#Commentary – The Shahed Lesson: When Great Powers Emulate the Underdog

By Őmer Őzkan

“These drones are originally an Iranian design. We took them back to America, made them better, and fired them right back at Iran,” said Admiral Brad Cooper, the commander of U.S. Central Command, referring to the one-way attack drones used for the first time during Operation Epic Fury under Task Force Scorpion Strike. The remark highlights an often-overlooked reality of military innovation: even the world’s most technologically advanced militaries closely observe the battlefield achievements of their adversaries. In this case, the United States has not only remained a pioneer of advanced military technologies but has also demonstrated its willingness to learn from opponents far less technologically advanced and to incorporate those lessons into its own practice.

The military technology of the Roman legions changed little during the six centuries between the conquest of Greece and the fall of Rome. This relative stability began to erode with the transformations brought about by the Industrial Revolution and was later accelerated by digitalisation and rapid technological innovation. As technological change has intensified, states have become increasingly anxious about not falling behind developments that could put them at a disadvantage relative to their adversaries. Yet adopting new technologies can also be risky. To reduce these risks, states closely observe ongoing conflicts and adopt models that appear effective.

However, recent conflicts have shown that emulation does not only occur from weaker states to stronger ones. On the contrary, the rising costs of complex military systems such as fighter jets, missiles, and rocket systems have prompted many major actors to seek alternatives.

Diffusion of One-Way-Attack Drones:

Over the past decade, drones have emerged as one such option in multiple conflicts. Despite their limited capabilities compared to manned aircraft, their relatively low cost, unmanned status, and smaller radar signature have made them attractive tools, demonstrating notable success in conflicts such as Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Syria. Yet the opening phases of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War quickly revealed the limits of large drones, which proved vulnerable to well-established air defence systems. Moreover, as the war dragged on, even their production costs and manufacturing pace came under scrutiny amid a prolonged, high-intensity conflict.

Faced with constant Russian missile barrages, Ukraine was the first to take the initiative by responding with smaller and cheaper drones. Despite attracting global attention in the early days of the war, when its Bayraktar TB2s struck advancing Russian columns, it soon lost a substantial portion of its larger drones to Russian air defence systems. Yet, Kyiv adapted quickly. By arming commercial drones and rapidly expanding domestic production, Ukraine turned smaller, mostly first-person-view drones into a critical component of its defence. The effectiveness of these systems was not only reflected in widely circulated Ukrainian social media footage showing the destruction of Russian troops and military equipment. It was also confirmed by Russia’s adoption of similar tactics, which Chavez and Swed describe as the ‘emulation of the underdog.’

After seeing the effectiveness of Ukrainian one-way attack drones, Moscow not only began developing its own variants but also sought alternatives that could be employed effectively at scale. Accordingly, Iran’s Shahed drones were procured and modified into Russia’s own variant, known as the Geran. While Russia’s procurement of the Geran can partly be explained by its limited production capabilities and the rising costs associated with the unexpectedly prolonged war, the decision to introduce these systems was also closely connected to Moscow’s first-hand experience of the damage inflicted by Ukrainian attacks.

Emulating the Underdog

Today, a similar pattern is emerging in the Middle East. In response to the strategic and complex airstrikes conducted by Israeli and U.S. air forces since early 2024, Iran has relied on mass missile and drone attacks. As part of these largely indiscriminate strikes, Tehran’s strategy has not been to match these operations by targeting equivalent strategic objectives, but rather to overwhelm the air defence inventories of Israel and the United States and inflict enough damage to generate political pressure on their administrations.

Accordingly, before the operation, the United States deployed additional assets to the region to counter this threat, implicitly acknowledging the operational usefulness of such drones. However, this dynamic deepened when Washington announced that it had reverse-engineered these one-way attack drones and operationalised them during Operation Epic Fury. Finally, on the fifth day of the campaign, President Trump, referring to Ukraine’s experience against Shahed systems and the damage they have inflicted in this conflict, stated that the United States would “take any assistance from any country,” illustrating once more how even a more capable military power may benefit from the battlefield experience of states that have already confronted such threats.

The emulation and adaptation of the Iranian Shahed drones is neither the first nor the last time that a state has adopted a successful model developed elsewhere. However, it is relatively rare to see a superior power emulate the practices of a weaker actor. In the end, even great powers such as the United States remain rational actors seeking the most effective outcome. The ability of such a capable air force to adapt to emerging threats demonstrates the U.S. military leadership’s responsiveness and its close attention to evolving patterns of warfare. More importantly, it reminds us that in the never-ending technological competition for aerial dominance, the best solution is not always the most complex one. Sometimes the simplest answer proves the most effective.

Ömer Ergün Özkan is a PhD candidate in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Cincinnati. His research examines military effectiveness, the impact of emerging technologies on defence procurement, and the strategic use of unmanned systems in modern warfare. He is also a Research Fellow at the Linda Hall Library in Kansas City, Missouri. He can be followed on X as @ErgnZkan.

Header image: The remains of a Russian Geran-2(Shahed) drone, found in the Vinnytsia region of Ukraine in March 2024. (Source: Wikimedia)