] Ibid., p. 37.

[21] Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team, pp. 17-8.

[22] Rein, Forging the Ninth Army-XXIX TAC Team, pp. 39-40.

[23] FM 1-10 Tactics and Techniques of Air Attack, p. 115.

[24] Ibid., p. 116.

[25] FM 31-35 Basic Field Manual: Aviation in Support of Ground Forces (Washington D.C.: War Department, 1942), p. 10.

[26] Ibid., pp. 26-27.

[27] Raines Jr., Eyes of Artillery, p. 51.

[28] FM 31-35 Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, p. 26.

[29] Raines Jr, Eyes of Artillery, p. 162.

[30] Wann Woodall, Experimental Training in Close Support Bombing (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School, 1941), p. 14.

[31] Ibid., pp. 14, 19.

[32] Ibid., p. 19.

[33] Ibid., p. 20.

[34] Williamson Murray, ‘May 1940: Contingency and fragility of the German RMA’ in Macgregor Knox, and Williamson Murray (eds.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 163.

[35] Woodall, Experimental Training in Close Support Bombing, p. 43.

[36] Ibid., p. 47.

[37] Ibid., p. 55

[38] Rein, Forging the Ninth Army-XXIX TAC Team, pp. 18-19.

[39] CMH Publication 100-6, To Bizerte with the II Corps (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990), p. 3.

[40] Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Historical Division, Air Phase of the North African invasion, November 1942 (U.S. Air Force Historical Study, 1944), pp. 19-20.

[41] Daniel Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support, North Africa (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1987), pp. 52-3.

[42] Ibid., 2.

[43] Matthew St. Clair, ‘Operation Husky and the Invasion of Sicily’: The Twelfth US Air Force: Tactical and Operational Innovations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 1943–1944, (Air University Press, 2007), p. 9.

[44] G-3 Training Section. Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia (Allied Force Headquarters, 1943), pp. 62-3.

[45] Thomas Mayock, AAF Historical Office, Headquarters, Army Air Forces. Twelfth Air Force in the North African winter campaign, 11 November 1942 to the reorganization of 18 February 1943, (U.S. Air Force Historical Study, 1946), p. 44.

[46] Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, p. 61.

[47] Ibid., p. 61.

[48] Ibid., p. 61.

[49] St Clair, Operation Husky and the Invasion of Sicily, p. 9.

[50] Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, pp. 70-2.

[51] Ibid., pp. 59, 62.

[52] St Clair, Operation Husky and the Invasion of Sicily, pp. 11-12.

[53] Karl Truesdell, ‘Northwest African Air Forces’ (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School, 1943), pp. 1-2.

[54] Laurence Kuter, ‘Northwest African Tactical Air Forces: Organization of American Air Forces’ (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 1945), p. 2.

[55] St Clair, Operation Husky and the Invasion of Sicily, pp. 12-3.

[56] Ibid., p. 13.

[57] Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, p. 72.

[58] Muller, Close Air Support, p. 187.

[59] Ibid., p. 76.

[60] Ibid., p. 83.

[61] Ibid., p. 84.

[62] Ibid., p. 85.

[63] Robert Ehlers Jr., The Mediterranean Air War: Airpower and Allied Victory in World War II (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015), p. 285.

[64] CMH Publication 100-6, To Bizerte with the II Corps, p. 3.

[65] Ibid., pp. 4, 28, 40.

[66] St. Clair, Operation Husky and the Invasion of Sicily, p. 13.

[67] FM 100-20 Field Service Regulations: Command and Employment of Air Power (Washington D.C.: War Department, 1943), pp. 15-6.

[68] Kuter, ‘Northwest African Tactical Air Forces,’ p. 9.

[69] Truesdell, ‘Northwest African Air Forces,’ p. 9.

#Podcast – “A Dizzy Idea” – The Airplanes that Didn’t Make It: An Interview with Dr Kenneth P. Werrell

Editorial Note: Led by Editor Dr Mike Hankins, From Balloons to Drones, produces a monthly podcast that provides an outlet for the presentation and evaluation of air power scholarship, the exploration of historical topics and ideas, and provides a way to reach out to both new scholars and the general public. You can find our Soundcloud channel here. You can also find our podcast on Apple Podcasts and Google Podcasts.

For every military aircraft that takes to the skies, many others never get off the drawing board or make it into full production. Renowned and prolific aviation historian Kenneth P. Werrell talks to us in his new book, Air Force Disappointments, Mistakes, and Failures, 1940-1990, about some of these projects and why some aeroplanes never seem to take off.

Dr Kenneth P. Werrell is the author of Death from the Heavens: A History of Strategic Bombing, Sabres over MIG Alley: The F-86 and the Battle for Air Superiority over Korea, Chasing the Silver Bullet: US Air Force Weapons Development from Vietnam to Desert Storm, Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers Over Japan During World War II, and other books.

Header image: A North American XB-70A Valkyrie rolling out after landing, employing drag chutes to slow down. In the photo, the outer wing panels are slightly raised. The panels were lowered to improve stability when the XB-70 was flying at high speed. (Source: Wikimedia)

#FilmReview – Masters of the Air, Episode Nine

By Dr Luke Truxal

Editorial note: On 26 January 2024, Apple TV+ launched the much-anticipated series Masters of the Air. This series follows the actions of the US 100th Bomb Group during the Combined Bomber Offensive in the Second World War. As the series is being aired, our Book Reviews Editor, Dr Luke Truxal, the author of Uniting against the Reich (2023), will critically review each episode.

In the final episode of Masters of the Air, we see the episode successfully bringing the plots of the US 100^th Bomb Group to a satisfying conclusion. It did well as an episode designed to finish the series and bring it to a successful landing. During the episode, we see the major characters resolve their past and begin to face their futures. Major Harry Crosby struggles with the nature of the air war and toils with how he has changed during the war. This is something that he struggled with after the war, like most veterans. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Rosenthal saw the Holocaust first-hand as he toured a concentration camp after he was shot down and rescued by troops from the Soviet Union’s Red Army. After the war, Rosenthal participated in the prosecution of Nazi officials at Nuremberg for their roles in the Holocaust. Finally, we see Majors Gale Clevan and John Egan face the horrors of the march from Stalag Luft III to their new camp at Mooseberg. During the march, Egan finally embraces the leadership role he had tried to avoid throughout the series.

The episode begins with Rosenthal and the 100^th Bomb Group attacking Berlin in February 1945. During the raid, Rosenthal is shot down for the second time in the war. As his plane falls out of formation, he makes his way towards the Soviet lines east of Berlin. By buying this time, he gave his crew the best opportunity to be rescued by the Soviets. After Rosenthal bails out and lands behind the Soviet lines, the viewers get their first glimpse of the nature of the fighting on the Eastern Front. German soldiers are shot as they are surrendering. This might be the only time we see the Eastern Front in a series produced by Tom Hanks and Stephen Spielberg, and they execute it well. The fighting on the Eastern Front was one without mercy, and the writers did not shy away from showing Soviet war crimes. After Rosenthal is rescued, he spends time behind the Soviet lines. At one point, he tours a concentration camp that the Red Army had liberated. He is clearly shaken by what he has seen. Later, before he is put on an aeroplane to begin his long circuitous route back to Thorpe Abbotts, he meets with a Jewish family. He starts to ask questions about what happened during the German occupation. As he begins to learn about the nature of the genocide conducted by the Germans, he is clearly shaken and changed by this experience. By the time he returns to Crosby at Thorpe Abbotts, he has no remorse for the German people suffering under the bombs after what he has seen.

Masters_Of_The_Air_Photo_010902 — Nate Mann in *Masters of the Air*. (Source: Apple TV+)

Crosby himself is dealing with many changes in his life. During the latter months at Thorpe Abbotts, we can see that he is becoming more challenging to live with as the only original group member to remain with the 100^th Bomb Group throughout the war. At one point, he physically assaults another officer for failing to have the equipment room ready for the combat crews as they are trying to get their parachutes for the upcoming raid. This is something that Crosby notes in his book, A Wing and a Prayer, on several occasions, which is partially why he was sent on leave to the United States. When Rosenthal returns, Crosby updates him on his life and the fact that he will become a father. Crosby doubts whether he will be a good father after everything he has gone through. He also hints at his doubts about the morality of some of the bombings that they are doing. Rosenthal lets Crosby know he will be a good father and tries to get him to put aside his doubts about the air war. This is another good discussion because it shows the divisions airmen felt over their attacks against Germany. It also shows how the war has changed Crosby and Rosenthal. Rosenthal gains confidence that they are doing the right thing in the air war after his experiences on the ground, but Crosby has doubts due to the destruction of German cities and significant losses of life.

Clevan and Egan are given short notice that they have only minutes to pack as they are about to leave Stalag Luft III with the Soviets driving towards the camp. This is the beginning of their march to a new camp, Stalag VII-A, located in Moosburg, Germany. On the march, we see the Americans witness the downfall of Nazi Germany within Germany itself. We still see the prisoners attacked and strafed by United States Army Air Force P-51 Mustangs, which misidentified them as a troop column. In another instance, we see the fanatical support for Hitler’s Germany in one of the guards participating in the march. At the same time, we see an armoured column of German soldiers pass the prisoners. Those in the armoured column clearly look beaten. In addition to the veterans who have seen too much combat in a war that they have clearly lost by this point, we also see the images of young boys and older men in the armoured formation. As the column gets closer to Moosburg, Clevan sees an opportunity for a number of other prisoners to attempt to escape. Realising that he will not make it, Egan obstructs the German guards pursuing Clevan and his comrades. This is where Egan really shines. Instead of trying to make a bolt for it, he helps his friend and comrades escape. Thus ensuring he would remain a prisoner for the remainder of the war. The story for Egan ends when he is liberated from Moosburg with the other prisoners by the US 14^th Armored Division.

Masters_Of_The_Air_Photo_010904 — Callum Turner and Austin Butler in *Masters of the Air* (Source: Apple TV+)

The episode ends with the ground personnel packing up Thorpe Abbotts and the 100^th Bomb Group taking off to return home to the United States. While the aircrews fly back on their planes, the ground echelon returns to the United States via troop transport across the Atlantic. The series ends on a sombre note. During their final pre-flight check, Egan asks Clevan what he is thinking. Clevan responds by stating that he is thinking about the airmen they left behind. Due to the high attrition rate in the air war, many viewers struggled to connect with many of the new crews as the original members of the 100^th Bomb Group were shot down. For men like Egan and Clevan, the losses of their comrades like Biddick and Bubbles, stuck with them long after the war. This brief moment tries to remind viewers of the high losses that the 100^th Bomb Group and US Eighth Air Force suffered throughout the war.

Like previous episodes, this one has a couple of missed opportunities. First, seeing more of the US 332^nd Fighter Group in this episode and the rest of the series would have been nice. Viewers never really saw the group conduct bomber escort missions, which it became known for throughout the air war. Additionally, there was an opportunity to cover Operation Thunderclap and the firebombing of Dresden from 13 to 15 February 1945. This would have provided better context for the viewers as Crosby and Rosenthal discuss the merits of the air war itself. Finally, I will state that the British spy plot that was dropped during the episode was the smart call to save airtime from tying off the other plot lines developed throughout the series. This decision did make me wonder why that story was even being told in the first place.

Overall, Masters of the Air has now become the best depiction of the American experience in the air war over Europe on screen. While this series has a lot of flaws, which I have noted throughout these reviews, it covers more ground than other depictions of the air war well. Also, it captures the nature of the fighting in ways that previous depictions could not be due to the technological limitations of their times. This series did a good job of paying homage to the experience of the American airman while also showing the brutality of air combat. Whereas previous depictions of air warfare chose to depict combat in the skies as more knightly duels or did not have the technological capabilities to fully capture the horrors of the air war, this series brought the struggles of the American airman front and centre. Scholars now have a series they can better use to talk about the air war with students and the public. I hope this series will inspire many young viewers to be the next generation of air power historians who usher in more scholarship on this subject at a time when it is most needed. While it is too early to tell, this series has renewed interest in the air war and the men who flew these planes into combat. If that is the only legacy of the television series, it has already contributed significantly to the field by renewing interest in the topic.

Dr Luke Truxal is an adjunct at Columbia State Community College in Tennessee. He completed his PhD in 2018 at the University of North Texas with his dissertation, ‘Command Unity and the Air War Against Germany.’ His previous publications include ‘Bombing the Romanian Rail Network’ in the Spring 2018 issue of Air Power History. He also wrote ‘The Politics of Operational Planning: Ira Eaker and the Combined Bomber Offensive in 1943’ in the Journal of Military Aviation History. In addition, Truxal is researching the effectiveness of joint air operations between the Allied air forces in the Second World War. He can be reached on Twitter at @Luke_Truxal.

Header image: Austin Butler in Masters of the Air. (Source: Apple TV+)

#Podcast – “There is a Holy Trinity of US Air Force History”: An Interview with Dr Brian Laslie

In our latest podcast, we put our co-host and editor, Dr Brian Laslie, in the hot seat to discuss his newest book, Fighting from Above: A Combat History of the US Air Force, from the University of Oklahoma Press. He discusses the earliest days of American air power up through the present and looks into the future.

Dr Brian Laslie is a US Air Force Historian and Command Historian at the United States Air Force Academy. Formerly, he was the Deputy Command Historian at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). A 2001 graduate of The Citadel and a historian of air power studies, he received his Masters’ from Auburn University Montgomery in 2006 and his PhD from Kansas State University in 2013. He is the author of Air Power’s Lost Cause: The American Air Wars of Vietnam (2021), Architect of Air Power: General Laurence S. Kuter and the Birth of the US Air Force (2017) and The Air Force Way of War (2015). The latter book was selected for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force’s 2016 professional reading list and the 2017 RAF Chief of the Air Staff’s reading list. He can be found on Twitter at @BrianLaslie.

Header image: A North American P-51 Mustang of the United States Army Air Force over France, c. 1944. (Source: US National Archives and Records Administration)

#FilmReview – Masters of the Air, Episode Seven

By Dr Luke Truxal

For the first time in the Masters of the Air television series, I was genuinely disappointed in an episode. There were two significant issues with this episode. The first major problem has now become a glaring problem for the show, which is the inability to tell a story outside the US 100^th Bomb Group with the quality that it deserves. This is either because the show relies so heavily on veteran accounts that it cannot tell the larger story or because the show only half-heartedly covers the topic, like checking a box on an essay due at the end of class. The second major issue is that this episode wasted priceless minutes of television time covering stories and plots that, in the grand scheme of things, are not as important as other aspects of the air war. In many respects, this is likely a major reason why the show will do some more box-checking in the coming episodes. The series spends too much screen time on less critical plots and must condense more essential stories into the final two episodes.

For this review, I will not give an overview of the episode and jump straight into the problems because there is much to criticise. The first major issue that this episode, and the show more generally, struggle with is its treatment of those not members of the 100^th Bomb Group. First, generals are written as blundering fools who do not care about their men. In the third episode, Colonel Curtis LeMay’s aggressiveness is blamed for the disaster of the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid, even though he flew in the lead plane for the mission. Also, it left out the debates that US VIII Bomber Command struggled with in determining whether to send out the raid. This theme continued in this episode. While the episode did a good job of covering the aftermath of the 6 March 1944 Berlin raid well, during the planning and briefing of the 8 March raid, the writers decided to portray the commander of the US Eighth Air Force, Lieutenant General James Doolittle, and the commander of the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, as blundering fools who are using the same navigational route for back to back raids. As an audience member, it is hard to decide whether the showrunners want us to believe these men are unintelligent, lazy, or do not care. Most likely all the above. For perspective, the navigational route was chosen because it avoided flak concentrations and limited combat losses.[1]

Masters_Of_The_Air_Photo_010707 — Kai Alexander and Bailey Brook in *Masters of the Air*. (Source: Apple TV+)

The show did not stop there. At the end of this episode, the new commander of the 100^th Bomb Group, Lieutenant Colonel John Bennett, lays out the latest air strategy for gaining air superiority at the end of the episode to Captain Robert Rosenthal. He states that the new strategy going into March and April 1944 will be to win the air war by using the bombers as bait for the fighters so that the newly arrived long-range escort fighters, the North American P-51 Mustangs, can shoot down the German fighters. There are so many ways in which that scene does an injustice to the strategic, operational, and tactical changes Spaatz and Doolittle implemented at the beginning of 1944. Starting with the strategic picture. Spaatz rightfully argued that Operation OVERLORD could not go forward if the air superiority had not been gained before troops began landing in Normandy. This was a huge point of contention between Spaatz and the commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory.[2] Spaatz went into 1944 to grind down the Luftwaffe through a large series of air battles carried out through the skilful concentration of all American air forces in the European and Mediterranean Theaters of Operations. Spaatz deserves much credit for bringing maximum pressure to bear on the Luftwaffe and degrading their combat effectiveness, starting with Big Week from 20 to 25 February 1944 and continuing through March and April 1944. Furthermore, the tactical changes implemented by the Eighth Air Force came from Doolittle. Doolittle changed the fighter tactics when he took over the Eighth Air Force from Lieutenant General Ira Eaker in January 1944. This came in two parts. First, American fighter pilots were no longer merely escorts as they were in 1943. Once engaged, American fighter pilots were to pursue German fighters even if it meant leaving the bomber stream. This was a more effective means to gain air superiority by prioritising shooting down German fighters. Additionally, Doolittle adopted the idea of using a bouncing fighter group, whose job was to roam the edges of the bomber formation in search of German fighters preparing to attack the bombers. These are well-known changes to scholars of the air war and can be easily told on screen to an audience. However, by stating that the generals wanted to use the bombers as bait, the show has given the impression to the audience that the American generals do not care about their losses and that this is simply a numbers game for the brass.

Another problem with this show is the anti-British bias that shows up. By this point, I wonder whether the showrunners think the British military can do anything well. While the criticisms of the British night bombing strategy in the second episode of the series were warranted, the scene did not convey the message well. I initially thought this was merely a poorly written-scene. At this point in the series, I think it is safe to say that whoever is writing the scenes regarding the British military holds them in contempt. It comes up again and again throughout the episodes. Sometimes in tiny doses. At other times, quite openly, as we saw in episodes two and six. In this episode, we get two more doses of British failures. While listening to the radio at Stalag Luft III, the Americans hear about the British failure to take Monte Casino in Italy. Later in the episode, there is the failure of the Great Escape, in which 76 British and Commonwealth prisoners escape the camp. Only three can evade captivity and get back home. Of the 73 that were captured, 50 were executed in retaliation. This is a significant moment for those living at Stalag Luft III and is a sign of British and Commonwealth prisoners continuing to wage war against the Germans using whatever means are at their disposal, including escape. Instead, it is portrayed as another British failure, and the consequences make life at the camp harder for the Americans of the 100^th Bomb Group interred there. These are just two examples of the shortcomings of this show to tell the bigger picture. Where Band of Brothers (2001) and The Pacific (2010) did a much better job providing context, Masters of the Air has fallen dreadfully short by putting so much emphasis on the perspective of the airmen. There is no sugarcoating it: this show is bad at telling stories outside the 100^th Bomb Group.

These problems pale in comparison to the poor use of screen time in this episode. Much of this episode was dedicated to two plots that did not serve a significant purpose and took away screen time to lay the groundwork for more critical plots. First, much of the plot at Stalag Luft III centred on maintaining some news of the outside world using a handmade radio that the airmen kept hidden. While this did indeed happen, the radio plot took away time that could have be en better spent. While at Stalag Luft III, Major John Egan handled security, and Major Buck Clevan oversaw education at the South Compound.[3] Telling these stories provides more insight into camp life than focusing on losing and rebuilding a radio. Furthermore, the show ended teasing that the Tuskegee airmen would first appear in the eighth or nine episodes. It would have been nice to use some of the time in this episode to show the challenges black airmen faced in their fight to serve their country as fighter pilots and help orchestrate significant civil rights changes in the military through their service. Instead, like with the film Red Tails, Masters of the Air has chosen to skip the crucial challenges faced during training in the United States. This was a big missed opportunity. This is why this episode is so bad. The US 332^nd Fighter Group’s story deserves more than a token appearance in the television series. Either tell the story well or save that story for a different television series. Simply throwing this story in without telling the back story does not do the history or airmen justice. For a better portrayal of black fighter pilots’ challenges, see the film The Tuskegee Airmen (1995).

This episode was a disappointment. This review cannot do a proper recap and review that covers every issue with this episode. Instead, I highlighted major flaws and trends in the episode and series. The treatment of other nationalities fighting against the Axis and the treatment of high-ranking officers do this series and subject a disservice. These are symptoms of long-growing problems with this show. This specific episode wasted valuable screen time on less essential plots like Captain Harry Crosby’s fictional infidelity and the time spent fixing a radio. By spending valuable minutes on these storylines, the show missed great opportunities to tell important narratives. This will have grave consequences as the show tries to introduce new storylines and wrap up the show in the final two episodes. Unfortunately, this is where the show is headed. Masters of the Air seems determined to give token coverage to serious issues while wasting valuable time on less important topics. This is an unfortunate development for a show I have come to enjoy.

Dr Luke Truxal is an adjunct at Columbia State Community College in Tennessee. He completed his PhD in 2018 from the University of North Texas with his dissertation ‘Command Unity and the Air War Against Germany.’ His previous publications include ‘Bombing the Romanian Rail Network’ in the Spring 2018 issue of Air Power History. He also wrote ‘The Politics of Operational Planning: Ira Eaker and the Combined Bomber Offensive in 1943’ in the Journal of Military Aviation History. In addition, Truxal is researching the effectiveness of joint air operations between the Allied air forces in the Second World War. He can be reached on Twitter at @Luke_Truxal.

Header image: Nate Mann in Masters of the Air. (Source: Apple TV+)

[1] Donald Caldwell and Richard Muller, The Luftwaffe Over Germany: Defense of the Reich (Barnsley: Frontline Books, 2014), p. 168.

[2] Luke Truxal, Uniting Against the Reich: The American Air War in Europe, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2023), p. 115-7.

[3] Donald Miller, Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 389.

#FilmReview – Masters of the Air, Episode Six

By Dr Luke Truxal

Episode six of Masters of the Air was a transition episode. From now on, the television series will focus on the stories of three main characters and the stories around them. Additionally, the show is now trying to broaden its perspective from the US 100^th Bomb Group to tell other stories related to the air war. Overall, this episode did a good job of setting up this new format, but whether the show will benefit from changing its approach to storytelling remains to be seen.

John Orloff’s thesis in episode six is about three men running from their fates. The show begins with Major John Egan trying to evade German police, military, and civilians. For the first time in the show, Egan faces the consequences of his actions as he encounters German civilians who either fear him or want to kill him in retaliation for the American air raids that are killing civilians as collateral damage in their bombing campaign or more directly trying to kill them to bring pressure on German morale as we saw in the last episode. There are several moments where it seems like Egan will escape his fate by evading his captors, but Egan is not so fortunate. He must face the brutal experience of being a prisoner of war at Stalag Luft III.

While Egan tried to escape capture, Lieutenant Robert Rosenthal attempted to run from the burden of leadership. During the episode, Rosenthal and his crew are sent to a ‘Flak Farm’ to recuperate after being the sole plane from the 100^th Bomb Group to return from the 10 October 1943 Munster raid. Rosenthal spends much of the episode distancing himself from his crew. While Rosenthal makes it clear to those around him that he feels a deep sense of duty to continue flying and fighting the war, he is also reluctant to really engage with his men during this time off. Ultimately, Rosenthal comes to terms with the reality that he is not just a pilot fighting the war against Germany but also a crucial leader for his crew and the 100^th Bomb Group. This is shown in Rosenthal’s final scene. He is standing at the door of his plane and gathering the inner strength to get inside one more time. This matters to his men, and the new crews witness someone who barely survived ‘Black Week’ going back into battle with a workman-like attitude.

Finally, Captain Harry Crosby spends the episode running away from his demon, survivor’s guilt. Crosby does not discuss losing his friend, Captain Joseph ‘Bubbles’ Payne. At the beginning of the episode, he is sent to attend a series of Oxford lectures designed to encourage greater cooperation amongst Allied personnel. During this episode, he meets Subaltern Alessandra Westgate. Her role in the war is never clear, but much speculation exists. Crosby spends much of the episode trying to bury his feelings about the loss of Payne by attending lectures and parties, but he finally unloads his guilt on Westgate. He questions why he survived, and Payne did not. Ultimately, Westgate reminds Crosby that this is not his fault. It is the fault of Germany for starting this war and bringing about the destruction that has affected so many lives as a result.

Masters_Of_The_Air_Photo_010606 — Austin Butler in *Masters of the Air*. (Source: Apple TV+)

While a solid episode, some problems need to be discussed. First, the show has gone to great lengths to try and separate the Luftwaffe and the actions of the SS and Gestapo. This plays into the ‘clean Luftwaffe’ myth, which historians like Victoria Taylor are trying to debunk with their research. The head of the Luftwaffe, Reichsmarshall Herman Goering, was one of the early members of the Nazi Party and participated in the Beer Hall Putsch in Munich. He was one of the most senior-ranking members of the Nazi Party at this point in the war. The Luftwaffe that he created embraced the ideals of the Nazi Party. The show fails to show that the Luftwaffe interrogation techniques were different because the Luftwaffe believed that they were more effective at acquiring information from American airmen. Also, this is the same Luftwaffe that executed 50 British prisoners during the Great Escape. Donald Miller wrote about why the Luftwaffe used a different interrogation approach in his book Masters of the Air.[1] This is another instance where the show might have benefited more by adding a little bit more context, but unfortunately, it failed here.

Overall, this episode showed three new aspects of the air war through the attempts by Egan, Rosenthal, and Crosby to evade their own personal battles in the air war. We see ‘Flak Houses’ covered in decent detail, the struggle of those who question why they were left behind, and finally, through Egan, we know the experience of those who try to escape but are captured. While there are problems that historians will have with this episode regarding the treatment of the Luftwaffe, this episode does highlight more aspects of the air war for audiences less educated on the experience of American airmen. Like with the first three episodes, the show struggles to put the experiences of American airmen into a broader context that audiences and scholars could really benefit from. This was another good but not great episode.

Header image: Callum Turner in Masters of the Air. (Source: Apple TV+)

[1] Donald Miller, Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), pp. 386-7.

#Podcast – “I want to serve in the same way they did”: An Interview with Dr Sarah Myers

During the Second World War, it was not only men who flew military aeroplanes. Many women flew all kinds of aeroplanes in various roles in the United States, many of them members of the Women’s Airforce Service Pilots (WASP). Their story did not end with the war either, as they fought for recognition as veterans throughout the 1960s and 70s. In our latest interview, From Balloons to Drones, Dr Sarah Myers joins us to discuss these women’s unique roles in the war and beyond and their legacy today.

Dr Sarah Parry Myers is an Associate Professor of History at Messiah University in central Pennsylvania, where she teaches courses on 20th Century U.S. history, gender history, public history, and war and society. Myers is the author of Earning Their Wings: The WASPs of World War II and the Fight for Veteran Recognition (2023). She previously attended a National Endowment of the Humanities Summer Institute on Veterans Studies. She received a 2020-2022 National Endowment of the Humanities Dialogues on the Experience of War grant, ‘We are Veterans Too: Women’s Experiences in the U.S. Military.’

Header image: Four United States Women’s Airforce Service Pilots members receive final instructions as they chart a cross-country course on the flight line of a US airport. Assigned to the ferrying division of the United States Army Air Transport Command, the women pilots belong to the first class of American women to complete a rigorous nine-week transitional flight training course in handling B-26 Marauder medium bombers. They have been given special assignments with the US Army Air Forces as tow target pilots. (Source: US National Archives and Records Administration)

#FilmReview – Masters of the Air, Episode Five

By Dr Luke Truxal

At halfway through Masters of the Air, we finally reached the culmination point for the Americans during the 1943 air offensive, Black Week. There are a lot of essential storylines that the creators of Masters of the Air needed to nail with the exact right tone. For the first time in a televised depiction of the American air war against Germany, we get two new major themes the series tries to address. First, losing. Black Week, which lasted from 8 to 14 October 1943, was the final straw for the US Eighth Air Force. During the course of the week, American aircrew and bomber losses reached such a level that they could no longer maintain their air offensive. Films such as Twelve O’clock High (1949) and Memphis Belle (1990) depict the mounting casualties, but we never see the Americans lose at the end of the day. Even in Band of Brothers (2001) and The Pacific (2010), Americans perform quite well. The Market-Garden episode was the only episode amongst those previous works that depicted a setback, but it was only for a single episode. Masters of the Air has been building to this point since it began. Another major topic that the series addresses that usually gets overlooked on film is attacks on German civilians. Previous depictions of the air war typically avoid discussing the morality of the air war, but Masters of the Air takes it on. This episode breaks much ground in how the air war is depicted on film. For the first time, audiences are getting to see an American campaign end in a loss, and the United States shift towards attacks against civilians.

The episode begins with Major John Egan drinking in a B-17 Flying Fortress and struggling with losing his good friend, Major Gale Clevan. Egan has been hit hardest by the loss of his good friend. While the group is reeling, they do get some good news with the arrival of Captain Everett Blakely’s crew and navigator Second Lieutenant Harry Crosby. After everyone reconvenes at the bar, we soon learn that Crosby has been promoted to group navigator and Captain Joseph ‘Bubbles’ Payne has been demoted. Crosby is told to report to headquarters when the red light flashes to begin planning the next mission. On cue, the red light starts flashing, and viewers get a behind-the-curtain look at the chaos that occurs as the group plans for its next raid. It is not unheard of for those involved in planning to work nights and sleep during the day. Crosby mentions the stress of planning and briefing his fellow navigators. He feels the weight of the whole group on his shoulders and wonders if something he did wrong could lead to calamity.

During the briefing, the new mission and target are announced. It is Munster. The target is the marshalling yards in the city centre. During the briefing, it was also noted that the bombs would likely also hit German workers living next to the rail yards. The yards are next to the town cathedral, and the mission is flown on Sunday, 10 October 1943. This does not sit well with group members like the veteran Captain Charles Cruikshanks. He and Egan argue over the merits of attacking German civilians, including women and children. Egan argues that it will bring the war to an end earlier, but despite his words, this is really about revenge. As the conversation ends, Cruikshanks is still clearly unhappy with the tenor of the conversation and target selection. This great scene shows the divide among American airmen over the shift to area bombing during the war. American airmen knew attacking civilians through area bombing was both a war crime and morally wrong. Also, this was not how they were trained to prosecute their air offensive. Yet others, like Egan, thought it was a way to hasten the war’s end. It is a great scene that does not seek to justify area bombing but simultaneously exposes the divisions amongst the Americans over the switch in tactics. A lot of television series and movies would have punted on this topic. John Orloff, who wrote this episode, deserves much credit for tackling this subject and writing these scenes well.

Masters_of_the_Air__Photo_010503 — Nate Mann in Masters of the Air, episode five. (Source: AppleTV+)

As the bombers take off, we learn that the 100^th Bomb Group can only muster 17 B-17s for this raid, many of which are loaned to them by other groups. As the groups formed, we quickly learned that the 100th Bomb Group was too far behind the rest of the 14^th Bombardment Wing. Making matters worse, four B-17s had to turn back due to aircraft malfunctions, leaving the strike force with only 13 B-17s. They are too far back from the other groups and short on aircraft. Egan notes that they are a perfect target for the Luftwaffe. As the bombers approached the target, German fighters attacked in massive head-on passes. One can understand why viewers might think this scene is an embellishment of the actual air battle, but it was not. Approximately 200 German fighters attacked the 14^th Bombardment Wing, singling out the 100^th Bomb Group in the rear of the formation. In a matter of minutes, veterans that we had come to love are shot down. Egan and Brady bail out, Cruikshanks falls out of formation, and his crew bail out, and finally, we see the B-17 with Bubbles on it take a direct hit and collide with another B-17, killing him in the explosion. The perspective has switched to Rosenthal’s aircraft and crew by this point. The combat is so fast and intense that Rosenthal and the viewers experience the same shock when they realize his ship is the last in the formation, still in the air. The music is great here to create a sense of both eeriness and fear as the aircrew comes to grips with the fact that an entire bomb group has been blasted out of the sky for the first time in the air war. During the historical raid, German fighters eliminated the 100^th Bomb Group during the first 10 minutes of a 45-minute air battle.^[1] The show does a great job of showing how fast and sudden these losses are.

Back at Thorpe Abbotts, everyone waits for the return of the bombers. The first sign that something is wrong occurs when a bomber from the 390^th Bomb Group arrives at the airfield. Colonel Neil “Chic” Harding calls the bomber to ask what happened to his bombers and soon finds out that they are all gone. As this occurs, Rosenthal’s plane returns, giving some hope that more might have made it back. That hope is soon dashed as Rosenthal’s crew relates the mission’s events in interrogation. The mood is sombre. The episode ends with Crosby packing up his good friend Bubbles’ foot locker to send home to his family. This is where Crosby finally breaks down and cries. For many of the airmen and ground personnel in the 100^th Bomb Group they have reached the end of the line for this campaign physically and emotionally. This is how the 1943 campaign ended for many other groups. This is where we leave the 100^th Bomb Group in the next episode. Episodes four and five are the best of the series by far. We have seen the morality of the air war brought into question, and the Americans lost the air war in 1943. Those who worked on this project went on a limb in the last two episodes by depicting sides of the air war that scholars are familiar with but rarely make their way to the big screen. They have created two great episodes that audiences can absorb, and scholars can use to teach about the air war.

Header image: Callum Turner in Masters of the Air. (Source: Apple TV+)

^[1] Donald Caldwell and Richard Muller, The Luftwaffe Over Germany: Defense of the Reich (Barnsley: Frontline Books, 2014), pp. 132-4.

#FilmReview – Masters of the Air, Episode Three

By Dr Luke Truxal

Editorial note: On 26 January 2024, Apple TV+ launched the much-anticipated series Masters of the Air. This series follows the actions of the US 100th Bomb Group during the Combined Bomber Offensive in the Second World War. As the series is being aired, our Book Reviews Editor, Dr Luke Truxal, the author of Uniting against the Reich (2023), will provide a critical review of each episode.

Three episodes in, we now better understand what the series Masters of the Air does well and where the show falls short. Let me begin this review by stating that I enjoy the series and what it deliers. Viewers gain a better perspective of the air war from the airmen who flew the missions than previous depictions. The show does justice to the US 100^th Bomb Group and tells its story. This is still a good episode and series despite the criticism you will see at the end of this review. I will still recommend it to others. My problem is that the show fails to reach its full potential in telling this story. I think this is where the shows Band of Brothers (2001) and The Pacific (2010) really soared and why, for me, Masters of the Air feels so close but still not on the same level.

This week’s episode was the fateful Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission on 17 August 1943. The raid was the second unmitigated disaster that the Americans suffered in the air war that month. On 1 August 1943, the US Ninth Air Force attacked the Romanian oil refineries at Ploiești with five B-24 groups, three of which were on loan from the US Eighth Air Force. While the raid succeeded in damaging the refineries, it failed to stop Romanian oil production at the cost of 54 Consolidated B-24 Liberators and 310 airmen.[1] While Ploiești does not appear in the episode, it is crucial to understand the context of the air war in 1943. These were some of the darkest days of the air war for the Americans. The episode begins with a briefing about the Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission. Colonel Neil Harding, portrayed by James Murray, does a great job at explaining the nature of the mission, bad sports metaphors aside. The first strike force, which included the 100^th Bomb Group, was to strike at German aircraft factories at Regensburg, thus drawing the bulk of the German fighter force onto their formation. He correctly explains that the bombers behind the 100^th Bomb Group will move towards Schweinfurt and strike at German ball-bearing production with less resistance. The audience now has a great understanding of how the mission is supposed to work on paper.

Masters_Of_The_Air_Photo_010305 — Elliot Warren as Lieutenant James Douglass, a bombardier with the US 100th Bomb Group who flies with Harry Crosby. (Source: Apple TV+)

The thesis of this entire episode was about the choices that soldiers make in war and how they impact the lives of those around them. It all begins with the poor weather delays that affected the execution of the raid. This led the US Eighth Air Force to send out Colonel Curtis LeMay’s Regensburg force five hours ahead of the rest of the force. During the raid, the creators of the show highlight several vital moments when decisions have to be made that affect the lives of the airmen in this episode. The first happens when Roy Claytor’s plane is shot down. As the crew bails out, the ball turret gunner, Sergeant William Hinton, becomes trapped and cannot escape. Sergeant William Quinn, the radio operator, hears his calls and tries to aid him as the rest of the crew bail out. Unfortunately, the plane enters a spin, and the force throws Quinn against the wall. He has to choose between his life and Hinton’s. He chooses his own. Later, we see that same choice posed to Quinn again when he speaks to a member of the Belgian resistance and has to decide if he wants to try to escape or spend the remainder of the war in a prison camp. His choice has not yet been revealed, and the scene ends on a cliffhanger. Lieutenant Curtis Biddick is the second character to face a life-or-death decision. His plane is hit during the raid, and his co-pilot, Lieutenant Richard Snyder, is severely wounded. In an emotionally impactful scene, Biddick decides to try and crash land the plane to save Snyder. The rest of the crew bail out successfully, and for a moment, it appears Biddick has once again pulled off the impossible. Unfortunately, he can’t maintain control of his Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress as it crashes into the ground in a massive explosion. The final major choice we see throughout the raid is Major Gale Clevan’s choice not to bail out and keep pushing his aircraft through the raid. His choice to keep pushing on paid off, with his plane landing just short of the runway at Telergma in the French colony of Algeria. Throughout the entire episode, there are several moments where the show makes it very clear that Clevan’s decision to press on could have had catastrophic consequences for him and his crew. The show did an excellent job at showing the choices that the young airmen of the 100^th Bomb Group, many in their late teens and early twenties, had to make in split seconds and their consequences.

For an episode that emphasized the importance of the decisions made in war, the biggest one was left out. On the morning of 17 August 1943, the head of the US VIII Bomber Command, Brigadier General Frederick Anderson, had to decide whether or not to scrap the Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission. Anderson, like the commander of the Eighth Air Force, Major General Ira Eaker, was under immense pressure to execute this mission. General Henry Arnold, the US Army Air Forces commander, had taken a great personal interest in the raid and its success. The raid had been put off before due to poor weather. Additionally, the Regensburg force had to leave with enough time to have light remaining to land when they reached Algeria. Anderson ultimately made the call to send LeMay’s force first through the fog while waiting for the rest of the fog to dissipate before sending the rest of the bombers. This is how the two forces end up five hours apart. [2] This brings me to my biggest criticism of the show. Three episodes in, the show struggles to discuss the air war’s wider context. In the second episode, the writers poorly executed a scene to introduce the doctrine debates between the Americans. In this episode, the decision to not fly the mission as planned does not appear on the screen, which was the raid’s most important decision. This was a big missed opportunity for the creators of Masters of the Air. Anderson had to live with the fact that his decision on 17 August 1943 cost the Eighth Air Force sixty B-17s and 559 airmen either killed or missing.[3]

When it comes to telling the story of the 100^th Bomb Group and its experience during the raid, this episode did an excellent job. It showed the life-or-death decisions these young men had to make in seconds, and if they were lucky, they would have to live with the consequences of those decisions. Yet, the quality of the television show could be much improved by occasionally widening its perspective. The series has become so zoomed in on the 100^th Bomb Group that it struggles to tell the bigger picture of the air war. Adding a short scene here or there to add that big-picture perspective would bring everything together and make this television series genuinely extraordinary. My criticisms aside, this is still the best series on the air war I have seen, and it deserves to be in the same conversation as the 1949 film Twelve O’clock High.

Header image: Edward Ashley, Matt Gavan, Callum Turner and Anthony Boyle in Masters of the Air (Source: Apple TV+)

[1] Jay A. Stout, Fortress Ploesti: The Campaign to Destroy Hitler’s Oil (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2011), p. 76.

[2] Luke Truxal, Uniting against the Reich: The American Air War in Europe (Lexington, KT: University Press of Kentucky, 2023), pp. 71-3.

[3] Truxal, Uniting Against the Reich, pp. 76-7.

#FilmReview – Masters of the Air, Episodes One and Two

By Dr Luke Truxal

The first two episodes of the Apple TV+ television series Masters of the Air are a great introduction to the air war for those less familiar with the subject. Yet, they also treat the subject with the seriousness that scholars of the air war demand from media portrayals. Stylistically, the episodes blend the storytelling style of the famous documentary Target for Today (1944) with the drama of the more famous film Twelve O’clock High (1949). Other films on air power, such as Top Gun (1986), tend to romanticize or glorify air-to-air combat. The episodes do not do that. Instead, viewers better understand the nature of combat in the skies above Europe. This one-two-punch season opener stands strong on its own. This was a very promising start for Masters of the Air.

These were two great episodes for those unfamiliar with the air war in Europe. The first episode centres around the US 100th Bomb Group, which became famous for the high losses that it suffered during the summer and fall of 1943. For those who wish to spoil themselves, read the book the series is based on, Don Miller’s eponymous Masters of the Air, or Harry Crosby’s memoirs A Wing and a Prayer. John Orloff, who created the series, uses the 100th Bomb Group as a vessel to tell the larger story of the American experience in the air war. The opening scenes show young pilots and their aircrews eager to enter combat. By the end of the first episode, they return, having experienced the true horrors of fighting high above the skies in subzero temperatures.

Their first mission to Bremen begins as an introduction to what a typical mission is like for the aircrews. Gale Cleven and the rest of the aircrews are woken up in the pre-dawn hours for all the work that takes place before a mission. As the time gets closer to the start of the mission, viewers can feel the tension building slowly until the aircraft take off. During the mission, viewers get a taste of the dangers aircrews faced, such as forming up in cloud cover, flak, and German fighters. The combat scenes in this episode are fast-paced and intense. Fighters whiz by the formation in the blink of an eye, and gunners struggle to keep up with the speed of combat. Keep in mind that German pilots approached from the front to limit the ability of the bomber formation to concentrate its guns on the fighters. Doing so significantly increased the closing speed between the fighters and the bombers. Masters of the Air is not the Memphis Belle, where combat is long and prolonged. It is quick, brutal, and deadly. This episode is a great educational tool for what a typical mission could look like.

I thought the second episode did a great job of highlighting the personal relationships between the ground crews and the British civilians living near the base at Thorpe Abbotts. We see the close bonds the children near the airfield had with the ground crew. At one point, a group of children helped the ground crew clean up oil on the runway after the planes took off. For many children, these bonds lasted a lifetime. This provides viewers insight into the American and British cultural interactions during the war.

Masters_of_the_Air__Photo_010203 — Raff Law and Samuel Jordan in the second episode of *Masters of the Air*. (Source: Apple TV+)

No depiction of the air war on film is perfect. There are some areas where the second episode struggled, but these are few and far between. Judging by online reactions, the most controversial scene involved the doctrinal debate between American and British airmen in the pub. I believe this scene did a good job of educating the public about the doctrinal differences between the two sides without having to dive into the high-level strategy meetings that occurred on this topic. The episode also demonstrates that the two allies are quite passionate about their beliefs on how best to prosecute the air war. However, the second episode failed to grasp the attitude with which the British expressed their concerns over daylight precision bombing. The British had tried and failed to carry out their own precision bombing campaign at the beginning of the war. Their experience led them to adopt night area bombing. As the more experienced partner in the alliance, the British were concerned that the Americans might be unable to maintain the attrition rate that a daylight campaign demanded. The Americans were, however, more than willing to sustain a much higher attrition rate to execute daylight precision bombing. Instead, the writers wrote a scene that wreaked of animosity between the two groups of airmen. Had the writers changed the tone of the scene, then they might not be facing the blowback that they are today. It was one scene, but even today, the emotions of the air war still run high.

Overall, the first two episodes of Masters of the Air started the series well and educated viewers about the ugly nature of the American strategic bombing campaign from the perspective of the airmen. This episode gave the audiences the basics of what to expect from typical American raids. As a result, they set the stage for the raids that would begin to stand out more in 1943, such as the upcoming 17 August 1943 Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission, a disaster for the Eighth Air Force. Masters of the Air has done an excellent job setting up the rest of the series. Now, viewers will see whether the series can maintain its form going into the darker days of the air war in the following episodes.

Header image: Austin Butler as Major Gale ‘Buck’ Cleven in episode one of Masters of the Air. (Source: Apple TV+)

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Tag: United State Army Air Force

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