Tag: Combined Bomber Offensive

#FilmReview – Masters of the Air, Episode Eight

#FilmReview – Masters of the Air, Episode Eight

By Dr Luke Truxal

Editorial note: On 26 January 2024, Apple TV+ launched the much-anticipated series Masters of the Air. This series follows the actions of the US 100th Bomb Group during the Combined Bomber Offensive in the Second World War. As the series is being aired, our Book Reviews Editor, Dr Luke Truxal, the author of Uniting against the Reich (2023), will critically review each episode.  

With only one more episode left, Masters of the Air turned in another disappointing performance in episode eight. The poor pacing of episode seven and, to some degree, episode six has forced the show into a dilemma, namely, what to cover in the final episodes. The showrunners have now decided to cover the significant events of the summer, fall, and early winter of 1944 that shaped the lives of the US 100th Bomb Group, the 332nd Fighter Group, and the prisoners at Stalag Luft III in just 51 minutes. That is too much to ask of any television series. This episode failed largely due to poor pacing and trying to cover too many topics without going into depth on any of them. As a result, the show gave each storyline a token appearance, and, as such, it lacked the substance of the series’ first five episodes. Given this, one must wonder if this series had been written and filmed with the intent of being a much longer television series and how poorly these subjects were covered.

Episode eight covers three main storylines. For the 100th Bomb Group at Thorpe Abbotts, the focus is Major Harry Crosby’s mental and physical breakdown due to the stress of planning missions that force him to be sent on a four-week leave. The second major plot revolves around the prisoners at Stalag Luft III and their preparations to fight back, escape, or be marched to another camp. Finally, the series introduced a new storyline with only one episode remaining, namely that of the famous 332nd Fighter Group – a unit composed of African-American personnel and more commonly known as the ‘Tuskegee Airmen.’ Even though there are some good moments where the show portrays the real struggles of these men, by grazing the surface of each one of these topics, viewers and historians come away asking for more. Masters of the Air tried to do too much, and this episode and the rest of the series paid the price.

Much of the Crosby plot in this episode focuses on his work as a staff officer and his ultimate breakdown. The lead-up to Operation OVERLORD, the landing in Normandy and, ultimately, the liberation of France, has Crosby working for days without sleep. Crosby narrates himself trying to push through and continue planning missions as he feels the weight of each mission on his shoulders. He consumes coffee like water and even resorts to taking medication to keep himself awake. Eventually, he passes out in front of Lieutenant Colonel John ‘Jack’ Kidd from exhaustion. This ultimately leads the new commander of the 100th Bomb Group, Colonel Thomas Jeffrey, to order Crosby to take a four-week vacation to recharge his batteries. This shows the war’s effect on those serving behind the front lines and involved in planning the conduct of the Second World War. This is something that did not get enough coverage in Band of Brothers or The Pacific. With the notable exception of Kenneth More’s portrayal of Captain Jonathan Shepard in Sink the Bismarck in 1960, this is something not often captured well in war films. However, throughout the Second World War, staff officers played a vital role in the success of their units, and it was not uncommon for those leading from the rear to suffer significant health crises because they quite literally worked themselves to death. Notably, for example, Major General Theodore Roosevelt Jr., the eldest son of the US President, died of a heart attack while serving as the Assistant Division Commander of the US 4th Infantry Division during the fighting in Normandy. Dealing with this issue was a nice addition to the series.

Masters of the Air introduced the story of the 332nd Fighter Group, more commonly known as the ‘Tuskegee Airmen,’ in this episode. There are a host of problems with this plot line. First, telling the story of this all-black fighter group is important, but giving the group only minutes of screen time in the second to last episode of the series does not do their story justice. Either increase the number of episodes to tell the story well or save that story for its separate mini-series. The last-minute addition of the 332nd Fighter Group also created additional problems with this plot. For example, we are never really introduced to the group itself and their previous struggles to get into combat. From training and through participation in the North African and Sicilian Campaigns, black fighter pilots faced an uphill struggle to prove their worth. Furthermore, the group became more widely known for their more conservative escort fighter tactics, leading them to snuggle tightly to the bomber formations. This hallmark of the 332nd Fighter Group contributed to their ability to reduce bomber losses while on escort duty and earned them a sterling reputation throughout the US Army Air Forces (USAAF). This moves us into the key individuals. Colonel Benjamin O. Davis Jr. is never really introduced. His story is critical here.

While the episode focuses on Lieutenants Alexander Jefferson and Richard Macon from the 332nd Fighter Group, they do not receive a proper introduction either. They are flung at us. Finally, the only mission we see is the 332nd providing close air support for Operation DRAGOON, the landings in southern France in August 1944. During this episode, Jefferson and Macon are shot down and then captured by the Germans. They go through the same interrogations that Egan also experienced in episode six. The key difference here is that the Germans used the state of racism in the United States to get Jefferson and Macon to turn on their country. While this fails, it is one of the few hints of these men’s challenges in fighting for their country. Instead of putting a face on racism, Masters of the Air decided to keep it faceless and very much in the background. Once again, this was another missed opportunity. In short, by dedicating so little time to this plot in previous episodes or by not expanding the episode count to tell this story well, we get additional problems. The 332nd Fighter Group’s story is glossed over, key individuals get a footnote, and finally, racism hardly appears in the episode.

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Adam Long, Matt Gavan, Callum Turner and Austin Butler in Masters of the Air. (Source: Apple TV+)

At Stalag Luft III, we see the Americans struggle with being cut off from the events of the world and the daily boring, melancholy life that takes over. It is a real struggle for Major John Egan, who wants to do something. Meanwhile, Major Gale Clevan tries to organise men to build a new water well. This leads to a fight between the two officers. Eventually, we see Jefferson and Macon arrive at the camp. When they arrived, some men regarded them as heroes, referring to them as the ‘Red Tails.’ Few American airmen knew of the 332nd Fighter Group besides their tail markings. Most did not know that they were an all-black fighter unit. So, this scene where they are greeted as heroes does not land well. Some American airmen did know about the 332nd Fighter Group, but they arrived later at the camp. Most of the airmen interred at Stalag Luft III were shocked to find that black fighter pilots were flying in the USAAF. This scene seems flung at the viewers without any context, especially considering that viewers never got to see the 332nd Fighter Group fly an escort mission in this episode. As the episode ends at Stalag Luft III, the airmen realise that they must work together to prepare for liberation, execution, a forced march to another camp, or escape. By the end of the episode, the different plot lines introduced in episodes six, seven, and eight finally start coming together to set up the series finale.

Overall, this episode fails because it tries to do too much. It tried to cover much of the fighting in 1944 in a single episode and juggled too many plots. In attempting to cover so many stories, we see the episode fail to introduce new characters, units, and stories well properly. Context is missing a lot of the time with each of these plots. Viewers are zipping from story to story like the fast-forward button has been hit on 1944 so we can get to the end of the war. This left a lot to be desired. One positive aspect of the episode was the analysis of Crosby’s physical and mental breakdown as a staff officer. However, one bright spot, in an episode that gave token coverage to a wide range of important historical events and topics, did not help this episode. Ultimately, the approach taken did not serve the series or the history well. One must wonder if this series was written with more episodes in mind and had been forced to make dramatic cuts at some point during the production process.

Dr Luke Truxal is an adjunct at Columbia State Community College in Tennessee. He completed his PhD in 2018 from the University of North Texas with his dissertation ‘Command Unity and the Air War Against Germany.’ His previous publications include ‘Bombing the Romanian Rail Network’ in the Spring 2018 issue of Air Power History. He also wrote ‘The Politics of Operational Planning: Ira Eaker and the Combined Bomber Offensive in 1943’ in the Journal of Military Aviation History. In addition, Truxal is researching the effectiveness of joint air operations between the Allied air forces in the Second World War. He can be reached on Twitter at @Luke_Truxal.

Header image: Josiah Cross in Masters of the Air. (Source: Apple TV+)

#FilmReview – Masters of the Air, Episode Four

#FilmReview – Masters of the Air, Episode Four

By Dr Luke Truxal

Editorial note: On 26 January 2024, Apple TV+ launched the much-anticipated series Masters of the Air. This series follows the actions of the US 100th Bomb Group during the Combined Bomber Offensive in the Second World War. As the series is being aired, our Book Reviews Editor, Dr Luke Truxal, the author of Uniting against the Reich (2023), will critically review each episode.

The fourth episode of Masters of the Air was about those left behind. This is meant literally in the sense that we do not go up in the air with the planes after they take off, but we also see many of the characters on the show struggle with loss during the war. The result is that we get a good episode that portrays the struggles of airmen, ground crews, resistance fighters, and civilians left on the ground. This review will examine the episode’s analysis and responses to grief thematically rather than tackle the episode chronologically, as in past reviews.

The episode begins with a party after Lieutenant Glenn Dye’s crew completes their 25th mission. This will be the first and only crew of the original 100th Bomb Group to complete their tour of duty and go home. At the party, we are introduced to two new characters, Lieutenant Herbert Nash and Lieutenant Robert ‘Rosie’ Rosenthal. Both are green but capable and eager pilots. During the episode, Nash dances and flirts with Helen, who works for the Red Cross at Thorpe Abbotts. There are sparks between these two characters. At the same time, Rosenthal tries to understand better what he is flying into by talking to Major Gale Clevan. Nash is more successful in flirtations than Rosenthal in feeling out the veteran pilots about the nature of air combat. As the aircrews depart for their first mission the following day, Nash makes a last pass at Helen with a line that foreshadows his fate, “You might be the last pretty face that I ever see.” Nash’s fate is shown off-screen, and it falls on Rosenthal to deliver the shocking news to the young woman with whom he had developed a budding romance. In the same sequence, the news is broken to the group that Clevan and Crosby had gone down. The news that the group’s best pilot and navigator went down in separate planes stuns the group. Colonel Neil ‘Chick’ Harding and Lieutenant Joseph ‘Bubbles’ Payne express the shock that the group and audience feel when the news is broken. Two of the more critical anchors for the group have now been lost off-screen. The show does an excellent job of showing how the loss of these veteran aircrews impacts morale.

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Callum Turner and Joanna Kulig in Masters of the Air. (Source: Apple TV+)

Along with shock, we see sympathy and grief for those living under the bombs. During the episode, Egan walks about a series of bombed homes while on leave in London. He finally can see the results of what bombing does to civilians. As he watches the rescue crews work we hear the scream of a woman who lost what appears to be her daughter. While short, this was a hard scene to watch. Seeing the woman pull the dead child out of the rubble builds sympathy between the viewers and the bombed. It is a great scene to include. It is easy for the audience to get lost in the air-to-air combat, but these bombs have consequences. Even those who play no part in this war, such as children, suffer from the air war. It is a well-written and executed scene.

Another element of processing grief for those in combat is the sense of guilt that those who survived feel. This is an area where Masters of the Air has surpassed both Band of Brothers (2001) and The Pacific (2010), in my opinion. That is not to say that the previous series ever avoided the topic, and The Pacific did lean into the post-war struggles of Eugene Sledge with post-traumatic stress syndrome. However, we never saw it portrayed so personally, with Sergeant William Quinn’s decision to leave Sergeant William Hinton behind, trapped on the B-17 Flying Fortress before it exploded. Throughout his time on the run, Quinn grapples with his guilt over leaving his comrade behind. It eats at him throughout the whole episode more so than the fear of being captured by the Germans as his fellow airmen keep asking him about what happens. This plot ends with another crewman who survived the crash, Sergeant Charles Bailey, comforting Quinn. Bailey tells Quinn that he would have made the same decision as well. Some viewers will find it easy to judge Quinn for his actions in the previous episode, but as the show eloquently shows, many of us would have made the same decision in the same circumstances. To me, this was a powerful sequence of scenes paired with the scenes of Sledge at the end of The Pacific; we get a better sense of the survivor’s guilt and its aftermath.

The last element of grief that the episode deals with is anger. During the episode, Major John Egan goes on leave in London and meets a Polish woman with whom he sleeps. As they are in bed together, they watch German bombers strike London from a distance. Egan admits that this is the first time he has seen this side of the air war. As they continue talking, the Polish woman expresses her anger and desire for revenge against the Germans for the war that they unleashed. This scene sets up viewers perfectly for Egan in this episode and in episode five. After finishing his night with the woman, Egan sees the woman grieving the loss of her daughter. He then sees a newspaper highlighting the heavy losses that the Eighth Air Force suffered on the most recent raid. Egan calls Thorpe Abbotts to learn the fate of the 100th Bomb Group and, more importantly, his best friend Clevan. Egan ends the episode by lobbying to be on the next mission. In the teaser at the end of the episode, we see that Egan desires revenge against not only the Luftwaffe but all Germans for the loss of his friend.

This might go down as one of the series’ more important episodes. It broadened the audience’s perspective of the air war. It showed the ground crews, the bombed, and how they fought the air war in their way. Some struggled to process the shock of loss either in the air or on the ground. Others struggled with survivor’s guilt. Finally, we see many turn their grief into anger and desire for payback for the anguish that they feel for the loss of their loved ones. In an episode where grief took centre stage and, in many forms, this episode handled such a delicate topic as well as you can on screen. I think this is arguably the best episode of the series up to this point.

Dr Luke Truxal is an adjunct at Columbia State Community College in Tennessee. He completed his PhD in 2018 from the University of North Texas with his dissertation ‘Command Unity and the Air War Against Germany.’ His previous publications include ‘Bombing the Romanian Rail Network’ in the Spring 2018 issue of Air Power History. He also wrote ‘The Politics of Operational Planning: Ira Eaker and the Combined Bomber Offensive in 1943’ in the Journal of Military Aviation History. In addition, Truxal is researching the effectiveness of joint air operations between the Allied air forces in the Second World War. He can be reached on Twitter at @Luke_Truxal.

Header image: Edward Ashley and Austin Butler in Masters of the Air. (Source: Apple TV+)

#FilmReview – Masters of the Air, Episode Three

#FilmReview – Masters of the Air, Episode Three

By Dr Luke Truxal

Editorial note: On 26 January 2024, Apple TV+ launched the much-anticipated series Masters of the Air. This series follows the actions of the US 100th Bomb Group during the Combined Bomber Offensive in the Second World War. As the series is being aired, our Book Reviews Editor, Dr Luke Truxal, the author of Uniting against the Reich (2023), will provide a critical review of each episode.

Three episodes in, we now better understand what the series Masters of the Air does well and where the show falls short. Let me begin this review by stating that I enjoy the series and what it deliers. Viewers gain a better perspective of the air war from the airmen who flew the missions than previous depictions. The show does justice to the US 100th Bomb Group and tells its story. This is still a good episode and series despite the criticism you will see at the end of this review. I will still recommend it to others. My problem is that the show fails to reach its full potential in telling this story. I think this is where the shows Band of Brothers (2001) and The Pacific (2010) really soared and why, for me, Masters of the Air feels so close but still not on the same level.

This week’s episode was the fateful Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission on 17 August 1943. The raid was the second unmitigated disaster that the Americans suffered in the air war that month. On 1 August 1943, the US Ninth Air Force attacked the Romanian oil refineries at Ploiești with five B-24 groups, three of which were on loan from the US Eighth Air Force. While the raid succeeded in damaging the refineries, it failed to stop Romanian oil production at the cost of 54 Consolidated B-24 Liberators and 310 airmen.[1] While Ploiești does not appear in the episode, it is crucial to understand the context of the air war in 1943. These were some of the darkest days of the air war for the Americans. The episode begins with a briefing about the Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission. Colonel Neil Harding, portrayed by James Murray, does a great job at explaining the nature of the mission, bad sports metaphors aside. The first strike force, which included the 100th Bomb Group, was to strike at German aircraft factories at Regensburg, thus drawing the bulk of the German fighter force onto their formation. He correctly explains that the bombers behind the 100th Bomb Group will move towards Schweinfurt and strike at German ball-bearing production with less resistance. The audience now has a great understanding of how the mission is supposed to work on paper.

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Elliot Warren as Lieutenant James Douglass, a bombardier with the US 100th Bomb Group who flies with Harry Crosby. (Source: Apple TV+)

The thesis of this entire episode was about the choices that soldiers make in war and how they impact the lives of those around them. It all begins with the poor weather delays that affected the execution of the raid. This led the US Eighth Air Force to send out Colonel Curtis LeMay’s Regensburg force five hours ahead of the rest of the force. During the raid, the creators of the show highlight several vital moments when decisions have to be made that affect the lives of the airmen in this episode. The first happens when Roy Claytor’s plane is shot down. As the crew bails out, the ball turret gunner, Sergeant William Hinton, becomes trapped and cannot escape. Sergeant William Quinn, the radio operator, hears his calls and tries to aid him as the rest of the crew bail out. Unfortunately, the plane enters a spin, and the force throws Quinn against the wall. He has to choose between his life and Hinton’s. He chooses his own. Later, we see that same choice posed to Quinn again when he speaks to a member of the Belgian resistance and has to decide if he wants to try to escape or spend the remainder of the war in a prison camp. His choice has not yet been revealed, and the scene ends on a cliffhanger. Lieutenant Curtis Biddick is the second character to face a life-or-death decision. His plane is hit during the raid, and his co-pilot, Lieutenant Richard Snyder, is severely wounded. In an emotionally impactful scene, Biddick decides to try and crash land the plane to save Snyder. The rest of the crew bail out successfully, and for a moment, it appears Biddick has once again pulled off the impossible. Unfortunately, he can’t maintain control of his Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress as it crashes into the ground in a massive explosion. The final major choice we see throughout the raid is Major Gale Clevan’s choice not to bail out and keep pushing his aircraft through the raid. His choice to keep pushing on paid off, with his plane landing just short of the runway at Telergma in the French colony of Algeria. Throughout the entire episode, there are several moments where the show makes it very clear that Clevan’s decision to press on could have had catastrophic consequences for him and his crew. The show did an excellent job at showing the choices that the young airmen of the 100th Bomb Group, many in their late teens and early twenties, had to make in split seconds and their consequences.

For an episode that emphasized the importance of the decisions made in war, the biggest one was left out. On the morning of 17 August 1943, the head of the US VIII Bomber Command, Brigadier General Frederick Anderson, had to decide whether or not to scrap the Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission. Anderson, like the commander of the Eighth Air Force, Major General Ira Eaker, was under immense pressure to execute this mission. General Henry Arnold, the US Army Air Forces commander, had taken a great personal interest in the raid and its success. The raid had been put off before due to poor weather. Additionally, the Regensburg force had to leave with enough time to have light remaining to land when they reached Algeria. Anderson ultimately made the call to send LeMay’s force first through the fog while waiting for the rest of the fog to dissipate before sending the rest of the bombers. This is how the two forces end up five hours apart. [2] This brings me to my biggest criticism of the show. Three episodes in, the show struggles to discuss the air war’s wider context. In the second episode, the writers poorly executed a scene to introduce the doctrine debates between the Americans. In this episode, the decision to not fly the mission as planned does not appear on the screen, which was the raid’s most important decision. This was a big missed opportunity for the creators of Masters of the Air. Anderson had to live with the fact that his decision on 17 August 1943 cost the Eighth Air Force sixty B-17s and 559 airmen either killed or missing.[3]

When it comes to telling the story of the 100th Bomb Group and its experience during the raid, this episode did an excellent job. It showed the life-or-death decisions these young men had to make in seconds, and if they were lucky, they would have to live with the consequences of those decisions. Yet, the quality of the television show could be much improved by occasionally widening its perspective. The series has become so zoomed in on the 100th Bomb Group that it struggles to tell the bigger picture of the air war. Adding a short scene here or there to add that big-picture perspective would bring everything together and make this television series genuinely extraordinary. My criticisms aside, this is still the best series on the air war I have seen, and it deserves to be in the same conversation as the 1949 film Twelve O’clock High.

Dr Luke Truxal is an adjunct at Columbia State Community College in Tennessee. He completed his PhD in 2018 from the University of North Texas with his dissertation ‘Command Unity and the Air War Against Germany.’ His previous publications include ‘Bombing the Romanian Rail Network’ in the Spring 2018 issue of Air Power History. He also wrote ‘The Politics of Operational Planning: Ira Eaker and the Combined Bomber Offensive in 1943’ in the Journal of Military Aviation History. In addition, Truxal is researching the effectiveness of joint air operations between the Allied air forces in the Second World War. He can be reached on Twitter at @Luke_Truxal.

Header image: Edward Ashley, Matt Gavan, Callum Turner and Anthony Boyle in Masters of the Air (Source: Apple TV+)

[1] Jay A. Stout, Fortress Ploesti: The Campaign to Destroy Hitler’s Oil (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2011), p. 76.

[2] Luke Truxal, Uniting against the Reich: The American Air War in Europe (Lexington, KT: University Press of Kentucky, 2023), pp. 71-3.

[3] Truxal, Uniting Against the Reich, pp. 76-7.

#FilmReview – Episodes 1 and 2 of Masters of the Air

#FilmReview – Episodes 1 and 2 of Masters of the Air

By Dr Brian Laslie

Friday, 26 January, the long-awaited first and second episodes of Masters of the Air, based on the excellent eponymous book by Don Miller, premiered on Apple TV+. When I say long-awaited, rumours and articles have swirled around the series for over a decade, dating back to 2012.

I was lucky to see the first episode early last week as part of pre-screening at the US Air Force Academy. As From Balloons to Drones was created to discuss just such a series in the public realm, I wanted to provide a quick commentary with my thoughts from the first episode.

The oft-watched, oft-quoted, and something of related series that Masters of the Air will be inevitably compared to is 2001’s Band of Brothers. When Band of Brothers released on 09 September 2001 (yes, at its first showing on the evening of the ninth, the world was less than 48 hours away from the events of 11 September), 57 years had passed since the events of the show. Many unit members were still alive in their late seventies or early eighties. As most remember, each episode either began or ended with the veterans telling their stories. This is, sadly, impossible for Masters of the Air. I do ponder how Major Gale ‘Buck’ Cleven, Major John Egan, or Lieutenant Colonel Robert ‘Rosie’ Rosenthal might have reacted to having themselves portrayed in the series. These real-life men never lived to see themselves portrayed in film, another bitter reminder that the Second World War generation is all but gone now.

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Bombs being dropped on enemy installations at Wessling, Germany by Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses of the US 100th Bomb Group, 12 August 1943. (Source: US National Archives and Records Administration)

In my two viewings of episode one so far, two words continually play in my mind: Poignant and terrifying. Masters of the Air has succeeded where other more recent films have failed – at least for me –  the actors portraying these real men (I cannot bring myself to refer to them as ‘characters’) do so without entering the realm of parody. The protagonists thus far, Buck and Bucky, seem like mid-twenties officers of the time, and I hope their character development continues in future episodes.

So far, the attention to detail seems well in hand. The men gearing up for the missions, the checklist, and the startup process for the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses is something too oft missed in other aerial films where pilots and crews hop in and zoom off to the wild blue yonder with nary a wave at the ground crews. The maintainers and mechanics also have their moments so far, and it is nice to see some recognition for the men who kept the planes in the air.

Obviously, the series uses CGI for the aerial battles but has used existing B-17s where possible. With only one episode down and knowing that the air battles are to increase in size with the number of aircraft and defenders, it has, thus far, demonstrated well the speed of attacking aircraft. Some critics have noted that the air battles are chaotic and difficult to follow. It is hard to tell who is who with the masks up and gear on, and the enemy fighters fly by in a blur with the gunners twisting to get off a few shots, but to my eye, there is realism here: the speed and chaos of air combat amongst the bomber crews is well done.

I cannot tell as of yet if Masters of the Air will live up to the hype, but as a historian, I have already found myself enjoying the series both for its storytelling and its accuracy. I also note that my air power colleagues have talked of little else this week and spent an inordinate amount of time talking to other interested parties, including media outlets (it’s a good time to be an air power historian). Knowing that the Tuskegee Airmen and Stalag Luft prison camps will be seen in future episodes only heightens my eagerness for more.

Thus far, I commend all parties involved in bringing the show to the screen. If this series inspires a younger generation to explore their past, ask questions about history, and look to learn more, it will have done its job.

Meanwhile, those of us already immersed in reading, researching, and publishing should use the series as a moment in time to explain what went on in the skies over Europe – and all over the world – during the Second World War: both the good and the bad, the glory and the horror, the rhetoric and the reality of the Masters of the Air.

Dr Brian Laslie is a US Air Force Historian and Command Historian at the United States Air Force Academy. Formerly he was the Deputy Command Historian at North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). A 2001 graduate of The Citadel and a historian of air power studies, he received his Masters’ from Auburn University Montgomery in 2006 and his PhD from Kansas State University in 2013. He is the author of Air Power’s Lost Cause: The American Air Wars of Vietnam (2021),  Architect of Air Power: General Laurence S. Kuter and the Birth of the US Air Force (2017) and The Air Force Way of War (2015). The latter book was selected for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force’s 2016 professional reading list and the 2017 RAF Chief of the Air Staff’s reading list. He can be found on Twitter at @BrianLaslie.

Header image: A formation of Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses of the 100th Bomb Group flies over a blanket of clouds en route to their target at Warnemunde, Germany, 29 July 1943. The aircraft shown is the  B-17 ‘Alice From Dallas’. Source: US National Archive and Records Administration)

#BookReview – The Leadership, Direction and Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive from Inception to 1945

#BookReview – The Leadership, Direction and Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive from Inception to 1945

Peter Gray, The Leadership, Direction and Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive from Inception to 1945. London: Continuum, 2012. Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Hbk. xv + 346pp.

Reviewed by Dr Ross Mahoney

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The British Strategic Air Offensive against Germany (SAOG) and the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) remain contentious and divisive areas of debate within the historiography of the Second World War and the development of air power, respectively. Essentially the central debate on the bomber offensive has been polarised between discussing the exigencies of military effectiveness – the contribution the campaign made to the overall war effort – and the philosophical view that it was a morally reprehensible act.[1] More recently, the historiographical trend has shifted towards understanding the impact that bombing had upon civilian populations.[2] Into this field in 2012 came a new and important work by Peter Gray that examined the conduct of the SAOG innovatively, namely through a deep understanding of the role of strategic leadership in war and its relationship with the legality and legitimacy of the bombing campaign against Germany.

Gray’s book focuses on strategic leadership and the interface between key senior leaders involved in the direction of the bomber offensive against Germany. Leadership remains an often discussed but little understood area of study within military history. As a result, books are replete with inadequate or ineffective leadership claims without understanding the factors underpinning it and how it interacts with operations. Nevertheless, effective leadership remains the key to understanding military performance at all levels of war.

Gray’s professional experience both as a senior officer in the RAF – he retired as an Air Commodore – and in academia meant that he was well equipped to write this book and the PhD on which it is based. While at the time of writing, Gray is a Professor of Air Power Studies at the University of Wolverhampton; he was previously the Royal Aeronautical Society’s Senior Research Fellow in Air Power Studies at the University of Birmingham and is an acknowledged expert in air power studies and leadership. Before he retired from the RAF, Gray served in several important positions, including Director of Defence Studies (RAF) at the Joint Services Command and Staff College and as Director of the Defence Leadership and Management Centre. However, that Gray is a retired officer does not affect his objectivity towards the subject he studies. Indeed, while it can be easy to suggest that retired senior officers often suffer from what might be described as cultural blindness towards the subjects they write on, this is not the case with Gray, as evidenced by his analysis of the role of Marshal of the Royal Air Force (MRAF) Sir Arthur Harris noted below.

Gray’s work used an interdisciplinary approach grounded in an understanding of leadership theory to examine the direction of the bomber offensive. Utilising his extensive background in the military and his teaching and writing about the subject, Gray explored some of the theoretical aspects of leadership while making it clear that leadership is both complex and ambiguous at the senior/strategic level. For example, in examining the interface between the relationship of the Air Officer Commander-in-C of RAF Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, and the RAF’s Air Staff, in particular Harris’ relationship with the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), MRAF Sir Charles Portal, it is evident that numerous factors related to the complexity of ambiguity of senior leadership influenced the conduct of SOAG. These factors included relationships with allies, operational commanders, inter-service rivalry, and moral and ethical considerations. Harris does not emerge from this analysis well, with, for example, Gray describing him as ‘naïve’ to expect the lion’s share of the national resources for the bomber offensive. In addition, Harris struggled to ‘accept the vicissitudes of coalition warfare’. Nevertheless, Gray does admit that Harris operated within a problematic area where the ‘operational and strategic levels’ overlapped (p. 291).

There are numerous reasons why Harris arguably struggled in looking up and outside of his operational silo. However, as Gray lamented, Portal probably regretted that Harris never went to the RAF Staff College at Andover and instead attended the British Army’s Staff College at Camberley (p. 43). This is an important cultural point that still requires further examination. Nevertheless, while Harris has often been portrayed as the archetypal advocate of the RAF’s perceived singular focus on bombing in his development as a leader, he lacked the intellectual underpinnings that most future senior RAF commanders shared: attendance at Andover. It should, however, be noted that his attendance at Camberley also illustrated that he was well regarded in the RAF as students attending the other service Staff College’s also acted as representatives of their parent services and sought to inform fellow students about their work. Also, unlike many of his contemporaries operating at the senior level, including Portal, Harris never attended the Imperial Defence College (IDC), where he would have learned to speak the language of a combined military.

Another example of Harris’ inability to look up and out of his silo concerns the debates over relations with the other services. While Harris issued directives and loyally carried out orders, he often soured relations with a poor choice of language for a senior leader. The use of terms such ‘oily boys’ did not aid him or the Air Staff’s ability to explain complicated arguments over the effectiveness of air power to both colleagues within other services and politicians and allies (pp. 255-7). These leadership challenges were a key issue throughout 1944, especially in the lead up to Operation OVERLORD (pp. 215-28). Nevertheless, a vital problem for senior leaders is the maintenance of vision and purpose for an organisation in the face of the leadership challenges that faced both Harris and the Air Staff. Maintaining this vision and purpose had implications for the direction of the bomber offensive.

A 18825
The Quebec Conference, 23 August 1943. Left to right round table: Lord Louis Mountbatten, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, General Sir Alan Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Air Marshal L.S. Breadner, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay, Brigadier H. Redman, Commodore R. Coleridge, RN, Brigadier General J.R. Deane, General H.H. Arnold, General G.C. Marshal, Admiral W.D. Leahy, Admiral E.J. King, and Captain Forrest B. Royal (Source: © IWM A 18825)

In comparison to Harris, the RAF was fortunate that, in Portal, they had a CAS who had the vision and ability to see the organisation’s central purpose through to fruition. Portal managed the shift to area bombing, and he was able to work well with both politicians and allies alike. However, Portal was perhaps aided in his work given that his key ally, the United States Army Air Force, placed as much importance as the RAF did on the bomber. However, the decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to place Portal in charge of the strategic direction of the Combined Bomber Offensive at the Casablanca Conference of January 1943 (p. 211) highlighted not only an indication of his abilities as a senior leader but also his standing amongst his peers. Unlike Harris, Portal was able to look up and out of his silo and interface with ‘the various organizations that contribute[d] to the greater enterprise […] across the range of Whitehall and into international arenas’ (p. 291).

Gray’s discussion of legitimacy is useful as it helps set the context for the conduct and direction of the bomber offensive and the challenges that confronted the RAF’s senior leadership during the Second World War. The interwar period saw significant discussions over air power in modern warfare. It also saw attempts to codify and limit its role through international law. While the Hague Conference of 1923 produced a report on the Rules of Aerial Warfare with genuine humanitarian intentions, it was not ratified by the nations involved. The attempt to codify laws relating to the use of air power failed most significantly at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, 1932-33. Nevertheless, this failure to agree did not mean that the RAF ignored the implications of the ethics of air power when formulating doctrine and strategy. However, beyond legal discussions, there was, as Gray argued, little in the way of contemporary philosophical debate over war in general. Indeed, the historiography concerning anti-war movements in the interwar period is ‘muddled at best’, thus raising significant questions over interpretations, such as Grayling’s (p. 48).

For Gray, the most influential writer in this period regarding issues surrounding legitimacy and international law was the jurist J.M Spaight (pp. 54-7). The reason for Spaight’s importance stems from his relationship with MRAF Sir Hugh Trenchard during his tenure as CAS, his standing within the Air Ministry and perhaps most importantly, the simple fact that his voluminous works appeared on the reading list for Andover, where future leaders would have been exposed to his writings. Although Gray does not make this point, Spaight wrote for the Royal Air Force Quarterly in the 1930s. This would have seen a broader audience in the RAF exposed his work, though the question remains how much journals such as the Quarterly were read beyond those attending Staff College.[3]

The failure to gain effective international agreement over the use of air power in war led Spaight to note that inevitably ‘cities would be bombed’ (p. 57). Similar ideas pervaded the development of air power doctrine but did not mean that other areas of operations were ignored. The focus on bombing was the logical development of an inherently offensive weapons system. When applied in the strategic sense, the application of bombing was going to raise moral issues. However, the British had a tradition of utilising its other strategic arm, the Royal Navy, to bombard and blockade so that the use of the British Army in continental warfare could be ‘sidestepped’ (p. 59). This, coupled with ineffective international control concerning the laws of war, allowed for the development of an offensively minded doctrine.

Moreover, this did not mean, as Spaight’s own writings indicated, that there was no desire to fight the war as humanely as possible. However, there was a realisation amongst the Air Staff that, as Gray has written elsewhere, ‘The Gloves Will Have to Come Off’ (p. 57).[4] This had clear operational implications for the conduct of the bomber offensive when the decision was taken to shift to both night attacks and area bombing. However, it should be seen as an incremental shift and not the obvious solution as traditionally portrayed. Nonetheless, questions over the humane use of strategic air power became acutely apparent in 1945 when the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, began to distance himself from the campaign after the raid on Dresden. Concerning this episode, Grey argues it had a degree of logic to it but must be placed within the context of being aware of the growing resilience of Germany’s military in the face of allied advances, and that the Air Staff argued that an early end to the bomber offensive might cause the loss of more lives in the long-term (p. 228).

Overall, this excellent book adds a fresh perspective to a well-trodden path in the historiography of the Second World War. Gray makes clear that before any evaluation can be made on the key areas that have occupied historians of the bomber offensive, namely the issues of effectiveness and morality; we must understand the challenges that confronted those responsible for its conduct and how they sought to deal with the ambiguities and complexities of senior leadership under the stress and strain of global conflict. It also illustrates that historians should not be afraid to learn from allied disciplines. In understanding alternative methodologies, we can bring new light to old subjects.

Dr Ross Mahoney is the Editor-in-Chief of From Balloons to Drones and is an independent scholar specialising in air power and the history of air warfare. He is currently the Senior Historian within the City Architecture and Heritage Team at Brisbane City Council in Australia. He has over 15 years of experience within the heritage and education sectors in Australia and the United Kingdom. He was the inaugural Historian at the Royal Air Force Museum in the UK. In Australia, he has worked as a Historian for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs and taught at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University based at the Australian War College. His research interests are focussed on military history, with a specific focus on the history of air warfare, transport history, and urban history. He has published several chapters and articles, edited two books, and delivered papers on three continents. He has a book review website here and can be found on Twitter at @airpowerhistory.

Header image: Air Marshal A.T. Harris, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, RAF Bomber Command points to a location on a map of Germany hanging in his office at Bomber Command Headquarters, High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire. On the left stands Air Vice-Marshal R. Graham (left) the Air Officer Administration at BCHQ, and on the right Air Vice-Marshal R.R.M.S. Saundby, Harris’s Senior Air Staff Officer. (Source: © IWM CH 5490)

[1] The view that bombing was morally reprehensible can be summarised by the work of A.C. Grayling. However, this work should be treated with care given the author’s clear lack of understanding of how both the SAOG and CBO were conducted. See A.C. Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: Is the Targeting of Civilians in War ever Justified?, Paperback Edition (London: Bloomsbury, 2007). Within the debate over the effectiveness of the CBO there are several continuing debates on themes such as the question of the bombing techniques employed by the RAF and the USAAF as well as the contribution made by the campaign in achieving air superiority over Europe before Operation OVERLORD. A key work on the debate over precision versus area bombing remains W. Hays Park, “Precision’ and ‘Area’ Bombing: Who did which, and when?,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 18, no. 1 (1995), pp. 145-74. For an examination of the role played in achieving air superiority over Europe, see: Stephen McFarland and Wesley Phillips Newton, To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority Over Germany, 1942-1944 (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991). For a discussion of how RAF Bomber Command sought to overcome some of the challenges it faced with reference to the use of operational research techniques, see: Randall Wakelam, The Science of Bombing: Operational Research in RAF Bomber Command (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).

[2] Important in this shift was the work undertaken by the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council funded project on ‘Bombing, States and Peoples in Western Europe, 1940-1945.’ For some of the work that emerged from this project, see: Claudia Baldoli, Andrew Knapp, and Richard Overy (eds.) Bombing, States and Peoples in Western Europe 1940-1945 (London: Continuum, 2011); Andrew Knapp and Claudia Baldoli, Forgotten Blitzes: France and Italy under Allied Air Attack, 1940-1945 (London: Continuum, 2012).

[3] For example, see: J.M Spaight, ‘An International Air Force: Part I – Fantasy,’ Royal Air Force Quarterly 1, no. 4 (1930); J.M. Spaight, ‘An International Air Force: Part II – Reality ‘, Royal Air Force Quarterly 2, no. 1 (1931).

[4] Peter Gray, ‘The Gloves Will Have to Come Off: A Reappraisal of the Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive Against Germany’, RAF Air Power Review 13, no. 3 (2010) pp. 9-40.

#BookReview – Selling Schweinfurt: Targeting, Assessment, and Marketing in the Air Campaign Against German Industry

#BookReview – Selling Schweinfurt: Targeting, Assessment, and Marketing in the Air Campaign Against German Industry

Brian D. Vlaun, Selling Schweinfurt: Targeting, Assessment, and Marketing in the Air Campaign Against German Industry. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2020. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Hbk. xiii + 320 pp.

Reviewed by Bryant Macfarlane

With Selling Schweinfurt Brian D. Vlaun, a Colonel and command pilot in the United States Air Force offers readers a history of air intelligence development of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) with two mutually supporting goals. First, the American conception of a strategically-minded independent air power arm that ‘was well suited to the limitations of the political will, manpower pool, and military-industrial complex of the United States’ (pp. 5-6) required unquestionable battlefield impacts from bombing offensives to be politically viable. Second, providing such indisputable effects required an intellectual cadre (p. 6) of ‘academics, industrialists, lawyers, and wartime-civilian-turned-military officers who shaped the targeting decisions and air campaign assessments.’ Vlaun centres his analysis around Major General Ira C. Eaker’s US Eighth Air Force and the 1943 Allied Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) that was intended to cripple German industrial and economic systems and establish air superiority over Europe. Leveraging thousands of declassified American and British documents, Vlaun draws upon nearly forty primary and over one hundred secondary sources to present a well-researched and highly accessible work. Vlaun pulls back the curtain on how doctrine writers or a commander’s staff profoundly impact the conception of problems and possible solutions available to a commander – especially when those organisations are vying for influence.

Selling Schweinfurt is organised chronologically along five chapters. Chapter one focuses on the development of strategic air power doctrine and requirements in the interwar years. Here, Vlaun provides the backstory on how and why US air intelligence (A2) and doctrine developed organically before sending liaisons to Britain in 1941 to observe and shape American efforts to establish a robust and capable air intelligence capacity. With the realisation that the USAAF was the most mobilised portion of the American Army, and with aviation’s ability to operate from friendly territory while actively contributing to the war in Europe, the chapter concludes with the establishment of the Eighth Air Force and the initial combat development of ‘effective’ American bombing.

Chapter two begins with acknowledging USAAF leaders that the A2 enterprise they created was too young to provide the type of in-depth strategic analysis required to ensure that the bombing efforts of the Eighth Air Force were contributing effectively to the demise of the German war-industry. In Washington and Britain, USAAF leaders turned to lawyers, bankers, economists, and industrialists to serve as a bulwark for their intelligence gaps. However, as these groups worked independently of one another and mainly without oversight, their analysis focused on gaining influence in targeting decisions and building analyses that dovetailed the specific leaders’ perspective for whom they were working. While civilian analysts argued for industrial targets, the USAAF continued to bombard U-boat pens and provide coastal patrols in what would prove to be a very futile effort to stave off German anti-shipping capacity. The chapter concludes with the January 1943 Casablanca conference that maintained a parallel but independent USAAF command and shifted more responsibility for targeting decisions onto American A2.

A formation of Boeing B-17Fs over Schweinfurt, Germany, on 17 August 1943. (Source: National Museum of the USAF)

Chapter three examines the targeting choices and the Eighth Air Forces’ demonstrated results supporting Operation POINTBLANK – the Allied campaign against the German industrial base – during the first trimester of 1943. Arguably, this period was essential to the foundational honing of aircrew skillsets; however, the period uncovered USAAF leaders’ inability to quantify results in attacking industrial targets in Germany. By the May 1943 Trident Conference, the CBO’s limited successes were doubled down upon by the Allied leadership as military and civil leaders concurred that Western European ‘air superiority was to be a joint problem and a necessary precondition for success.’ (p. 103) Trident approved a reallocation of the CBO towards German war-industries with a secondary focus on single-engine aircraft production. Air superiority was a way of preparing Western Europe for the upcoming OVERLORD invasion and pulling German air power away from the Eastern front to ease pressure on the Soviets.

Chapter four addresses the understanding that both the Americans and Germans were realising the limitations of manpower in their ability to mobilise continually, train, and deploy forces while maintaining industrial capacity. By mid-August 1943, the Americans had successfully targeted ball-bearing factories in Schweinfurt and V-weapons at Peenemünde. Despite the successful raid into Schweinfurt, scientists and political entities shifted Allied CBO priorities towards a continued focus on V-Weapons. Despite their distributed nature that limited their susceptibility to aerial bombardment, the ‘political objectives, public outrage, intelligence prestige, and strategic interaction’ colluded to darken ‘Allied airman’s hopes for victory through airpower alone.’ (p. 162)

Chapter five focuses on the successful recognition of an air-minded specialist intelligence organisation within the American War Department. While industrial raids such as Schweinfurt had proven the need for an independent A2 and G2, the Eighth Air Force’s lack of demonstratable progress led to questioning the capability of the commander of the Eighth. While the Allied CBO losses had proven the necessity of fighter escorts to the most devout adherents of the bomber’s supremacy, the intelligence analysts pinned their hopes to continued pressure on the German industry regardless of the operational realities of the CBO. In assessing the outcomes of 1943, the USAAF’s leadership chose to articulate the failure of the Eighth Air Force commander’s ‘lack of creativity and flexibility as he had underutilised and underperformed the forces he commanded’ (p. 198) instead of accepting an under-resourced and doctrinally unsound conception of the CBO from the outset.

Vlaun concludes with a compelling argument that ‘the growth of airpower cannot be thoroughly comprehended without an understanding of the maturation of its air intelligence component.’ (p. 207) While it is clear that air power proponents doggedly pursued a course to demonstrate the suasive power of strategic bombing, it is also clear that no conclusive evidence exists in the post-war analysis that industrial attacks created or exacerbated materiel bottlenecks. This is not to say that air power is without operative function.

As just one element of military power, airpower offers a means to fight at a lower cost to friendly forces along with potential for less political entanglement [however] the promise of airpower brings along with it a robust air intelligence requirement – one that starts well before bombing and continues after hostilities cease. (p. 210)

Vlaun cautions the reader against assuming that modernisation or technology is a panacea to creating an intelligence capacity for identifying the ‘perfect target.’ If Selling Schweinfurt has anything to convey, decisions are influenced by organisational determination of which data to impart. Vlaun is clear that commanders must retain perspective in targeting decisions and align intelligence roles and responsibilities with operational and strategic imperatives.

If Vlaun’s effort is to be found wanting, it is only that the narrative does not extend into the Allied CBO’s successes and the maturation of the A2 in 1944 and 1945. Selling Schweinfurt is the very best effort this reader has found to insight the staff work required of any useful command. Selling Schweinfurt’s truly accessible presentation alone is worthy of inclusion in every air power enthusiast’s bookshelf. While certainly not a biography, Vlaun presents a critique of key leaders in American air power development that fills a critical gap in the existing historiography. Specialists will particularly welcome Vlaun’s depiction of Eighth Air Force raids to Ploesti, Hüls, St. Nazaire, Regensburg, and Schweinfurt for their operational and tactical significance to the development of strategic air power. Generalist readers will appreciate Vlaun’s easy tone and accessible style in presenting the development of doctrine and intelligence organisation as the USAAF struggled to define itself as a critical element of American military power. However, Vlaun’s study’s real power is in the representation of the importance of a staff in the decision-making process of every commander. As Vlaun concludes:

It is clearly possible to launch aircraft and bomb something without solid intelligence, but without a refined sense of what to target or how to measure bombing effectiveness, airpower will be inefficient if not all together ineffective. (p. 208)

As such, Selling Schweinfurt is highly deserving of inclusion in the discussion of air power during the Second World War and beyond by specialists and generalists alike.

Bryant Macfarlane served in the United States Army from 1997 to 2019 and is a PhD student at Kansas State University studying the technological momentum of vertical flight and its effect on military culture. He can be found on Twitter @rotary_research.

Header image: On 13 May 1943, the B-17F ‘Hell’s Angels’ of the 303rd Bomb Group became the first heavy bomber to complete 25 combat missions over Europe, four days before the crew of the ‘Memphis Belle’s’. After flying 48 combat missions, ‘Hells Angels’ returned to the US for a war bond tour in 1944. (Source: National Museum of the USAF)

Bringing It All Back Home: How one sortie by the No. 1474 Flight RAF in December 1942 helped save the lives of countless aircrew

Bringing It All Back Home: How one sortie by the No. 1474 Flight RAF in December 1942 helped save the lives of countless aircrew

By Dr Thomas Withington

The weather was mild for early December as scattered showers, and high winds continued to visit RAF Gransden Lodge near Cambridge.[1] It was a shade after 02:00 on the morning of 2 December 1942 when Flight Sergeant Edwin Paulton (Royal Canadian Air Force/RCAF) gently rotated the yoke causing the Vickers Wellington Mk1C of the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) No. 1474 (Special Duties) Flight to unstick from the runway and climb into the East Anglian night.[2] Paulton’s sortie that autumnal evening was part of the RAF’s response to the growing intensity of the Luftwaffe’s defensive effort against Bomber Command’s attacks on targets in Germany.

Emil-Emil

With most of Western Europe’s occupation now complete, and the invasion of the UK postponed indefinitely by Adolf Hitler in September 1940 following the Battle of Britain, the German high command turned its attention towards bolstering the country’s defences against RAF Bomber Command.[3] Even with the commencement of the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, which involved a significant effort by the Luftwaffe, this did not deprive Germany of fighter defences to resist the Command’s efforts.[4] These fighters were able to exact heavy losses and between July 1942 when the RAF commenced recording aircraft loss and damage to separate causes, and December 1942 Bomber Command lost 305 aircraft to fighters during the day and night operations; 2.3 per cent of all sorties despatched.[5]

C 5477
A low-level aerial reconnaissance photograph of the ‘Freya’ radar installations at Auderville, taken using an F.24 side-facing oblique aerial camera. (Source: © IWM (C 5477))

It was imperative for Bomber Command to staunch the bleeding. By late August 1942 Bomber Command understood the workings of the Luftwaffe’s integrated air defence system. The initial detection of incoming bombers was performed by a chain of FuMG-80 Freya ground-based air surveillance radars. A defensive ‘belt’ known as the Kammhuber Line, named after Generalleutnant Josef Kammhuber, the head of the Luftwaffe’s XII Fliegerkorps, stretched from Kiel in northern Germany southwest past Luxembourg. Behind this line lay all of Germany’s major cities and industrial centres including Cologne, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hanover, and Stuttgart. Quite simply it was almost impossible for bombers to approach their targets without crossing this line. The line was subdivided into separate ‘boxes’ each covering 247 square miles (640 square kilometres). Within each box were two FuMG-62D Würzburg ground-controlled interception radars. One of these radars would hold the fighter in its gaze while another would search the box for a bomber. A ground controller would coordinate the interception seeing the position of the fighter and bomber on his radar screens. He would then bring these two together. Once the fighter was just short of one nautical mile/nm (1.8 kilometres/km) from the bomber, the ground controller would hand over the interception to the fighter. The crew would activate their Lichtenstein-BC airborne interception radar to locate the bomber and then press home their attack. All the while the fighter and the ground controller would remain in radio contact.[6]

The British Air Ministry issued a report in July 1942 which stated that Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) had revealed that from early 1942 the Luftwaffe’s night fighters had been using a device codenamed ‘Emil-Emil’. Little was known about this beyond the fact that it seemed to assist interceptions and may have used either radar or infrared technology to do so. Initially, this equipment appeared to be used exclusively by night fighters near Vlissingen on the Netherlands’ west coast. Further investigations revealed that by October 1942 Emil-Emil appeared to be in widespread service elsewhere in the night fighter force. Such was the discipline of Luftwaffe fighter crews and their ground controllers that the purpose of Emil-Emil was not betrayed in radio chatter.[7]

Experts from the Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE), tasked with developing and producing electronic countermeasures for the British armed forces, collected radio signals on the East Coast which revealed transmissions on a 491 megahertz/MHz frequency strongly suspected of being transmitted by Emil-Emil.[8] This information was a breakthrough, but the relationship of these transmissions to Emil-Emil had to be confirmed. The only way to do so would be to fly one of the RAF’s SIGINT gathering aircraft from No. 1474 Flight into hostile airspace where there was a high chance that enemy fighters would be encountered. The rationale was to use the aircraft for two interrelated tasks. First, entice a night fighter into an attack and then record the characteristics of any hostile radio signals it transmitted. By doing this, it would be possible to determine whether Emil-Emil was an airborne interception radar. As always in electronic warfare, once it was discerned that the enemy was using a particular type of radar in a particular way, it would be possible to devise means to jam it.

Paulton and his crew were tasked with collecting SIGINT across an area stretching from the French north coast to Frankfurt in central Germany.[9] The specifics of the mission called for the Wellington, which was equipped with a radio receiver, to lure a fighter into an interception. The aircraft would then record the radio signals transmitted by the fighter. So far No. 1474 Flight had performed 17 sorties, but none resulted in the desired interception. Finally, on the night of 2 December, the Luftwaffe would cooperate, although this would almost cost the Wellington’s crew their lives.

Against All Odds

At 04:31, two-and-a-half hours into the flight, the aircraft was northeast of the Luftwaffe airfield at Pferdsfeld in southeast Germany. Paulton set a course to fly north. As he turned Pilot Officer Harold Jordan, the aircraft’s ‘Special Operator’ tasked with the SIGINT collection, began receiving signals which seemed to match those the crew were tasked to investigate. As the Wellington flew north, the signals became stronger. Jordan warned the crew that a fighter attack was likely. As Jordan received signals, he was passing this information to wireless operator Flight Sergeant Bill Bigoray (RCAF) who coded and transmitted them back to the UK. Ten minutes later the aircraft turned west to head for home while the signals received by Jordan were getting stronger still. At that moment cannon fire from a Junkers Ju-88 fighter slammed into the Wellington. Paulton immediately put the aircraft into a violent corkscrew turn in a bid to shake off the fighter. Jordan was hit in the arm but realised that the signals he was receiving were correct with Bigoray relaying this information back to base. Despite Jordan’s injuries he continued to record the transmissions while Bigoray continued to send coded messages, having received no ‘R’ transmission from base to indicate their reception. Unbeknownst to Bigoray, they had been received at 05.05. Flight Sergeant Everitt Vachon (RCAF), the Wellington’s rear gunner, managed to fire almost 1000 rounds at the Ju-88 but his turret was hit and rendered unserviceable, with Vachon wounded in the shoulder.[10]

The Ju-88 manoeuvred for another attack. This hit Jordan in the jaw but did not stop him operating his equipment and telling Paulton from which side the next attack would occur. Along with Jordan Flight Sergeant Grant, the front turret gunner was hit, as was Bigoray who was injured in both legs as he tried to free Grant from the turret. Grant was eventually being extricated by the navigator Pilot Officer Alexander Barry (RCAF). The third attack hit Jordan again, this time in the eye. Try as he might, he could no longer operate his radio receiver. Instead, he struggled forward to find Barry to show him how to operate the receiver so that the signals collection could continue. Nonetheless, now almost blinded this proved an impossible task.[11]

While Jordan had been trying in vain to instruct Barry Vachon had managed to free himself from the rear turret. He went into the aircraft’s Astrodome to provide a running commentary on the Ju-88’s position. Vachon was hit once again, this time in the hand, and Barry took over. Throughout the engagement, those in the aircraft had been thrown around like ragdolls as Paulton’s evasive actions saw the aircraft descend from 14,000ft to a mere 500ft. The Wellington suffered twelve attacks in total; six of which may have been successful. The damage to the aircraft was extensive: The port and starboard engine throttles were jammed. The front and rear turrets were unserviceable along with the starboard ailerons and trim tabs. The starboard fuel tank was holed and the hydraulics useless, causing both engines to run erratically. The aircraft’s pitot heads were also damaged preventing the airspeed indicator showing the plane’s velocity.[12]

Despite the Wellington’s near-mortal damage Paulton managed to reach 5,000ft altitude and crossed the coast ten miles northeast of Dunkirk at 06:45. Being mistaken for a hostile aircraft was an ever-present danger when RAF planes were returning from operations over the continent. Bigoray switched the aircraft’s IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) Mk.3 transmitter to squawk that the plane was friendly and sent out a mayday message. Deciding to ditch in daylight after realising that the Wellington’s landing light was insufficient to perform a safe water landing, Paulton asked the crew if anyone wanted to bail out. Bigoray asked to do so concerned that his leg would stiffen up so much that he would be unable to leave the aircraft once it was in the water. As he was about to jump, he realised he had not secured the transmission key of his radio to prevent it accidentally retransmitting. Moving back into the fuselage and in much pain, he secured the key and jumped landing near Ramsgate on the Kent coast. Paulton finally ditched the Wellington in the channel near Walmer beach, south of Deal. Even the aircraft’s dingy, packed for such eventualities, was a casualty and despite a valiant attempt by Jordan to plug some of the holes, it was unusable. Instead, the crew climbed on top of the Wellington, being rescued by a small boat some moments later.[13]

Results

The intelligence Paulton and his crew gathered on that fateful December night had implications for the rest of the war. Their actions enabled the TRE ‘boffins’ to not only confirm that the Emil-Emil device was the Lichtenstein-BC radar but also to divine the radar’s characteristics. Once these were known it was possible to develop an Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) in the form of the Ground Grocer jammer. This was installed at Dunwich on the Suffolk coast commencing operations on 26 April 1943.[14] The jammer would blast electronic noise at the Lichtenstein-BC across a waveband of 486MHz to 501MHz. Even for Luftwaffe fighters flying 120nm (222 kilometres) distant from the transmitter could have their radar ranges reduced to 1500ft (457 metres) from their usual range of four nautical miles (eight kilometres). This forced the fighter to come closer to the bomber to detect it in darkness; greatly increasing the chances of the bomber crew hitting the fighter as it commenced its attack.[15] Nonetheless, Ground Grocer was not bereft of imperfections: It tended to work best when a fighter was flying towards the transmitter and was generally used to protect bombers on their outward and return journeys. The official record notes that by the end of June 1943 Ground Grocer had caused six of the seven cases of radar interference reported by Luftwaffe fighter crews to their ground controllers.[16]

C 5635
A Royal Air Force Avro Lancaster bomber over Essen dropping WINDOW to interfere with ground gunners during a 1000 bomber raid on the city. (Source: © IWM (C 5635))

Ground Grocer was not the only ECM developed because of the intelligence obtained by the Wellington. By gathering details on the Lichtenstein-BC’s characteristics, the TRE was able to develop several versions of Window, arguably the most famous countermeasure of the Second World War, capable of jamming this radar. Window consisted of millions of metal foil strips cut to precisely half the wavelength of the radar they were intended to jam. The TRE also developed a system known as Serrate based on the same intelligence. This was one of the RAF’s most successful electronic systems of the war. Serrate was installed on De Havilland Mosquito fighters, entering service in September 1943. It detected transmissions from the Lichtenstein-BC allowing Serrate-equipped aircraft to find and attack fighters using the radar. Serrate was employed extensively over enemy territory contributing to the 242 Luftwaffe fighters that the Mosquitoes of Bomber Command’s No. 100 Group shot down following its introduction.[17] Moreover Ground Grocer, Window and Serrate may have hastened the withdrawal of the Lichtenstein-BC which was all but phased out of service by April 1944 in favour of new radars with improved resistance to such countermeasures.[18]

The Legacy

The endeavours of Paulton and his crew were relayed to the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal who told them: ‘I have just read report of your investigation flight […] and should like to congratulate you all on a splendid performance.’[19] Their deeds were recognised with the award of a Distinguished Flying Cross for Barry and Paulton, Distinguished Service Order for Jordan and Distinguished Flying Medals for Bigoray and Vachon. It is miraculous that the Wellington returned to the UK yet the actions of Paulton and his crew helped pave the way for the development of ECMs which undoubtedly saved Bomber Command lives. Their legacy can still be seen today. Radar jammers are now standard equipment on most military aircraft venturing in harm’s way, illustrating how one sortie on a cold December night would have implications for airpower which are still felt today.

Dr Thomas Withington specialises in contemporary and historical electronic warfare, radar, and military communications, and has written numerous articles on these subjects for a range of general and specialist publications. He holds a PhD from the University of Birmingham.

Header Image: A Vickers Wellington Mark IC (R1448) of No. 218 Squadron RAF on the ground at RAF Marham, Norfolk. R1448 was presented to the RAF by the Gold Coast Fund. This was the mark of Wellington flown by No. 1474 Flight during the operation described in this article. (Source: © IWM (CH 3477))

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[1] Monthly Weather Report of the Meteorological Office, December 1942.

[2] The National Archives (TNA), AIR 50/503, No. 1474 Flight, December 1942.

[3] TNA, AIR 20/8962, War in the Ether: Europe 1939 to 1945: Radio Countermeasures in Bomber Command: An Historical Note (High Wycombe: Signals Branch, Headquarters Bomber Command, October 1945), p. 6.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945: Volume IV, Annexes and Appendices (Uckfield: Naval and Military Press, 2006), pp. 429-39.

[6] TNA, AIR 20/8962, War in the Ether, p. 9.

[7] Air Historical Branch, The Second World War 1939-1945 – Royal Air Force Signals, Volume VII: Radio Countermeasures (London: Air Ministry, 1950), p. 151.

[8] Ibid.

[9] TNA, AIR 27/1156, No.1474 Flight Operations Record Book.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Air Historical Branch, The Second World War 1939-1945, p. 153.

[15] TNA, AIR 20/8070, Glossary of Code Names and Other Terms Used in Connection with RCM; AIR 20/8070, Ground Grocer.

[16] Air Historical Branch, The Second World War 1939-1945, p. 154.

[17] M.W. Bowman and T. Cushing, Confounding the Reich: The RAF’s Secret War of Electronic Countermeasures in World War Two (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2004), pp. 235-42.

[18] Air Historical Branch, The Second World War 1939-1945, p.154.

[19] TNA, AIR 27/1156, No. 1474 Flight ORB.