By Major Darren Johnson

During the Second World War, the United States (US) achieved success on the battlefield, largely due to its effective coordination of air and ground forces. The integration of these elements did not come easily; personality conflicts, misinterpretation of doctrine, and a lack of joint training opportunities had hindered innovation during the interwar period and the early stages of the war. After initial setbacks following Operation TORCH in November 1942, US air and ground commanders and staffs utilised pre-existing doctrine and developed a force structure, in conjunction with Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF), that not only won the campaign in North Africa by May 1943 but also set the conditions for continued success in mainland Europe. This article argues that pre-existing air-ground coordination doctrine, developed in the interwar period, tested in training, and implemented in the latter stages of the North Africa campaign, sufficiently provided support to ground forces and achieved air superiority by degrading deep targets.

The Interwar Period and the Development of Air Doctrine

During the First World War, the United States Army Air Service (USAAS) supported the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France by destroying German aircraft, interdicting enemy rear areas through strafing and bombing, observing enemy movements, and performing other supporting missions. Aerial warfare proved to be immensely valuable in achieving results on the battlefield at the tactical and operational levels of war. It demonstrated its potential to influence war at the strategic level. German, British, and French air forces conducted ‘terror’ bombings to demoralise the home front and disrupt war production in World War I. However, at the conclusion of the First World War, the role of the USAAS in future conflicts was ill-defined. Advocates for an independent air force, seeking equal status with the US Army and US Navy, argued that strategic bombardment, not direct support of ground forces, should be the primary mission of the US Army Air Corps (USAAC). The USAAC was formed in 1926 by renaming the USAAS and given greater autonomy than its predecessor.

The Italian officer Giulio Douhet, who had commanded an air unit in 1915, was an air-war visionary who advocated a more expansive and independent role for the air arm. Military theorists like Douhet were the inspiration behind the creation of an independent American air force focused on strategic bombardment.^[2] Notably, in 1921, Douhet published The Command of the Air, which advocated for independent air forces ‘capable of launching powerful offensives on land and sea.’^[3] A key principle for an independent air force was the ability to concentrate its forces to ‘inflict the greatest damage in the shortest possible time.’^[4] Officers attending the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) at Maxwell Field, Alabama, for their professional military education (PME), along with their regular academic courses and practical exercises, discussed theories on strategic bombardment against adversaries’ economic and industrial bases to achieve strategic success. Air power enthusiasts believed that strategic bombing could deliver decisive blows, eliminating the need for another bloody struggle on land and effectively win the war through air power alone.^[5]

Based on their experiences during the First World War, interwar German air power theorists recognised the potential of strategic bombing and developed doctrine to enhance their air arm’s capabilities. The Germans, having ignored the restrictions in the Treaty of Versailles by building the Luftwaffe in 1933, ’envisioned the use of bomber fleets against an enemy’s air force, industry, communications, and supply systems.’^[6] However, the Germans also recognised that close air support (CAS), albeit a secondary mission, is vital to ground campaigns. Covertly, the Germans developed a CAS doctrine that included ‘the use of air liaison officers, recognition signals, and communication channels,’ which proved effective in their campaigns in Poland, France, and the Soviet Union between 1939-1941.^[7] The Luftwaffe also gained significant combat experience during the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s.

Similarly, the British recognised the value of CAS; however, many of the lessons they drew from the First World War focused on its downsides, given the immense losses of pilots and aircraft in conducting those missions. Additionally, British military budgets in the interwar period were strained, and attention within the RAF remained focused on fighter aircraft for air-to-air missions rather than on a dedicated ground-support mission.[8] The British recognised the positive morale effect that CAS missions had on friendly troops but considered their use only under ‘certain and rare circumstances.’^[9] However, the cooperation and liaison between RAF officers and ground commanders conducting operations in India and Palestine in the 1930s indicated potential successful use on a larger scale, even against a well-trained adversary.^[10] It is, however, important to note that nations interpreted lessons from the interwar period differently. National will, economic constraints, and a nation’s political climate influenced how modern technology was incorporated into its doctrine before the Second World War.

The German invasion of Poland in September 1939 provided American and British analysts with examples of effective CAS of ground forces at the decisive point of a battle. However, challenges remained for the Germans in coordinating between air and ground commanders and planners. For example, German CAS was often pre-coordinated to support the advance of ground forces, and there was limited communication between air and ground elements, which contributed to incidents of fratricide. Nevertheless, German efforts in Poland and subsequent campaigns in Western Europe indicated that the Americans and British were inferior to the Germans in providing effective CAS.^[11]

In the US, the concept of strategic bombing also raised questions about aircraft commanders’ authority in combat. To achieve the greatest effect in strategic bombing, theorists believed bombers should be centralised and concentrated under a single air commander. In 1940, this led the Army to publish the Air Corps Field Manual (FM) 1-10 Tactics and Technique of Air Attack, which outlined how commanders and forces would conduct air attacks, with special reference to command authority, bombardment, and planning. FM 1-10 also outlined the differences in air missions and how air superiority was achieved through strategic bombing, interdiction, and close support for ground forces. Specifically, regarding tactical air power, FM 1-10 emphasised that ‘temporary decentralization of control of combat aviation in direct support of armoured forces may be necessary in order to ensure the timely employment of aviation in close coordination with the supported forces for the accomplishment of a specific task.’^[12]

Nonetheless, ground commanders continued to view aircraft as an enabler in the combined arms team, much like an engineer or artillery asset that’s assigned to support a specific mission.^[13] The key outgrowth of this viewpoint was that ground force commanders should have tactical control of the aircraft. Ground force commanders feared that, if left concentrated under a single air commander, aviation assets would be delayed or unable to provide timely CAS. Ground commanders’ anxiety about delays in CAS was heightened during large-scale manoeuvre training in the Spring of 1942.[14] Conversely, airmen argued that without concentrating air assets, the USAACs would not achieve air superiority, resulting in further air and ground losses.^[15] Additionally, with increased demand for aviation units, fewer were available to participate in air-to-ground training manoeuvres. Moreover, air and ground commanders needed opportunities to train as combined arms teams to alleviate tension and solidify the newly developed doctrine through practical application.^[16]

Testing the Doctrine

In September 1941, the US Army Ground Forces (AGF) organised the Louisiana Maneuvers, led by its Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Lesley McNair. The Louisiana Maneuvers were a multi-week training exercise pitting the US Second Army against the US Third Army to test Army doctrine on a large scale.^[17] The manoeuvres recreated battlefield conditions to prepare leaders and units for combined-arms warfare by bridging the gap between doctrine and practice in large-scale training.^[18] Hundreds of aircraft ranging from medium and light bombers to US Navy dive bombers and fighters participated in the manoeuvres, demonstrating their capabilities to senior army commanders. Participating aircraft were evenly distributed between the two forces and organised under the Air Support Command (ASC). Air assets were centralised under the ASC for the exercise but remained available to support ground commanders’ missions, which was a doctrinal compromise specific to the Louisiana Maneuvers. The ASC focused heavily on achieving air superiority and conducting interdiction operations before the ground elements engaged each other, which aligned with the US Army Air Forces (USAAF) concept of employment in combat. The USAAF had been formed in 1941 and superseded the USSAC. It was one of three autonomous components of the US Army, each with its own chief of staff.

The Louisiana Maneuvers provided ground commanders with a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of aircraft at both tactical and operational levels of war. While air forces demonstrated their ability to attack fixed targets such as airfields, bridges, and key intersections, communication between air and ground elements remained difficult.[19] Additionally, due to communication delays, CAS requests took an average of 90 minutes to execute. The subsequent Carolina Maneuvers in November 1941 remedied this delay by implementing a ‘combat air support unit’ tasked with immediately responding to ground support requests.^[20] However, despite some successes in the Louisiana Maneuvers, conflict persisted between air and ground commanders over the lower priority of CAS missions relative to air superiority and interdiction.^[21]

The AGF had organised the Carolina Manoeuvres to test US Army armour and anti-tank doctrine. From an air power perspective, these manoeuvres differed from the Louisiana Maneuvers in that they created an imbalance of air assets, with IV Corps fighting against First Army, simulating the German assault across Europe from 1939 to 1941. As with the Louisiana Maneuvers, the ASC managed CAS requests; however, the preponderance of air missions still focused on gaining and maintaining air superiority and interdiction operations, thereby validating already published doctrine on the priority of air missions to isolate the battlefield in support of ground forces.^[22] Of the 167 raids flown by the 1^st and 3^rd ASCs, 99 went against aerodromes, railroads, and bridges, 37 against armoured and mechanised units and 31 against miscellaneous targets. As FM 1-10 stated, ‘the mission of first priority of combat aviation in support of ground force units is, whenever possible, the destruction or neutralization of effective hostile air resistance.’^[23] In an ideal environment, combat aviation eliminated hostile air threats before ground forces entered the battlefield. FM 1-10 provided for the use of combat aviation for CAS missions when ‘the operation is critical and the end to be accomplished warrants the acceptance of the risk of heavy losses in the friendly aviation forces.’^[24] The Carolina Maneuvers also demonstrated the potential of combat aviation to ‘set conditions’ before ground forces enter the battlefield by destroying hostile aircraft and disrupting sustainment efforts. While the issue of aircraft control persisted, advances in air-ground integration during the manoeuvres underscored combat aviation’s vital role within the combined-arms team in shaping the battlefield.

Another significant output from both manoeuvres was the publication of FM 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, which refined guidance on how combat aviation could support ground forces. As with FM 1-10, FM 100-5 Operations, and FM 100-15 Larger Units, FM 31-35 emphasised the need for close coordination and liaison between air and ground commanders during the planning and execution phases of operations. Likewise, the updated doctrine, while acknowledging the benefits of increased firepower and improved soldier morale from CAS, emphasised that combat aviation should not engage targets within the effective range of artillery or mortars.^[25] FM 31-35 exempted armour and mechanised forces that outpaced their organic or attached artillery or mortars, which required urgent CAS to maintain the initiative on the battlefield.^[26] FM 31-35 also codified the use of observation aircraft to support artillery missions and for area and route reconnaissance by all ground forces. During the Louisiana Maneuvers, pilots directed artillery fire and conducted reconnaissance missions in light aircraft to support the Third Army. This proved so successful in support of Third Army’s mission that the umpires of the exercise banned its use, as it gave an ‘unfair advantage to Third Army.’^[27] The use of observation aircraft magnified a unit’s ability to adjust fire and observe the enemy’s composition and disposition on the battlefield.^[28] Indeed, in North Africa, ‘air observation posts proved their value by their ability to bring the far side of hill masses, hidden to ground observation posts, under observed fire […] the German artillery did not fire as long as one of the (45th) division’s L-4s (observation aircraft) was in the air.’[29] Furthermore, FM 31-35 highlighted the issue of communication between support aircraft and ground units. Significantly, however, the highly secret and sensitive manual failed to detail specific methods for marking friendly or enemy units – much as the wider issue of incorporating unproven doctrine remained throughout the war.

The British experience of coordinating CAS during fighting in France and Africa since 1940 provided the Americans with applicable lessons. As with their USAAF counterparts, the British believed that achieving air superiority was the RAF’s priority and a precondition for conducting CAS, particularly in support of armoured or mechanised formations.^[30] The RAF viewed CAS as a tool to support ground forces beyond artillery range, enabling them to defeat hostile forces when organic means were unavailable.^[31] Indeed, Lieutenant Colonel J.D.  Woodhall, one of the key figures in the development of British tactical air power after the Fall of France, wrote on September 3, 1940, that ‘in recent operations the Germans have employed air bombardment most effectively in co-operation with their army to sustain the impetus of advance of almost all types of formation and especially that of their armoured units.’[32]

RAF leaders, however, recognised the limitations of CAS as a reliable method of aiding the ground fight. The aircraft’s speed, the lack of effective communication between air and ground elements, and limited means for differentiating friendly from enemy forces often contributed to inaccuracies in CAS and incidents of fratricide on the battlefield.^[33] For example, during the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, the Luftwaffe provided CAS for advancing ground forces. Still, it relied upon Nazi flags draped across German vehicles to prevent incidents of fratricide.^[34] While there were instances of German innovations in air-to-ground coordination in Poland, it remained primitive. The inability to communicate effectively between air and ground forces negatively affected the Germans’ missions. Similarly, within the RAF, debate raged over which level of command would be delegated for CAS missions.^[35]

In October 1940, the RAF conducted an inter-service training exercise with ground and air personnel in Northern Ireland. The training scenario replicated the ideal British response to a German amphibious invasion of a British beach. The scope of the exercise focused on three challenges British commanders foresaw in conducting CAS for ground forces: first, the tactical employment of bombers in CAS for small forces; second, requesting CAS missions; and third, fighter cover or escort for bombers conducting CAS.^[36] After the exercise, the RAF and British Army identified communication between elements as a particular challenge, especially in a rapidly changing, dynamic combat environment. To ensure effective targeting of enemy forces, wireless communication between aircraft, ground forces, and command nodes had to be maintained. Additionally, the British recognised the value of attaching air reconnaissance squadrons to armoured formations to enhance situational awareness within units and battlefield effectiveness.^[37]

Another lesson with their Allied partners, once the United States entered the war, was the importance of close coordination between air and ground forces. The use of liaison officers at division-level echelons and above proved essential to the RAF’s successful CAS missions against Axis forces in Egypt and Libya in 1941. Furthermore, the RAF employed a system of ‘tentacles’ or forward control teams to maintain connectivity between air and ground forces via wireless communications.^[38] This system, which the British established, remained in place throughout the war. The concept of liaison personnel embedded in inter-service command posts was already in FM 31-35, confirming their effectiveness outside the training environment. The use of mobile forward control teams to manage the CAS fight was a novel idea for the Americans that gained traction in North Africa. The use of liaison officers provided significant value for the gaining command, and the forward control teams were the vital connection between air and ground forces.

Operation TORCH and the North Africa Campaign

Despite some experience in manoeuvres and benefits from British training and conceptual development, American forces entered the Second World War with an unproven doctrine of air-ground integration. Germany declared war on the US on 11 December 1941, four days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Once British and American leaders adopted a ‘Germany First’ strategy at the ARCADIA Conference in Washington, D.C., they postponed a cross-channel invasion of northwest Europe in favour of an Allied attack on the periphery of occupied Europe in northwest Africa.

Planning for TORCH envisaged an amphibious landing of over 100,000 Allied soldiers establishing a lodgement inland, seizing ports and aerodromes, consolidating forces, and eventually moving east into the rear area of Axis forces in Tunisia. Before the invasion, Allied heavy bombers carried out raids against Axis supply lines and facilities in Italy and Sicily while medium bombers interdicted Axis shipping in the Sicilian Strait.^[39] The air elements for TORCH consisted of two air forces: the American Twelfth Air Force, supporting the Western and Centre Task Forces (the US Fifth Army) landing at Casablanca and Oran, and the RAF Eastern Air Command supporting the Eastern Task Force (the British First Army) landing at Algiers. Initial air support for the Allied soldiers landing in North Africa came from carrier-based fighters; the Twelfth Air Force and Eastern Air Command relieved naval aviation once aerodromes were seized by ground forces.^[40] However, before TORCH, Allied leaders were unsure if the Vichy French forces would resist the invasion in French Morocco and Algeria. In addition, there were questions about whether Spain would remain neutral or join the fighting against the Allies alongside Axis forces.

Lieutenant General Dwight Eisenhower, serving as the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Mediterranean Theatre, envisioned the Twelfth Air Force conducting strategic and tactical missions, including CAS and the bombing of Axis shipping, ports, communication centres, and airfields beyond the horizon. Eisenhower believed the USAAF should centralise its air assets to target theatre-level threats and opposed distributing these assets to corps and division commanders.^[41] Further complicating the USAAF’s role during the North African invasion were the planned geographically separated landings. The Twelfth Air Force and Eastern Air Command could not support or coordinate their efforts to achieve air superiority.

On 8 November 1942, TORCH commenced with amphibious landings near Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. With the support of naval gunfire and carrier-based aircraft, Allied ground forces advanced inland and established secure lodgements beyond the beachhead. The Vichy French resistance was sporadic yet stubborn across multiple Allied landing sites. However, on 10 November, Eisenhower secured peace with Vichy French Admiral François Darlan, relegating Axis forces to positions in Tunisia, between predominantly American ground forces from the west and British ground forces from the east. In response, Germany occupied Vichy France.

As Allied forces advanced eastward towards Tunisia, they encountered stiff resistance from German Stuka dive-bombers, fighters, and medium bombers based at aerodromes near the front line and on Sicily, Sardinia, and the Italian mainland. To compound the problem, Allied fighter aerodromes were located more than 100 miles from the front lines, and bomber aerodromes more than 600 miles away, severely limiting Allied dwell time in support of ground forces. Due to the Allied air forces’ initial failure to achieve air superiority and interdict Axis lines of communication, the Germans were able to reinforce their African forces, unimpeded, with up to 1,000 soldiers and shiploads of equipment each day after TORCH.^[42] Allied ground force commanders pleaded for aircraft to provide air cover for their ground operations against German aircraft.^[43] For example, a member of the US 1st Armoured Division described how ‘the Germans can call for air support with only three rounds of smoke, and when they do, the Stukas are over immediately.’^[44] His experience was representative of many Americans throughout the North Africa campaign.

Soldiers and leaders on the ground expected air cover to protect them from the repeated German air attacks. Hearing of attacks on Axis harbours or aerodromes, essentially ’deep targets’ did little to boost the morale of the average soldier.^[45] Major General Terry Allen, the commander of the US 1^st Infantry Division, advocated for a division-level air advisor to expedite CAS requests.[46] Brigadier General  Paul Robinett, commander of Combat Command B of the 1st Armoured Division, insisted, ‘that men cannot stand the mental and physical strain of constant aerial bombing without feeling that all possible is being done to beat enemy air efforts.’^[47] The incessant calls for air cover by ground commanders were granted, despite the need to establish air superiority against Axis forces.

Requests for air cover or CAS were prioritised over air-superiority missions, despite objections from RAF and USAAF leaders and the violation of both Allied air forces’ doctrines.^[48] The Luftwaffe maintained air superiority during the opening weeks of the North Africa campaign due to the proximity of its aerodromes to ground forces, its experience in CAS, and Allied mismanagement of aerial assets.^[49]

Part of the problem was the limited number of aircraft available to provide defensive air cover for ground forces while simultaneously seeking air superiority. After months of the ineffective use of CAS, including the tactical setback at Kasserine Pass, which resulted in aircraft losses from enemy and friendly fire, Eisenhower was convinced that the theatre air plan was insufficient.^[50] Indeed, the Battle of the Kasserine Pass was a low point for the Allies, especially American forces, in North Africa, as German forces advanced against inexperienced US troops and pushed them back more than 50 miles from their original positions. Allied reinforcements and air support, though ill-coordinated and delayed, attacked the overextended Germans, forcing them to withdraw. However, Allied inefficiencies in CAS, their inability to achieve air superiority, and significant coordination challenges necessitated a reorganisation of the Allied air forces in North Africa.^[51] This led Eisenhower to conclude that placing air elements under a centralised air commander could resolve the issues the Allies were facing in the theatre. At Kasserine, air reconnaissance provided little help to forward ground units; bombing missions were untimely; and CAS was in short supply. The deviation from interwar air-to-ground coordination doctrine resulted in the American inability to coordinate their air efforts during the first four months of the North African campaign. The subsequent organisational change, which reflected American interwar doctrine and the RAF’s utilisation, paid immediate dividends in North Africa, resulting in a more effective application of air-to-ground coordination and CAS for ground forces.

On 18 February 1943, following the Casablanca Conference, which saw the American President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, along with their staffs, solidify Allied strategy for the remainder of 1943, the Northwest African Air Force (NAAF) was formed under Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz. The formation of NAAF centralised control of aircraft from the Twelfth Air Force and the Eastern Air Command under one theatre air commander.^[52] The Twelfth Air Force remained an administrative headquarters commanded by Spaatz. This organisational change reflected the doctrinal developments during the interwar period and experiences of both the American and British air forces before the North Africa campaign. The lessons the USAAF learned were Allied ones, given the joint nature of the Allied command structure during the war. NAAF consisted of seven subordinate units, each with a unique task to support theatre operations: the Tactical Air Force, Strategic Air Force, Coastal Air Force, Photographic Reconnaissance Wing, Troop Carrier Command, Training Command, and Service Command.^[53] Brigadier General Laurence Kuter, deputy commander of the Northwest African Tactical Air Forces (NATAF), wrote that in the previous structure, aircraft ‘were employed in direct support roles to the neglect of the proper offensive task of obtaining air superiority and thus assisting the theatre task as a whole. Each commander agreed that superiority in the air was necessary, but that someone else’s air force should fight the air war which could gain that superiority.^[54] The establishment of NAAF facilitated better coordination and unity of effort in allocating the appropriate number of aircraft for both strategic- and tactical-level targeting.

Under the new organisation, air commanders received co-equal status with ground commanders, ensuring that the limited number of aircraft was used efficiently in line with the prescribed doctrine and battlefield conditions.^[55] Moreover, in a letter from Major General Carl Spaatz to Lieutenant General Hap Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces, he wrote, ‘Air support of the ground forces on the other hand, cannot be made effective in the face of air supremacy, superiority and under certain conditions, even parity on the part of the enemy’s air forces. It follows from this that for the army to advance, the air battle must be won first […] Since air formations can move freely in the air without regard to terrain, it is evident from the above that the control of the air units must be centralised’ and cannot be divided into small packets among several armies or corps.’[56]

Leading NATAF was British Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, who was instrumental in developing the British forward air control parties in 1941. Opposing the employment of tactical aircraft in defensive air-cover missions, Coningham advocated the offensive pursuit of the enemy’s air force and bases, similar to the way the RAF employed its aviators against German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s forces in Libya.^[57] Coningham’s ideas on tactical-level air support were not new to the British contingent of officers on the NATAF staff, but they were for the American ones. As expected, ground commanders bristled at CAS being relegated to a secondary role in favour of air-superiority missions. Major General Omar Bradley, serving as the Deputy Commander of the American II Corps under General Lloyd Fredendall at the time, stated regarding CAS, ‘by the time our request for air support goes through channels the target’s gone, or the Stukas have come instead.’[58] To ease their concerns, Coningham distributed a pamphlet endorsed by British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery that advanced the British principle of concentrated air power. Highlighting the battle-winning factor of concentrated air power, the pamphlet read that ‘nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resources into small packets placed under command of army formation commanders, with each packet working on its own plan.’^[59] Coningham also received support from Eisenhower and Field Marshal Harold Alexander, the senior British army commander in North Africa, for the priority he placed on air superiority, despite continued complaints by Allied commanders for the lack of close air support aircraft. With the Kasserine Pass debacle behind them, the Allies began their counteroffensive against Axis forces with renewed vigour.

Central to Allied success in air-to-ground integration was inter-service and inter-Allied coordination. Coningham and Alexander, commander of the Allied 18^th Army Group, met daily to ensure that the air and land plans were synchronised to achieve a general victory on the battlefield.^[60] Concentrating air elements enabled greater flexibility to support prioritised ground forces while simultaneously fighting to gain air superiority. Eisenhower understood ground commanders’ demand for immediate air support but also recognised the far-reaching impact of air power beyond the tactical ground fight. Ground commanders’ vision was limited to their immediate operational area, preventing them from recognising the theatre’s needs.^[61] Improved communication between air and ground forces remained a critical need for the Allies as well. Spaatz encouraged increasing the number of air support parties assigned to ground forces to support CAS missions. Air support parties used radio communication with pilots, but its unreliability necessitated communication redundancy through landmarks, ground smoke, or coloured panels.^[62]

Despite operational setbacks and continued tension regarding the allocation of close support aircraft, the Allies achieved positive results by concentrating their strategic and tactical air formations in defeating the Axis forces in the air, interdicting Axis lines of communication between Tunisia and sustainment centres in Sicily, Sardinia, and mainland Italy, and through CAS, which enabled ground forces to isolate the increasingly tenuous Axis position on the continent.^[63] In late April 1943, the Allies successfully targeted German aerodromes at night and destroyed ‘129 Axis planes, including 72 out of 100 enemy transports. On 22 April, the Tactical Air Force destroyed 20 ME-323 6-engine transports carrying the equivalent of a regiment into Tunisia.’[64] The Allies’ greater focus on applying published doctrinal principles of airpower in North Africa enabled them to achieve air superiority and greater freedom of movement for the ground forces. NATAF aircraft conducted 1,500 sorties over ten days in the Medjerda Valley and other Axis strongholds to support the advance of Allied ground forces in their final push towards Bizerte and Tunis.^[65] The Allies achieved air superiority by early May, enabling the Allied breakthrough towards Tunis, which eventually fell on 13 May 1943, setting the stage for subsequent Allied operations in Sicily and mainland Europe.

Conclusion

The reorganisation of the Allied air forces in North Africa did not solve every problem in air-to-ground coordination during the Second World War. However, it established the path forward for the air component within the combined-arms team. In July 1943, during the height of the fighting in Sicily, the War Department published FM 100-20, ‘Command and Employment of Air Power.’ Identified as the USAAF ‘declaration of independence’ from ground forces, FM 100-20 harnessed the lessons from North Africa and directly influenced how the war was fought in Sicily and mainland Europe.^[66] FM 100-20 emphasised the primary role of the USAAF was to establish air superiority before interdicting enemy movement in rear areas and CAS for the ground component. The document codified command authority for aircraft in theatre, outlined their role as members of the combined arms team, and advocated increased interoperability with ground forces through liaison and training exercises.^[67]

As a result of the experience in North Africa, the USAAF’s role as part of the combined-arms team was solidified, and the air-ground doctrine written before the United States entered the war was validated.^[68] Indeed, tactical air forces are a theatre resource to serve at the behest of the theatre commander, not any one specific ground element. Major General Karl Truesdell, the Commandant of the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) at Fort Leavenworth, KS, wrote to Spaatz in March 1943 to inquire about the advancements in air-ground integration. Spaatz replied that, ‘until air supremacy has been established the commander of the Tactical Air Force may refuse any but the most urgent targets to concentrate his effort on the enemy aerodromes and installations necessary to secure air supremacy.’^[69] As a result of Spaatz’s letter and overall air-to-ground experiences in North Africa, students at CGSS in 1943 and after received more lessons on USAAF doctrine and its practical application than their predecessors, which proved essential for the success of planning and coordinating combined arms fighting on a massive scale in the European Theatre of Operations until the end of the war.

Major Darren Johnson is a US Army infantry officer currently serving as a Brigade Executive Officer in the 11^th Airborne Division. He’s previously served as a platoon leader, company commander, and instructor of military history at the United States Military Academy at West Point.

Header image: Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Air Command (left), in conference with Major General Carl Spaatz, Commander of the North-West African Air Forces, at Tedder’s Headquarters in Algiers, 1943. (Source: IWM (CNA 181))

[1] Peter R. Faber, ‘Interwar US Army Aviation and the Air Corps Tactical School: Incubators of American Airpower’ in Phillip Meilinger (ed.), The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (USAF. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997), p. 213.

[2] Kent Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team Including Organic Light Aviation. History of the Army Ground Forces Study No. 35 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948), p. 1.

[3] Guilio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2019), p. 49.

[4] Ibid., p. 47.

[5] Edgar Raines Jr., Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2000), p. 17.

[6] Richard Muller, ‘Close Air Support: The German, British, and American Experiences, 1918-1941,’ in Williamson Murray and Alan Millett (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 160.

[7] Ibid., p. 157.

[8] Ibid., pp. 164-5.

[9] Ibid., p. 165.

[10] Ibid., p. 171.

[11] Ibid., p. 181.

[12] FM 1-10 Air Corps Field Manual: Tactics and Techniques of Air Attack (Washington D.C.: War Department, 1942), p. 118.

[13] Christopher Rein, Forging the Ninth Army-XXIX TAC Team: The Development, Training, and Application of American Air-Ground Doctrine in World War II (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2019), p. 15.

[14] Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team, p. 7.

[15] Ibid., pp. 15-6.

[16] FM 1-10 Tactics and Techniques of Air Attack, p. 119.

[17] Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team, p. 88. McNair later became the Commanding General of the AGF after the War Department’s reorganization in March of 1942. Tragically, McNair was killed while observing close support bombing during the breakout from Normandy in July 1944.

[18] Christopher Gabel, ‘The 1941 Maneuvers: What did they Really Accomplish?’ Army History 14 (1990), p. 5.

[19] Rein, Forging the Ninth Army-XXIX TAC Team, p. 36.

[20] Ibid., p. 37.

[21] Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team, pp. 17-8.

[22] Rein, Forging the Ninth Army-XXIX TAC Team, pp. 39-40.

[23] FM 1-10 Tactics and Techniques of Air Attack, p. 115.

[24] Ibid., p. 116.

[25] FM 31-35 Basic Field Manual: Aviation in Support of Ground Forces (Washington D.C.: War Department, 1942), p. 10.

[26] Ibid., pp. 26-27.

[27] Raines Jr., Eyes of Artillery, p. 51.

[28] FM 31-35 Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, p. 26.

[29] Raines Jr, Eyes of Artillery, p. 162.

[30] Wann Woodall, Experimental Training in Close Support Bombing (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School, 1941), p. 14.

[31] Ibid., pp. 14, 19.

[32] Ibid., p. 19.

[33] Ibid., p. 20.

[34] Williamson Murray, ‘May 1940: Contingency and fragility of the German RMA’ in Macgregor Knox, and Williamson Murray (eds.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 163.

[35] Woodall, Experimental Training in Close Support Bombing, p. 43.

[36] Ibid., p. 47.

[37] Ibid., p. 55

[38] Rein, Forging the Ninth Army-XXIX TAC Team, pp. 18-19.

[39] CMH Publication 100-6, To Bizerte with the II Corps (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990), p. 3.

[40] Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Historical Division, Air Phase of the North African invasion, November 1942 (U.S. Air Force Historical Study, 1944), pp. 19-20.

[41] Daniel Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support, North Africa (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1987), pp. 52-3.

[42] Ibid., 2.

[43] Matthew St. Clair, ‘Operation Husky and the Invasion of Sicily’: The Twelfth US Air Force: Tactical and Operational Innovations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 1943–1944, (Air University Press, 2007), p. 9.

[44] G-3 Training Section. Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia (Allied Force Headquarters, 1943), pp. 62-3.

[45] Thomas Mayock, AAF Historical Office, Headquarters, Army Air Forces. Twelfth Air Force in the North African winter campaign, 11 November 1942 to the reorganization of 18 February 1943, (U.S. Air Force Historical Study, 1946), p. 44.

[46] Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, p. 61.

[47] Ibid., p. 61.

[48] Ibid., p. 61.

[49] St Clair, Operation Husky and the Invasion of Sicily, p. 9.

[50] Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, pp. 70-2.

[51] Ibid., pp. 59, 62.

[52] St Clair, Operation Husky and the Invasion of Sicily, pp. 11-12.

[53] Karl Truesdell, ‘Northwest African Air Forces’ (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School, 1943), pp. 1-2.

[54] Laurence Kuter, ‘Northwest African Tactical Air Forces: Organization of American Air Forces’ (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 1945), p. 2.

[55] St Clair, Operation Husky and the Invasion of Sicily, pp. 12-3.

[56] Ibid., p. 13.

[57] Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, p. 72.

[58] Muller, Close Air Support, p. 187.

[59] Ibid., p. 76.

[60] Ibid., p. 83.

[61] Ibid., p. 84.

[62] Ibid., p. 85.

[63] Robert Ehlers Jr., The Mediterranean Air War: Airpower and Allied Victory in World War II (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015), p. 285.

[64] CMH Publication 100-6, To Bizerte with the II Corps, p. 3.

[65] Ibid., pp. 4, 28, 40.

[66] St. Clair, Operation Husky and the Invasion of Sicily, p. 13.

[67] FM 100-20 Field Service Regulations: Command and Employment of Air Power (Washington D.C.: War Department, 1943), pp. 15-6.

[68] Kuter, ‘Northwest African Tactical Air Forces,’ p. 9.

[69] Truesdell, ‘Northwest African Air Forces,’ p. 9.